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INTRODUCrION

Legal change-like organic evolution-can occur at varying paces.1
Long periods of gradual evolution are sometimes punctuated by brief
moments of rapid, irregular change. Recent developments in class action
practice bear witness to this phenomenon: during the 1990s, evolution
has given way to mutation. At least with respect to mass torts, the development of the class action had been slow and halting. Well into the
1980s, federal courts uniformly resisted attempts to certify such mass tort
class actions, largely out of concern that the interests of the individual
litigant would be submerged within any large-scale proceeding.2 By the
1. Modem evolutionary theory sees evolution as characterized by "punctuated
equilibria": long periods of stasis interrupted by events causing rapid change. See Niles
Eldredge & Stephen J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic
Gradualism, in Models In Paleobiology 82, 82-115 (Thomas J.M. Schopf ed., 1972);
Stephen J. Gould, The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History 179-85
(1980).
2. See Steve Baughman, Note, Class Actions in the Asbestos Context Balancing the
Due Process Considerations Implicated by the Right to Opt Out, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 211,
212-13 (1991) (discussing cases). For a fuller discussion of the case law up to the 1990s,
see infra text accompanying notes 37-51. Today, however, federal courts appear to be
moving from hostility to receptivity, at least with regard to proposed settlements of mass
tort class actions. For examples of recent decisions in which courts have certified a mass
tort class action for personal injuries, see Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cv526, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11062, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995) (approving settlement of asbestosrelated claims under Rule 23(b) (1) (B)); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., "Albuterol"
Prods. Liab. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995) (denying motion to decertify Rule
23(b) (3) nationwide personal injury class action for drug contamination with unknown
effects); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) (certifying Rule
23(b) (3) nationwide class action for tobacco-related illnesses); In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 1, 1994) (certifying class of breast implant recipients); Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (approving settlement of asbestos class action); In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 911 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (certifying class of
beneficiaries of asbestos settlement trust pursuant to Rule 23(b) (1) (B)), vacated on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1993). The leading decisions upholding personal injury mass tort class actions when the
class members were exposed and/or injured at widely varying times and under widely
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end of the 1980s, however, the tide began to turn in favor of class certification, as the advocates of aggregative techniques increasingly gained the
upper hand over the defenders of individual litigant autonomy. Already,
some have described this transition as a paradigm shift, signaling a fundamental movement away from the traditional bipolar organization of litiga3
tion to a new, more collectivized structure.
While acknowledging this transition, others have expressed normative reservations about it. 4 Their concerns have focused largely on "process values": in particular, whether the shift from an intellectual rationale
based on "individual rights" to one focused on "group interests" abandons the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court."5 So framed, the debate may seem to pose the usual
varying circumstances are In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 959 (1989), and In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 163-67 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). Nonetheless, federal courts remain largely
unreceptive to mass tort class actions that are not presented to them as pre-arranged
settlements in the form of "settlement classes." Attempts to certify a mass tort class action
over the objections of defendants still regularly fail. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,
51 F.Sd 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting mandamus and reversing certification of
nationwide class action of hemophiliacs infected by the AIDS virus); Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d at 721 (modifying district court's certification of asbestos litigation
trust claimants); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting mandamus
and reversing certification of class of individuals exposed to asbestos); Kurczi v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 160 F.R.D. 667 (E.D. Ohio 1995) (declining to certify class composed of women
exposed to DES).
As a definitional matter, personal injury mass tort class actions need to be
distinguished from property damage class actions. The latter have been more frequently
certified and inherently tend to involve both greater homogeneity among class members
and greater commonality in their factual issues. See, e.g., Central Wesleyan College v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628 (D.S.C. 1992) (conditionally certifying class of some 480
potential class members with friable asbestos in their buildings on eight common issues),
aff'd, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1993).
3. See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Summer 1991, at 5; Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 Brook. L. Rev.
659 (1994). For a general overview of the modem development of the class action, see
Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 664 (1979).
4. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the
History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. Rev. 213, 287-804 (1990) (reviewing
Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class Action (1987));
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80
Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 104-05, on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L
Rev. 779, 820-22 (1985) [hereinafter Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives]; Roger H.
Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69 [hereinafter
Trangsrud, Mass Trials]; Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989
U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 44; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation:
A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & Com. 1 (1990) (criticizing ALI
proposals for consolidation and claim aggregation).
5. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18 Charles A. Wright et al.,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
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clash between efficiency and fairness, between those concerned with the
high public and private costs of duplicative litigation and those committed to an individual's right to control litigation involving important personal interests. 6
The problem with this supposed tradeoff is that it distorts the "real
world" of mass tort litigation by making unwarranted assumptions. In
fact, the dilemma in mass tort reform arises precisely because neither efficiency nor fairness, taken alone, is easily realizable. On the one hand,
the efficiency claims made for the mass tort class action are problematic
because, as this Article will argue, claim aggregation through class actions
systematically tends to disfavor certain identifiable, but underrepresented, classes of tort victims. On the other hand, litigant autonomy
in the mass tort context may be an illusory goal. Without discounting the
urgency or uniqueness of the ethical issues that arise in mass tort class
actions, 7 this Article recognizes that individual plaintiffs have weak to
nonexistent control over their attorneys across the mass tort context for
reasons that are inherent to the economics of mass tort litigation. Accordingly, proposals for the return to a traditional system of individual
case litigation are apt to be as quixotic as they are costly.
All that is certain about mass tort litigation is that it places a heavy
burden on the federal courts, while producing often modest and delayed
benefits to plaintiffs. As a result, "a consensus has now emerged calling
for substantial modifications in traditional court processes to improve the
efficiency and equity of the mass claims resolution process."8 This consensus, however, unites strange bedfellows. For some academics, the seductive appeal of a "public law" vision of litigation, stressing communitarian values and alternative modes of dispute resolution, has led them to
reject the traditional bipolar model of litigation in favor of a more bureaucratic, problem-solving model in which courts negotiate and impose
a solution. 9 For "law and economics"-oriented academics, aggregation
6. Indeed, some have framed the debate in exactly these terms. See Mark W.
Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class
Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action,
100 Yale L.J. 745, 759-61 (1990). Others define the current debate as between "reformers"
and "preservationists." See Stempel, supra note 3, at 688. This seems essentially the same
debate.
.7.
For the best statement of these issues, see Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 469 (1994).
8. Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 89, 89-90; see also David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 854 (1984)
(advocating a model for handling mass torts that would rely on class actions, use
probabilistic determinations of causation, allocate liability proportionately among
defendants, and award scheduled damages to class members).
9. For the fullest and best statement of this vision, see Rosenberg, supra note 8; see
also David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 Ind. L.J. 561, 569-74 (1987) (advocating "public law" tort model); Leon E.
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makes sense because of the high costs of individual civil litigation.' 0
Proceduralists and judges in turn often favor consolidation and class resolution of mass torts over the "old" individual case system because of the
growing burden on the federal judiciary." The one common denominator in this new genre is that the vast majority of commentators agree that
there is a crisis, one characterized by high costs and unjustified fees,
threatening recurrent corporate bankruptcies, and requiring some form
2
of radical remedy or another.'
Unfortunately, this consensus frames the mass tort dilemma, rather
than resolves it. Easy as it is to point out that mass tort litigation involves
high transaction costs, one must move on to the inevitable next question:
"compared to what?" Here, the costs (both private and public) of alternative approaches must be evaluated in terms of their likely actual operation, not their utopian potential. To date, few have done so. In the race
to a new system of group litigation in which lawyers represent "interests,"
rather than individuals, few in particular have looked for the perverse
incentives that almost inevitably arise at such junctures when client control over attorneys is weakened. No opening generalization about the
modem class action is sounder than the assertion that it has long been a
context in which opportunistic behavior has been common and high
agency costs have prevailed.' 3 If not actually collusive, non-adversarial
Trakman, David Meets Goliath: Consumers Unite Against Big Business, 25 Seton Hall L.

Rev. 617, 628-40 (1994) (favoring mandatory class actions).
10. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial 5-7 (1986); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort
Reform, 73 Va. L Rev. 845, 884 (1987); Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 563, passim; see also

Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 Yale LJ.
813, 814, 820-22 (1989) (book review) (noting the "intolerable consequences of relying
on the tort system in mass toxic disaster cases"). Professor Rabin is, however, equally
skeptical of the class action as an alternative and prefers non-tort alternatives such as
administrative compensation schemes. See id. at 824-26. Social insurance systems are

beyond the scope of this Article (although bankruptcy proceedings, which are discussed,
do represent a non-tort alternative).
11. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed
Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1039 (1986) (recommending statutory change to

increase use of mass tort class actions); Jon 0. Newman, Comment, Rethinking Fairness:
Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 Yale LJ. 1643, 1644-46 (1985) (advocating
reforms of litigation system to reduce costs and delay); Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and
Litigation Disasters, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 429, 434-35 (1986) (describing litigation crisis imposed
by mass tort cases and impact on the tort system); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and
Duplicative Litigation, 62 Ind. LJ. 507, 507 (1987) (advocating use of injunctions against
duplicative litigation and restrictions on opt out rights to increase efficiency of class
action).
12. For examples of this genre, see Rabin, supra note 10, at 820-22; Rubin, supra note
11, at 434-38, 441; Paul C. Weiler & Christopher F. Edey, Jr., Asbestos: A Multi-Billion
Dollar Crisis, 30 Harv.J. on Legis. 383, 392-95 (1993).
13. For discussion of the agency costs in class action litigation, seeJohn C. CoffeeJr.,
The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883-89 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, The
Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
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settlements have all too frequently advanced only the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys, not those of the class members. A second generalization
may be more controversial but also rests on an empirical foundation:
courts have little ability or incentive to resist the settlements that the parties in class action litigation reach. 14 Thus, if the court's most powerful
sword (namely, its authority to reject the settlement in a class action) will
typically remain in its scabbard, the quest for accountability must look to
other weapons and remedies.
Still, the possibility of opportunistic behavior and collusive settlements is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis for rejecting mass tort class
actions. In truth, individual tort litigation is notoriously expensive 5 and
Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 701-20 (1986) [hereinafter
Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney];Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 12-27 (1991).
14. Few in-depth studies have examined the process by which the fairness and
adequacy of a class action settlement is reviewed by the court. However, one recent study
'by staff members of the Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center provides some
revealing insights. Studying all class actions closed between July 1, 1992 andJune 30, 1994
in two federal district courts, these researchers found that the rate of settlement approval
was very high. In one of the two studied courts (the Eastern District of Pennsylvania),
preliminary data indicate that approximately 34 out of 38 proposed class action settlements
(or 89%) were approved without changes (and two others were approved with changes); in
the other district court (the Northern District of California), 26 out of 30 class actions
(87%) were approved without changes, and the remaining four were approved with
changes. See Thomas E. Willging et al., Federal Judicial Center, Preliminary Empirical
Data on Class Action Activity in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern
District of California in Cases Closed Between July 1, 1992 and June 30, 1994 at 57-58
(Apr. 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review). Standing
alone, these data could be consistent with either the conclusion that most settlements are
fair and reasonable or the conclusion that courts are passive and accepting. Two other
preliminary findings in their study, however, point to the latter conclusion. In the cases for
which information was available (12 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 5 in the
Northern District of California), the median length of the fairness hearing on the class
action settlement was 38 minutes in the first district and 40 minutes in the second district.
See id. at 57. Such expedition seems inconsistent with careful judicial scrutiny of the
settlement's fairness. Similarly, in approximately 83 to 84% of the cases studied in the two
districts, the court awarded the exact amount of attorneys' fees requested by the plaintiffs'
attorneys. See id. at 79-82. Again, because such deference in turn invites attorneys to
make excessive demands, this finding in particular suggests a pattern ofjudicial passivity at
the settlement stage.
15. One much cited estimate, based on asbestos litigation, is that transaction costs
consume $.61 of each asbestos litigation dollar (of which $.37 is attributable to defendants'
litigation costs). The plaintiffs therefore receive only $.39 from each litigation dollar, and
plaintiffs' attorneys only $.24. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D.
Tex. 1990); see also Rubin, supra note 11, at 434 (citing Rand study and other studies
showing that majority of payments made in product liability cases are for legal services).
Even if these factual assumptions are correct, they imply that defendants' litigation
expenses ($.37) exceed plaintiffs' expenses ($.24) by slightly more than 50%. The impact
of these data on the case for mass tort actions is problematic, because "reform" may
produce a wealth transfer from plaintiffs to defendants. It cannot safely be assumed that
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arguably threatens to inundate the federal docket.' 6 Mass tort class actions could then be a more effective system, at least viewed in terms of
their ability to deliver compensation to victims, even if they are characterized by much self-interested attorney behavior and a resulting high rate
of suspicious settlements.
Against this backdrop, this Article does not propose to eliminate
mass tort class actions, but rather to restructure them by placing prudential limits on the problems that courts can competently handle. A balance must be struck between pragmatism and idealism, and, to do so, this
Article will offer what it terms a "constrained autonomy" model for reconciling group litigation with individual rights. It does so because, whatever
the plight of mass tort victims, there is today more reason to believe that
group litigation and a public law approach aggravates, rather than alleviates, their problems.' 7 The mass tort class action occupies a polar position at the extreme end of the continuum in terms of its relative vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. Although agency costs are inevitably
high in all class actions, the mass tort class action is uniquely vulnerable
to the danger of collusion and thus needs special safeguards. Increasingly, defense counsel have come to understand that the mass tort class
action can be utilized to obtain cheap settlements that pay little attention
to the interests of certain structurally underrepresented classes of
claimants.
Other scholars have begun to note this dark underside to the mass
tort class action,' 8 but none has yet placed it in its fuller context. Originally, the class action was viewed by both sides as the plaintiffs' weapon, a
technique for extorting settlements even in non-meritorious cases. 19
Throughout the 1980s, corporate defendants vigorously resisted the use
of the mass tort class action, preferring even the alternative of a bankreducing defendants' litigation costs will increase the recoveries to plaintiffs (although it
will reduce the deterrent impact, if any, of mass tort litigation). Nor, if corrective justice
considerations are taken into account, is it clear that plaintiffs should lose their
opportunity to receive individualized damages because of the costs to defendants.
Mass tort litigation is, however, considerably less expensive when sampling techniques
and consolidated trials are used, and in such cases there may not be the same reduction in
settlement value that seems to accompany the mass tort class action. See infra text
accompanying notes 156-162.
16. For data on the impact of mass torts on federal and state dockets, see infra notes
63-72 and accompanying text.
17. Some recent academic voices have also seen the problems with a "public law"
vision. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort As Public Law Litigation: Paradigm
Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 580-82 (1994).
18. See Koniak, supra note 4 (manuscript at 104); Mullenix, supra note 17, at 580;
John A. Siciliano, Mass Torts: The Case Against a Special Case, 80 Cornell L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 17-20, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
19. For the classic statement of this view, see Milton Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L Rev. 1, 8-9 (1971). This same suspicion of an extortionate
motive clearly runs throughJudge Posner's decision in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1297-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
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ruptcy reorganization. 20 But with the 1990s, their perception of the class
action has changed dramatically. Defendants have not only adopted the
class action as their preferred means of resolving their mass tort liabilities, but have also actually begun to solicit plaintiffs' attorneys to bring
such class actions (as a condition of settling other pending litigation between them).21 Behind this transition lies defendants' discovery of a variety of procedures for minimizing their tort liabilities. Collectively, these
amount to a new legal technology, the impact of which uniquely disadvantages future claimants. Most importantly, these techniques can be implemented only through the use of a mass tort class action.
In overview, this transformation is of historic significance: once a
sword for plaintiffs, the modem class action is in some contexts increasingly becoming a shield for defendants. 22 Rather than serving as a vehicle by which small claimants can aggregate their claims in order to make
litigation economically feasible (and thereby also gain negotiating leverage vis-a-vis defendants), the mass tort class action now often provides a
means by which unsuspecting future claimants suffer the extinction of
their claims even before they learn of their injury.
Why is this happening? The one safe generalization about mass tort
class actions is that the traditional safeguards used by courts to guard
against collusive settlements have little value or relevance here. Three
basic factors explain the unique vulnerability of the mass tort class action:
First, courts themselves are "conflicted" because of the threat of
docket inundation from individual mass tort cases, and thus they may be
more willing to countenance doubtful settlements that they probably
would not otherwise accept. 23 Indeed, the case studies on which this
20. See infra text accompanying notes 163-171.
21. That some defendants today seek class certification, preferring class resolution to
repetitive individual litigation, is beyond dispute. See David Crump, What Really Happens
During Class Certification? A Primer for the First-Time Defense Attorney, 10 Rev. Litig. 1,
8-9 (1990). Defendants also regularly seek to extend the scope of the class action filed by
plaintiffs. A good example is the class action filed over the defective Bjork-Shiley heart
valve. Brought as a nationwide class action, defendants insisted that it be extended to a
global class action. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 154-55 (S.D. Ohio 1992),
appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993); Michael Schachner, Global Settlements
Draw Praise, Scorn, Bus. Ins., Oct. 10, 1994, at 1, 35. Ordinarily, a defendant has no desire
to be sued by additional plaintiffs and fights to define the class narrowly.
22. This Article will argue that the mass tort context is the leading such example, but
is not the only one. Employment discrimination also represents an area in which
individual claims for substantial damages are economically viable, but defendants
increasingly prefer a class resolution. SeeJ. Spencer Schuster, Precertification Settlement
of Class Actions: Will California Follow the Federal Lead?, 40 Hastings L.J. 863, 865 (1989)
(noting trend toward settlement class actions in variety of litigation contexts).
23. For discussion of the impact of mass tort actions on the federal docket, see infra
text accompanying notes 63-72. Two distinct claims, however, need to be separated here
at the outset.
First, there is the strong possibility that judges fi-ame legal standards with their own
self-interest in mind. Several recent procedural commentators have either made or
conceded this observation as a starting point for analysis of procedural rules. Compare
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Article will concentrate are ones in which activist judges became deeply
involved in the negotiation of the settlement-with disastrous consequences for plaintiffs.
Second, the court's primary tool for regulating plaintiffs' attorneys in
class actions-judicial control over plaintiffs' attorneys' fees-is less effective in the mass tort context because defendants can (and do) offer inducements to settle that are largely beyond the court's control.
Third, even when individual class members hold legally meritorious
claims for significant damages, client passivity may remain the norm because many (and sometimes virtually all) class members are "future claimants"-that is, persons who have not yet experienced any symptomatic
illness or disease, but rather share only a statistically enhanced risk of
future illness or injury because of their exposure to a toxic product or
process. To the extent that future claimants will remain rationally apathetic about a legal proceeding brought in their name (because they may
have a low probability on an individual basis of experiencing actual, compensable injury), defendants have a strong interest in resolving such an
action at an early stage well before any such class members experience
injury and thus have an incentive to monitor their attorneys' conduct.
One other preliminary distinction needs to be understood about
class actions. Although there are gray areas at the margin, class actions
divide economically into "small claimant" classes and "large claimant"
classes. In the former context, individual claimants lack legal claims that
would be economically viable if asserted on an individual basis, while in
the latter context most class members can attract competent counsel to
represent them in individual actions on a contingency basis. Securities
and antitrust class actions in particular tend to be thought of as "small
Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23J.
Legal Stud. 627, 629 (1994) (asserting that judicial behavior in procedural matters is likely
to conform to judges' rational self-interest rather than to economic efficiency) with Janet
C. AlexanderJudges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23J. Legal

Stud. 647, 647-48 (1994) (arguing that although judges' self-interest does play some role,
this is not contrary to the public interest). Some judges have come perilously close to
admitting that the mass tort litigation crisis is primarily a crisis of mind-numbing boredom,
which requires appellate courts to approve the certification of mass tort class actions in
order to relieve trial judges of "litigation 're-runs' for those who face a series of identical
pending cases." See Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98

F.R.D. 323, 328 (1983).
Second, there is the tougher empirical question of whether courts are in fact being
overwhelmed. Although this Article accepts the proposition that no reform will be
accepted with regard to mass tort litigation unless it curbs the exponential growth in case
filings, there remains some basis for skepticism about this constantly reiterated claim that
courts are about to be overwhelmed by mass torts. The judicial system-state and
federal-annually disposes of approximately 500,000 automobile accident cases each year,

a number exceeding the claimants in any mass tort case, and does so without any seeming
sense of crisis. SeeJames S. Kakalik & Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in
Tort Litigation 14 (1986). However, it is true that mass tort cases tend to be concentrated

in specific areas (e.g., along the Eastern seaboard in the case of asbestos litigation), thus
maximizing their congestive impact. See infra note 71.
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claimant" classes, 24 whose members cannot afford to opt out and pursue
individual claims.2 Personal injury class actions, however, are populated
by many class members with large individual claims. This distinction between "small claimant" and "large claimant" class actions helps to explain
one other initially puzzling feature of class action practice and behavior:
sometimes corporate defendants resist class certification vehemently, and
sometimes they rush to embrace it (even soliciting the action). Under
closer examination, defendants' behavior is consistent and rational. In
"small claimant" class actions, defendants tend to resist class certification
(because plaintiffs have no realistic alternative), whereas in "large claimant" classes, defendants increasingly prefer class certification for a variety
of reasons, including both their desire to avoid repetitive awards of punitive damages and their hope to reach a "reasonable" global settlement
26
with cooperative plaintiffs' attorneys.
24. See Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14
Rev. Litig. 79, 99 (1994).
25. See Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 28. This generalization is no longer
invariably true given the predominance today of institutional investors (who may hold
sizeable stakes). See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the
Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 Yale LJ. 2053, 2088-93 (1995). Nonetheless, in my view, institutional
investors are likely to continue to prefer passivity (while allowing others to bring and
maintain the class action) for extrinsic and reputational reasons. That is, because most
institutional investors wish to remain in contact with corporate managements (to receive
earnings forecasts and other "soft" information), and some (particularly private pension
funds) are deeply conflicted about shareholder activism, the majority will prefer to free
ride on the efforts of professional plaintiffs and specialized class action counsel and will
not themselves initiate class actions.
26. Defendants also resist class certification in cases where plaintiffs have not been
able consistently to win individual actions. Two examples illustrate this tendency. First, in
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), the Seventh Circuit granted
defendants' application for a writ of mandamus, overruling the district court's certification
of a nationwide class of hemophiliacs infected by the HIV virus that causes AIDS. The
decision seems to have been motivated chiefly by the circuit court's belief that class
certification would give the plaintiffs an unjustified leverage over the defendants, chiefly
because the plaintiffs were asserting a novel legal theory that had been generally
unsuccessful in individual cases; in fact, plaintiffs had lost 13 out of the 14 individual cases
that had gone to trial earlier. See id. at 1296. Such a weak track record gave defendants
little reason to favor a global settlement.
A second example is furnished by defendants' intense resistance to the certification of
a nationwide class action for smoking-related illnesses. See, e.g., Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995); see also Andrew Reidy & Robert Carter,
Tobacco Litigation: Looking for Cover, Legal Times (Washington), Mar. 6, 1995, at S37,
S38 (discussing efforts by tobacco industry to avoid the potentially vast liability arising from
the Castano decision). To date, the only significant award in smoking-related litigation
came in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992), which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial.
See Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, &
Culture 131, 133, 136-40, 144-45, 150-53 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
1993).
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Against this backdrop, a roadmap of this Article is now in order. Part
I initially will examine the development of, and dynamics within, the mass
tort class action and then focus on the new technology for collusion that
it has fostered. Three techniques-inventory settlements, settlement
classes, and the deliberate definition of the class to cover only future
claimants-have become standard and deserve special attention. An additional but still doctrinally uncertain tactic is the certification of a
mandatory or "non-opt out" class action in an action that is primarily for
monetary damages. 2 7 Use of this technique would be greatly expanded
in a new version of Rule 23 that is now before the Advisory Committee on
28
Civil Rules.
Because the case for reform depends on first recognizing how exposed the position of the future claimant is in a mass tort class action,
Part II will examine in detail several recent mass tort class actions involving asbestos, breast implants, mass disasters, and defective products.
From these case studies, an attempt will be made to generalize the procedural tactics that facilitate non-adversarial settlements that disadvantage
class members.
Part III will turn to the search for remedies. Clearly, the most vulnerable and least protected litigant in mass tort litigation is the future claimant. How should such persons be protected? Arguably, federal courts
simply lack jurisdiction over such an "exposure only" class because no
justiciable "case and controversy" exists for purposes of Article Ill. Similar arguments have been made under the Bankruptcy Code as to when
future claims are dischargeable in bankruptcy, and Part III suggests that a
synthesis is necessary to treat future claims similarly in these related contexts. Part III also explores the non-constitutional limitations on the authority of the class representative to settle future claims and suggests that
these limitations may preclude the certification of an exclusively future
29
claimant class action.
The future claimant's greatest problem is that the recovery in a mass
tort class action can be easily eroded by the impact of inflation and by the
27. A non-opt out class action may be certifiable under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) if there is a
"limited fund." To exploit this technique, defendants have attempted to structure such a
"limited fund" by focusing on the insurance policies covering the defendant. See infra
notes 142-150 and accompanying text.
28. See Bone, supra note 24, at 80-86. The proposed revision of Rule 23 greatly
increases the discretion of the trial judge by eliminating the separate class certification
categories of Rule 23 in favor of a unitary standard. Today, considerably more rigorous
requirements apply in the case of a class action brought under Rule 23(b) (3) to seek a
monetaryjudgment than in the case of actions brought under Rule 23(b) (1) or (b) (2). As
a practical matter, the proposed unitary standard will grant discretion to the trial judge to
relax the notice requirements and to deny any right to opt out in the case of a class action
for a moneyjudgment. For the text of the proposed Rule, see id. at 109-12.
29. As suggested later, an exclusively future claimant class is more likely to be passive
than one which includes "high stake" present claimants. Thus, from a policy perspective,
requiring the class to consist of present claimants as well as future claimants increases the
possibility that some class members will be in a position to monitor their attorneys actively.
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possibility that the actual number of claims made against the settlement
fund exceeds that projected. Although courts to date have given little
attention to these problems, Part III argues that the "superiority" requirement of Rule 23(b) (3) requires the court to find that a proposed settlement adequately protects the future claimant against those dangers.
Such a finding will be difficult to make in lump sum settlements (where
the defendant is not responsible if the actual rate of claims exceeds that
projected) unless the settlement permits the future claimant to opt out as
of the time of the discovery by the claimant of the injury or illness if the
real economic benefits will be less than that originally projected. As one
means of satisfying the "superiority" requirement, this Article proposes a
"limited" class action that combines a mandatory class at the liability stage
with an individualized damages determination. However, this right to individualization at the damages stage could be conditioned on restrictions
(including the use of an arbitration forum) that save congested federal
district courts from inundation. This compromise accomplishes two important things at once: (1) it protects the future claimant; and (2) it
spares the courts from endlessly repetitive mass tort trials.
Part III also seeks to redefine the future claimant's right to opt out.
Here, a lively debate has begun to surface. Those most anxious to shrink
the size of the federal docket have begun to question whether there need
be any such right at all. In contrast, Part III will argue that the right to
opt out has to be specifically redefined for the mass tort context where
long latency periods trivialize the existing right. In the case of future
claims, the right should be reformulated as a deferred right, which is triggered by the discovery of the injury. Both the limited class action and the
deferred opt out are examples of what this Article will call a "constrained
autonomy" model of litigation, which seeks to steer a middle course between the advocates of group litigation and those of individual autonomy.
A premise of this approach is that reform must prioritize litigant autonomy interests, protecting those that are most important and compromising those that are not.3 0

The most ethically disturbing problem with the mass tort class action
may be its tendency toward "structural collusion." Even in the absence of
bad faith, suspect settlements result in large measure because of the defendants' ability to shop for favorable settlement terms, either by contacting multiple plaintiffs' attorneys or by inducing them to compete against
each other. At its worst, this process can develop into a reverse auction,
with the low bidder among the plaintiffs' attorneys winning the right to
settle with the defendant. Here, it is necessary to confront the comparatively new institution of the "settlement" class action. Part III will thus
80. Elsewhere, I have argued that the damage determination phase triggers a more

important litigant autonomy interest than the liability stage because an opt out right at this
stage protects the "high stakes" plaintiff from a settlement that pays such claimant only the
median value of all claims. See Coffee, The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation,
supra note 13, at 925-30.
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consider various approaches that can prevent defendants from choosing
plaintiffs' counsel.
Finally, Part III faces the obligation to compare alternatives, rather
than simply report imperfections, and contrasts the mass tort class action
with the mass tort bankruptcy. In terms of both its fairness to creditors
and its ability to rehabilitate a financially strained debtor, the latter wins
on all counts-except its ability to preserve management in control.
I. A PRoFIL

OF THE MASS TORT CLAss ACTION

At the outset, one obvious and inescapable fact about mass tort litigation must be placed at center stage in any public policy analysis: mass tort
litigation typically involves seriously injured persons who lack insurance
or substantial financial resources. Immediately, this distinguishes mass
tort litigation from most other class action contexts-such as securities or
antitrust class actions-where the class members tend to be diversified
shareholders or substantial economic entities whose injuries are more
modest in proportion to their net worth. In these other contexts, commentators largely have agreed that deterrence, not compensation, should
be the rationale of the class action, 31 and they have doubted that compensation is likely to be achieved.3 2 Insurance and indemnification statthe
utes, they argue, imply a basic circularity, with shareholders paying
33
cost of insurance against litigation victories by other shareholders.
In the mass tort context, however, the participants at least perceive
compensation to be the primary objective. Not only are the victims often
seriously injured (as, for example, in asbestos litigation) and financially
dependent on a litigation-funded recovery, but deterrence is a much
more problematic objective. Because of the long latency periods associated with most mass tort injuries, the defective or toxic product may well
have been removed from the market long before the class action is ever
brought.34 As a result, some commentators have argued that neither the
goals of deterrence nor corrective justice are realizable in the mass tort
31. See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 Geo. LJ. 1733, 1739-41 (1994).
32. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit Litigation Without Foundation?, 7J.

L Econ. & Organization 55, 84 (1991) (noting that in most shareholder suits, "settlements
provide minimal compensation").
33. See Dale A. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation's Protection of its Directors and
Officers from Personal Liability, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 513, 570-73.

34. This was the case in the asbestos, silicone breast implants, and Dalkon Shield class
action cases-to give only the examples of the best known recent mass tort class actions.
Agent Orange was also infrequently used after the Vietnam War. In the case of asbestos,
federal law sharply restricted its use in any products after 1970. See Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Yet the first

important case establishing liability was not until 1973. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
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setting.8 5 Others warn that deterrence is a blunt sword and fear that what
may in fact be deterred is innovation generally.8 6 In any event, the focus
of both the courts and the litigants in mass tort cases has been almost
wholly preoccupied with victim compensation: how to fund at least minimal recovery for desperately injured individuals. But, as will be seen, it is
precisely within these terms that they have been least successful.
A. The InstitutionalBackdrop
Mass tort actions matured during the 1980s. Tabulating the actions
brought during that decade, two respected commentators have noted:
"Hundreds of thousands of people sued scores of corporations for losses
due to injuries or diseases that they attributed to catastrophic events,
pharmaceutical products, medical devices or toxic substances."3 7 Those
who have sought to explain this phenomenon of mass "claiming" have
identified cultural and social factors that may be more important than
any legal developments over this period.8 8 Whatever the reason, the most
important mass torts that arose during this decade-asbestos, Agent
Orange, and the Dalkon Shield-each involved nearly 200,000 or more
claimants, and collectively they remade both bankruptcy law and the class
action. At the beginning of the decade, the mass tort class action was
uniformly rejected by appellate courts. By the end of the decade, it was at
least provisionally embraced by many.
Some of the reasons for the initial judicial skepticism of the mass tort
class action were obvious. First, the Advisory Committee that drafted
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had suggested that a
"'mass accident' . . . is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action" be35. See Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics
Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 Md. L Rev. 951, 962 (1993) ("A system designed
to achieve corrective justice goals in two-party accidental harm cases simply cannot be
accommodated effectively to the demands of mass tort cases [involving] ... long-latent
toxic disorder."); see also Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation
for Tortious Risk, 14 J. Leg. Stud. 779, 785 (1985) ("[T]he deterrent value of legal
penalties for managerial error depends heavily on the proximity of the penalties to the
actions for which they are assessed.").
36. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 305-20 (1985); see also Peter Huber,
Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 11 (1988) (claiming that costs
associated with legal liability are substantial component of prices paid by consumers for
goods and services). But see Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A
Response to Huber, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 547-51 (1990) (disputing methodology employed
by Peter Huber to reach his estimate of $300 billion as annual cost of civil litigation to the
U.S. economy).
37. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 961, 961 (1993). In truth, the process
began before 1980. Between 1961 and 1984, federal court tort filings nearly doubled. See
John G. Fleming, The American Tort Process 3-4 (1988).
38. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1019-26 (discussing impact of mass
media, social networks, physician contacts, and availability of plaintiff law firms on
"claiming" behavior of ordinary citizens).
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cause of the presence in such cases of significant issues (including causation and possible defenses) that would impact upon the individual class
members differently.3 9 Individual issues and defenses, it was felt, would
likely overwhelm the common questions, and eventually disaggregation
would become inevitable. Judicial decisions following the 1966 revisions
of Rule 23 were quick to take this hint to decline class certification in
mass tort cases. 4o
Even when trial courts did certify a mass tort class, they were usually
reversed. 4 1 In 1981, Judge Spencer Williams certified the first Dalkon
Shield class action, but in 1982 the Ninth Circuit reversed him.42 Also in
1981, after the collapse of two skywalks at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in
Kansas City, Missouri, the victims were certified as a class, but again a year
later the Eighth Circuit reversed.4 3 Other cases at the time encountered
a similar fate.4 4 In a little noted development, however, the Hyatt
Skywalk cases were subsequently settled by means of a non-mandatory settlement class action. 45 In short, the practical message was that a class
action could not be certified over the defendants' objections, but it could
be utilized with their consent-that is, if a defendant's self-interest lead it
to prefer a class action resolution over repetitive individual litigation.
The breakthrough in the attitude of appellate courts to the certification of mass tort class actions came first with asbestos. In 1986, in affirming class certification in an asbestos mass tort case, Jenkins v. Raymark
Industries,46 the Fifth Circuit was explicit about its motivation: "The
courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by
the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters."47
39. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). The Rule

appears to have been chiefly drafted by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, who has explained his
reasoning. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 386, 391-93
(1967). Others have suggested that Professor Kaplan's reasoning may not have reflected
that of the Advisory Committee as a whole. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 14-15.
40. See, e.g., Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402, 407 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (rejecting
class certification for class consisting of all paralyzed veterans injured by negligent
urological surgery at Veterans Administration hospitals).
41. See Baughman, supra note 2, at 213 ("[A]ppellate courts have almost uniformly

rejected this approach.").
42. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
43. See In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 680 F.2d 1175
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
44. See generally Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen W. Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure
Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. Cin.L. Rev. 467, 485-90 (1985)
(summarizing decisions).

45. See Scott 0. Wright &Joseph A. Coluss, The Successful Use of the Class Action
Device in the Management of the Skywaiks Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. Rev. 141, 142
(1984).
46. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
47. Id. at 473.
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That same year, the Third Circuit also partially upheld a similar certification in another asbestos class action.4 8 A year later, the Second Circuit
upheld Judge Weinstein's certification of the Agent Orange class action.49 Finally, in 1989, in the most emphatic victory for mass tort class
certification, the Fourth Circuit approved class action treatment for the
Dalkon Shield litigation. 50
What explains this reversal in judicial attitude? A strong hint is supplied by a curious fact: in the early 1980s, the federal courts first refused
to certify class actions in simple "mass accident" cases (like the Skywalk
collapse), but several years later certified class actions in far more complicated "mass exposure" cases. By any doctrinal test, class certification is
easier to justify in the mass accident setting than in the mass exposure
context. In the former context, there is little variation in terms of legal
claims among those injured (thus making class treatment more appropriate), while in the latter "mass exposure" cases both the facts and the applicable law vary greatly from case to case. Unlike a single accident (such
as a plane crash or a building collapse), mass exposure to a toxic product
(such as asbestos, the Dalkon Shield, or Agent Orange) implicates the law
of multiple jurisdictions. In a nationwide class, it may involve most state
jurisdictions and most major participants in the industry. The hypothesis
that best explains this puzzling inconsistency is that the burden on the
courts from a failure to certify was far greater in the latter context where
individual actions would otherwise proliferate. For example, Jenkins, the
first asbestos mass tort class action to be certified, aros e in East Texas, an
area that one commentator has called "the fertile crtcent of asbestos
litigation."5 1 Put differently, asbestos cases had a chaacteristic that a
mass accident class action did not: unless resolved on a class basis, they
threatened to flood the docket within that district.
B. The Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation
Every litigation context has its own distinctive traits. Mass tort litigation is characterized by several unique features: (1) a predictable evolutionary cycle during which the value and volume of individual claims
starts low and then spirals upward; (2) high case interdependency so that
litigated outcomes in any mass tort area quickly impact on the settlement
value of other pending cases in that same field; (3) a highly concentrated
48. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd in part, 789
F.2d 996 (3d Cir.) (reversing non-opt out provision, but allowing a permissive certification

of a class action for property damages), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 and 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
49. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
50. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989).

51. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.Rev. 659,
660 (1989); see also infra note 71 (discussing concentration of asbestos cases in certain
federal districts).
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plaintiffs' bar, in which individual practitioners control exceptionally
large inventories of cases, sometimes totaling in the tens of thousands;
and (4) a capacity to place logistical pressure on individual courts that is
simply unequalled by any other form of civil litigation. As discussed below, each of these factors tends to undercut the traditional ideal of litigant autonomy.
1. The Mass Tort Evolutionary Cycle. - For understandable economic
reasons, mass torts (other than mass disaster cases) do not appear overnight, but rather evolve in a predictable cyclical fashion that often involves first slow and then later exponential growth in case volume. Early
in the cycle, defendants are more likely to win "because of strategic and
informational superiority."52 Later, however, the odds will shift in the
plaintiffs' direction, and eventually a stable equilibrium may be reached.
Predictably, as a mass tort begins to "mature" into a recognized legal specialization (as asbestos did in the 1980s), individual plaintiffs' attorneys,
who have necessarily invested and developed context-specific human capital in this field, will seek to exploit their expertise by searching nationwide for individual claimants to represent. Sometimes this search process
can become extraordinarily institutionalized (as, for example, during the
1980s when asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys arranged with labor unions for
portable x-ray trucks to screen union workers for telltale lung scars suggesting asbestos).53

Both because mass tort cases involve a high commonality of issues
and because the mass tort bar is highly concentrated, monetary recoveries tend to be interdependent.5 4 Here, the contrast between mass tort
litigation and other forms of high volume litigation is important. For
52. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 482 (1986) (analyzing the normal cyclical evolution of a
mass tort litigation); see generally McGovern, supra note 51 (analyzing and discussing
procedural problems peculiar to "mature" mass tort litigation).
53. The International Sheet Metal Workers Association, a union whose president,
Edward Carlough, was originally the lead plaintiff in Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10
F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (later restyled Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246
(E.D. Pa. 1994), after his ouster as union president), conducted regular x-ray screening of
its members for asbestos and related diseases during the late 1980s and early 1990s. For
representative examples, see Chris Green, Mobile Unit to Test Workers for Asbestos, State
J.-Reg. (Springfield, III.), Nov. 20, 1993, at 11, available in Westlaw, STJNLRSI Database;
John J. Monahan, Asbestos-test Results Awaited: Older Sheet Metal Workers Screened,
Sunday Telegram (Worcester, Mass.), May 16, 1993, at A16, available in Westlaw,
ALLNEWS Database; Union Offering Asbestos Tests, Las Vegas Rev.-J., Nov. 12, 1993, at
711, available in Westlaw, LVRJ Database.
A more extreme example of entrepreneurial litigation is furnished by two Texas
plaintiffs' attorneys, who founded the National Texas Workers litigation Project and
equipped vans with x-ray machines and traveled to various plants of one major asbestos
producer (Raymark) in order to screen workers. Hiring three doctors to conduct x-ray
screening for them, they identified some 6000 plaintiffs in this nationwide solicitation
effort-and also incurred considerable judicial displeasure. See Milo Geyelin & MichaelJ.
McCarthy, Judge Chides Lawyers in Asbestos Claims, Wall St. J., June 7, 1990, at R10.
54. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 967-69.
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example, a victory at trial in an automobile accident case does not significantly affect the negotiations in other pending auto accident cases, 55
whereas a litigated victory in a mass tort case, in contrast, markedly affects
all other cases involving the same product. Thus, if plaintiffs can develop
evidence to demonstrate a causal link between exposure to a particular
product and a particular illness in one case, all similar cases will acquire
an enhanced settlement value.
Another factor contributing to a high growth rate is the tendency for
mass tort injuries to involve long latency periods (sometimes twenty-five
years or more) before victims who have been exposed to a toxic product
or substance exhibit symptoms or learn that they have been injured.
From the defendants' perspective, this tendency means that, even after a
dangerous product has been withdrawn from the market, the defendant
will likely still face decades of continuing claims as new victims predictably develop illnesses. For plaintiffs' attorneys, this means that an annual
crop of new clients is obtainable if they search diligently. Plaintiffs' firms
specializing in the field also have a special incentive to search for claimants in order to realize continuing returns from their investment in
human capital. The asbestos litigation illustrates this tendency. It has
been estimated that fifty or fewer plaintiffs' firms specialize in asbestos
litigation, but that they have represented hundreds of thousands of claimants in individual actions in state and federal courts.5 6 Hence, the more
success these firms have, the greater their incentive to invest in search
57
costs to identify new claimants.
The blunt implication for defendants of these linked factors-the
commonality of the issues in mass tort cases, the interdependence of
monetary recoveries, and the long latency periods associated with many
mass torts-is that they should seek to reach a global settlement of any
new mass tort as early as possible in its predictable developmental cycle.
Assume, for example, that a new drug is thought to be responsible for a
rare form of cancer and plaintiffs' attorneys have finally been able to develop sufficient evidence of causation to win their first litigatedjudgment
55. Several reasons explain why recoveries in standard tort cases tend not to be

interdependent. Most importantly, the issues in such two-party cases tend to be extremely
fact-specific (e.g., the defendant driver was driving too fast, was drunk, or had worn out
brakes). Unless there is a claim that the vehicle was inherently defective (as in the classic
example of the Ford Pinto), the imposition of liability will have little impact on other
automobile cases involving, say, injuries to pedestrians. Mass tort cases, in contrast, tend to

turn on scientific issues of causation, which are common to a broad range of cases. In
addition, the parties in standard tort cases are not repeat players, whereas both corporate
defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys are in mass tort cases. Information also travels quickly
within the small and highly specialized mass tort plaintiffs' bar.

56. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 966.
57. As a practical matter, this process generally involves seeking referrals from local
personal injury lawyers who turn over their own clients under some fee-splitting
arrangement. In some mass torts, direct advertising for injured victims is used. Plaintiffs'
attorneys also develop referral networks with doctors and clinics. Eventually, an informal
underground railroad develops to refer victims to specific firms.
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(for $500,000) in an individual case. At this point, few other victims have
been identified and a lump-sum settlement of $50,000,000 (deposited
with a newly established mass tort claims facility) might seem sufficient to
provide for the unknown number of future claimants. If,however, a
global settlement is not reached at this point, the magnitude of the individual recovery and the estimates of future claimants may soon grow.
Early in the "maturation" of a mass tort, defendants can economize
on settlement costs by offering a reduced amount per known claim and
by seeking to underestimate the number of future claimants expected to
develop injuries and thus achieve a low-cost global settlement. Although
actuarial techniques for estimation of future claimants exist and have
been used in mass tort bankruptcies, different experts have produced
widely varying estimates, 58 and even the projections of the most reliable
experts come with a fifty percent margin of error.5 9 Finally, the parties
58. Attempts to predict the likely number of future asbestos claims against the entire
industry have produced widely varying estimates. The one common denominator is that
most projections have already proven too low. In 1982, Coming & Company predicted
that between 68,000 and 158,000 asbestos-related personal injury claims would be filed
from 1983 forward. By 1993, over 200,000 claims had been filed against the Manville Trust
alone. In 1992, another expert estimated 210,000 as the most likely number of claims that
would be thereafter filed against the Manville Trust, with a range of between 125,000 and
250,000. Subsequently, one team of experts appointed by U.S. District Judge Jack
Weinstein to estimate future claims against the Manville Trust predicted that 560,000
claims would be filed from 1990 forward. In 1994, National Economic Research Associates
projected 306,000 claims on the same basis. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Denise A.
Neumann, National Economic Research Assoc., Inc., Estimating Future Asbestos Claims:
Lessons from the National Gypsum Litigation 33-34 (1993) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). In any lump sum settlement, the amount actually received by future
claimants depends chiefly on the number of claims made. Thus, if 100,000 claims are
projected and 200,000 actually materialize, benefits will likely be reduced by half. Worse,
because the underestimation of future claims will not be evident at the outset, early
claimants may be paid in full, thus depleting the settlement fund and necessitating an even
greater reduction in the payments to later claimants. On this basis, the foregoing wide
ranges in estimates of total claims indicate that at least the earlier projections would result
in settlements that would drastically undercompensate future claimants.
59. An expert panel, which was appointed by U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein
(pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) to evaluate the Manville Trust, has
estimated that as many as 450,000 future claimants with asbestos injuries may be expected
between 1990 and 2049. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1005 n.239. Note that
this estimate is lower than another projection by the same expert panel, see supra note 58,
which difference is apparently the result of different drafts of the experts' report. This
panel cautioned, however, that their projection was subject to a ± 50% margin of error for
total claims over this period. See Eric Stallard & Kenneth G. Manton, Projections of
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims Against the Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust, Males 1990-2049, by Occupation, Date of First Exposure, and Type of Claim 3 (Mar.
8, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). After hearing a variety of
predictions over the years, Judge Weinstein has been willing to make only the broadest
estimates: "My own best estimate of future claims at the moment is somewhere between
300,000 and 600,000 claims into the mid-twenty-first century." See Weinstein, supra note 7,
at 510 n.164. Others have noted that in some cases the more complex the projection
technique used, the greater the margin for error that must accompany the projection. See
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have little incentive to use such techniques if they know that their use will
only reveal underfunding of that portion of the settlement reserved for
future claimants. 6 0 Both in the bankruptcy and class action contexts, this
same tendency for underestimation (and hence undercompensation) of
61
future claimants has been evident.
Other reasons also make early settlements desirable for defendants.
At an early stage in the development of a mass tort, the plaintiffs' bar may
not have developed the expertise or financial resources that they will later
assemble and hence will be at a greater disadvantage vis-i-vis defendants.
The first litigated victories may be for amounts well below that which will
be recovered once more evidence is uncovered (particularly if there is
evidence that the defendants suppressed data and knew the risks). Psychological evidence also suggests that courts and fact-finders will feel
comfortable in awarding far less in a lump-sum settlement to a "hypothetical" class of future claimants than they would award to actually injured
victims appearing before them in individual cases. This phenomenon is
known as the "vividness effect." 62 Finally, because only a relatively small

percentage of individuals exposed to most toxic substances will actually
develop compensable physical injuries, members of the future claimant
class can be expected to be rationally apathetic about their future legal
rights-until the point at which they themselves develop injuries. Put
differently, a rational individual with less than a one percent risk of developing lung cancer from exposure to tobacco products, asbestos, or some
other toxic product will understandably invest very little time, attention,
or money to protect legal rights that he or she does not expect (or want)
Michael A. Stoto, The Accuracy of Population Projections, 78J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 13, 13, 18
(1983).
60. In marked contrast to the serious efforts made to estimate future claimants in the
Johns-Manville and National Gypsum bankruptcies, no effort was made to develop any
actuarial estimate of future claims in the recent asbestos class actions. In Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994), which was an exclusively future
claims class action, this deficiency seems particularly glaring because the settlement itself
imposed "case flow maximums" on the number of claims that would be paid in any year,
and these case flow maximums were already "less than the annual new case filings against
the CCR defendants." Id. at 280. Indeed, the only finding made by the court with regard
to the likely number of future claims for specific disease categories was a vague (and
questionable) finding "that claims for asbestos-related lung cancer should be on the
decline due to the diminished levels of asbestos exposure to the class members in the past
few decades." Id. This casual disdain for the number of claims likely to be filed again
underscores the vulnerability of future claimants in mass tort class actions.
61. See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104
Yale L.J. 867, 382-89 (1994) (discussing underestimation of claims in mass tort
bankruptcies).
62. Decisionmakers tend, social psychologists have found, to give excessive weight to
concrete and vivid information relative to more abstract information. See Richard Nisbett
& Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment 59-61
(1980); Smith, supra note 61, at 383-84. Present claimants may present such vivid
information, while future claimants (even though actuarially inevitable) may not, The
result is to distort the allocation of funds between present and future claimants.
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to exercise. In any event, the early experience in both bankruptcy cases
and class actions has been that future claimants do far less well than present claimants in terms of the per claimant recovery.
2. The Impact on the Judiciary. - The concentrated logistical impact
of mass torts on the judiciary may be the most important factor in understanding the landscape of mass torts. During the mid- to late 1980s, the
perception grew that, unless checked, mass tort cases would soon inundate the federal docket. 63 In some courts, mass tort claims accounted for
over twenty-five percent of the entire civil caseload. 64 By 1990, asbestos
litigation represented seventy-five percent of all new federal product liability filings65 and had become the largest single category of personal in-

jury litigation. 6 6 Little reason existed to believe that the rate of filings
would decline substantially in the foreseeable future; rather, by 1990, two
new asbestos cases were filed each year for every one case resolved. 67 A
sense of crisis clearly pervaded the federal judiciary, 68 as multiple commissions and study groups warned of dire consequences unless the mass
tort case explosion could be brought under control. 69 In such an envi63. See Deborah R. Hensler et al., Asbestos in the Courts: The Challenge of Mass
Toxic Torts 24-29 (1985).
64. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 87, at 961.
65. See Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What's Going
on in the Civil Liability System?, 16JUst. Sys.J. 139, 147 (1993). By 1991, however, the rate
of case filings fell to 57% of new products liability cases. See id.
66. See Baughman, supra note 2, at 211, 211-12 n.4 (citing 100,000 Asbestos Cases
Ordered Consolidated, LA Times, July 17, 1990, at D2).
67. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing
report prepared by Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation appointed by ChiefJustice
Rehnquist).
68. The frustrations faced by trial courts in the face of a growing asbestos docket are
exemplified by Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990). There,
ChiefJudge Robert Parker observed that if his district court tried asbestos cases at the rate
of 30 cases per month, it would take six and one-half years to try all asbestos cases on the
existing docket, and at that point the court could anticipate that 5000 new cases would
have been filed during the interim. For a very similar estimate in a non-asbestos mass torts
case, see In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.RD. 239, 240 & n.3 (S.D. Ohio)
("disposition of the present Bendectin cases at the trial level alone might require 21,000
trial days or the equivalent of 105Judge years, i.e., oneJudge for 105 years or 105 Judges
for one year"), mandamus to vacate certification, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
69. The leading example in this still-expanding genre was the Judicial Conference's
Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, which was established by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in September 1990 to search for solutions to the asbestos litigation crisis. It
found that "[w]hat has been a frustrating problem is becoming a disaster of major
proportions to both the victims and the producers of asbestos products, which the courts
are ill-equipped to meet effectively." Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of
the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2 (Mar. 1991)
[hereinafter Asbestos Ad Hoc Committee Report] (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Columbia Law Review), reprinted in Asbestos Litig. Rep., Mar. 14, 1991, at 22698,
22699. Based on this perception of an imminent crisis, the 1991 report recommended a
"national asbestos dispute resolution scheme that permits consolidation of all asbestos
claims in a single forum." Id. at 3, reprinted in Asbestos Litig. Rep. at 22700. Months after
the release of this report, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred all
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ronment, some judges and academics came to believe that emergency
conditions justified an emergency solution-in short, that the end of saving the federal docket justified means that otherwise might seem improper. 70 In truth, the impact of asbestos litigation was highly uneven
and localized. 71 But the decisions legitimizing the mass tort class action
72
came from precisely those courts most under stress.
3. Concentration and Collusion. - A characteristic style of mass tort
litigation also developed during the 1980s. An important aspect of this
style was the high level of concentration within the plaintiffs' bar specializing in these cases. Less than fifty law firms appear to specialize in asbestos litigation, and a handful dominate the field.78 Some thirty firms represented the majority of the Dalkon Shield claimants. 74 A closer look at
the Dalkon Shield litigation reveals still another facet of this picture: individual attorneys acquire large case inventories. Of the approximately
44,000 most seriously injured victims of the Dalkon Shield (a defective
intrauterine birth control device which was implanted in approximately
2.2 million American women), 75 one survey found the following levels of
client concentration: some six attorneys represented 8039 claimants (or
on average 1340 each), 76 and another forty-three attorneys represented
some 13,174 claimants (with each attorney handling between 100 and
1000 cases-or, on average, over 300 cases each). 77 As one expert in asbestos litigation has generalized, "[t]ypically an extremely small number
of firms represents massive numbers of plaintiffs; it would not be unusual
for a single lawyer with four associates to represent over a thousand
78
clients."
To sum up, attorneys specializing in the mass tort field tend to accumulate a large inventory of clients with similar claims; they do so partly by
direct advertising and partly through referrals from other attorneys.
pending asbestos personal injury litigation to a single forum. See In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. itig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 128-137.
71. For example, one study in the mid-1980s found that 40% of all federal asbestos

filings in the late 1970s and early 1980s occurred in the districts of Massachusetts, Eastern
Texas, and Southern Mississippi. In terms of circuits, the district courts in the First and
Fifth Circuits accounted for 52% of all asbestos disease case filings. See Thomas E.
Willging, Federal Judicial Center, Trends in Asbestos Litigation 15 (1987).
72. See supra notes 51 and 71 and accompanying text. The Georgine class action,
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 192-214, was consolidated in the federal district
with the highest concentration of asbestos cases in the country. See infra note 481.

73. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 966.
74. See id.
75. See Morton Mintz, At Any Cost Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon
Shield 4 (1985).

76. See Georgene M. Vairo, Reinventing Civil Procedure: Will the New Procedural
Regime Help Resolve Mass Torts?, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 1065, 1075 n.47 (1993).
77. See id. There were also 11,443 unrepresented claimants, but only a small minority
of the claimants (7101 out of over 44,000) were represented by an attorney having fewer

than ten Dalkon Shield claimants.
78. McGovern, supra note 52, at 479.
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More importantly, they also tend to deal in inventories, settling their
cases not on an individual basis, but on an inventory-wide basis with a
particular defendant. 7 9 Here, different styles exist, with some plaintiffs'
law firms being characterized as "boutique firms" that screen clients carefully and bring actions only on behalf of severely injured claimants for
high damages, and other firms being known as "wholesalers" who seek to
represent a large number of claimants but invest little in individual case
preparation.8 0 In either case, however, litigation decisions are made by
attorneys in terms of their impact on the entire portfolio of claims in the
firm's inventory.8 ' After all, even a boutique firm may invest heavily in
scientific evidence for an individual case and take it to trial largely to
establish the market value of other cases in its inventory.
The concentration within the plaintiffs' bar is more than matched
on the defendants' side. In early cases, a defective product or toxic substance was typically produced by a single manufacturer (for example,
A.H. Robins Co. made the Dalkon Shield; Richardson-Merrell manufactured Bendectin; and Dow Coming was the first and by far the largest
manufacturer of silicone breast implants.8 2) Even in the case of asbestos,
where an industry of about thirty firms manufactured asbestos products,
the producer of the asbestos products used at a particular site could usually be identified. Thus, litigation could focus on a principal defendant-and negotiations would be with a single defense counsel. As asbestos litigation developed during the 1980s, asbestos-producing defendants
organized into a consortium to pursue common defense and settlement
strategies, united behind a single counsel.8 3 In practice, therefore, mass
tort litigation is reduced to battles between repeat players who have litgated and negotiated settlements in similar cases many times in the past.
During the 1980s, this concentration and familiarity among the litigants was for the first time matched by a corresponding consolidation at
the judicial level, as mass tort cases came to be transferred (at least for
79. This practice of mass settlement of individual cases often results in controversy
and may violate ethical norms. See Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar
Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6 (discussing
evidence, including work sheets, showing that aggregate settlements were negotiated,
despite compromise of individual claims and possible ethical violations as a result thereof).
80. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1042-43.
81. There is also a tendency for plaintiffi' attorneys to file as much of their inventory
as possible in the same court. This may clog judicial arteries and slow the progression of
the individual case to trial, but it maximizes the plaintiffs' attorney's leverage with the
court and certainly inclines the court to favor an aggregate resolution.
82. See Alison Frankel, From Pioneers to Profits, Am. Law., June 1992, at 82, 84.
83. Originally, this group was known as the Asbestos Claims Facility. See Harry H.
Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 Clev. St. L Rev.
375, 387-89 (1984-85). Later, after the bankruptcy of some of its members, a smaller
organization, known as the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) replaced it. The CCR
represents 21 firms that are the principal asbestos manufacturers not in bankruptcy. See
Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Autumn 1990, at 13, 17.
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discovery purposes) before a single judge. Either as a result of bankruptcy proceedings (which act as a stay of pending litigation against the
insolvent firm) or a transfer order by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML), huge numbers of related mass tort claims came under
the control of individual judges. For example, Judge Robert Merhige of
the Eastern District of Virginia oversaw the resolution of some 195,000
Dalkon Shield claims, 84 and Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District
of New York handled proceedings which resolved over 240,000 Agent
Orange claims.s 5 In 1991, when theJPML transferred all pending asbestos claims in federal court toJudge Charles Wiener, some 27,000 actions,
many of which had been litigated elsewhere for years, were transferred
overnight to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 86 This pattern of universal transfer contrasts sharply with the pattern in securities or antitrust
litigation. There, although a trial judge may have substantial experience
with a particular cause of action, no court has ever had all pending securities or antitrust actions consolidated before it.
Nor would any trial court have the same incentive to achieve a global
resolution of all pending securities or antitrust actions. Around 300 securities class actions have been filed annually in federal court over recent
years. Although often criticized as "strike suits" or "frivolous," such actions do not amount to a significant burden on the federal docket and
amount to approximately ten percent of the class actions filed in federal
court each year.8 7 In contrast, mass tort filings impose a far larger burden, and, as discussed later, decisions made by the JPML to consolidate
all such pending actions before a single judge were clearly made with the
hope of inducing a global resolution.
These circumstances supply the preconditions for collusion between
defendants and a favored plaintiffs' counsel: repeat players, a single fo84. See Richard B. Sobol, Bending the Law 106 (1991).
85. See Schuck, supra note 10, at 205.
86. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (J.P.M.L.
1991).
87. See Private Securities Litigation: Staff Report Prepared at the Direction of Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 64, in Hearings on Abandonment of the Private Right
of Action for Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud/Staff Report on Private Securities
Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 166, 234 (1994) (reporting that 315, 299, and 268
securities class actions were filed in 1990, 1991, and 1992, respectively, and that these
numbers reflected about 10% of all class actions annually filed). According to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 290 securities class actions were filed nationwide
in 1994 and 298 in 1993. See Legislation on Securities Fraud Litigation, 1995: Hearings
on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Federal News Service, Jan. 19, 1995
(prepared testimony of William S. Lerach), available in LEXIS, News Library, FEDNEW
File. Even these figures may overstate the actual number of securities class actions because
of the existence of multiple actions against the same defendant. Mr. Lerach further
estimated that only 125 corporations have been sued annually over the last several years"out of over 14,000 public corporations reporting to the SEC." Id.
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rum in which the court is eager to achieve a global settlement, and "passive" future claimants. But how is collusion actually implemented? Here,
it is critical to distinguish between the traditional techniques (which have
long been observed in corporate and securities litigation) and the new
techniques that have developed in mass tort litigation,
C. The "Old" Collusion
Collusion within the class action context essentially requires an
agreement-actual or implicit-by which the defendants receive a
"cheaper" than arm's length settlement and the plaintiffs' attorneys receive in some form an above-market attorneys' fee. The mechanics of
such an agreement varies with the litigation context. In the corporate
and securities litigation settings, the standard means has been the nonpecuniary settlement: the plaintiff sues for money damages, but the final
settlement awards only therapeutic relief-new bylaws, additional disclosure to shareholders, and other frequently cosmetic changes.8 8 In return
for this bloodless settlement, defendants either pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees themselves or agree not to contest the plaintiffs' attorneys' application for court-awarded fees from the corporation. 89 In the latter
case, the plaintiff shareholder class suffers twice: first, by the abandonment of their claim for money damages, and second, by the payment of a
fee by their corporation to a plaintiffs' attorney who has not performed
any valuable service.
In the mass tort and antitrust contexts, a variation on the nonpecuniary settlement (known informally as a "scrip settlement") has become
popular, involving discount coupons or certificates granting the injured
class the right to buy the defendant's product at a discount. 90 Often, the
discount is no greater than what an individual plaintiff could receive for a
volume purchase, or for a cash sale, or for using a particular credit card,
88. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, 48 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5, 24.
89. If the plaintiff's action has conferred a "substantial benefit" on the corporation,
the traditional corporate law rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorneys' fees. See Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 101 N.W.2d 423, 426
(Minn. 1960). Nonpecuniary benefits can be recognized as conferring such a benefit. See,

e.g., Fischman v. Wexler, 309 F. Supp. 976, 978-79 (D. Del. 1970) ("corporate
therapeutics" found to confer such a benefit).

90. Probably the first case in which this technique was used was In re Cuisinart Food
Processor Antitrust Litig., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 446, 449 (D. Conn. 1983), in
which class members received a coupon valued at 50% of a product's list price to purchase
one of defendant's products costing up to $300. In subsequent cases, the percentage value
of the coupon in relation to the product quickly declined. See In re Domestic Air Transp.

Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (coupon between $10 and $200 for
flights costing between $50 and $1500); New York v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 775 F. Supp.
676, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ($5 coupon for video game costing $100); see also Barry Meier,
Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1995, at D1 (describing scrip certificates in class
action settlements for a $25 rebate in airfares, a $400 credit toward a car purchase, and,

amazingly, a "free box of Cheerios").
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and typically restrictions are placed on its transferability. In the General
Motors "side-saddle" fuel tank case (a mass tort product liability case), the
Third Circuit remanded a settlement under which the plaintiff class
would receive a scrip certificate in the face amount of $1000, which
would be redeemable against a purchase of a GM light duty truck (worth
possibly $20,000 at retail-or a five percent discount). 9 1 The Third
Circuit panel was concerned not only with the low percentage value of
the coupon (i.e., five percent), but also with the restrictions on its transfer, the infrequency of pickup truck purchases by most class members,
and the possibility of an inequitable distribution that primarily benefitted
major car fleet owners. 92 But such a settlement is predictable, because it
maximizes the interests of the defendants, the plaintiffs' attorneys, and
the few class members (i.e., the car fleet owners) with sufficiently large
economic interests to undertake to monitor the litigation and protest.
Ultimately, if the GM settlement had passed judicial scrutiny, the plaintiffs' attorneys would have been able to multiply the $1000 certificate received by each class member by the 5.7 million customers in the class
(who had previously purchased GM trucks with "side-saddle" tanks that
were alleged to explode on minor collisions) and claim that they had
thereby created a $5.7 billion benefit for the class (upon which "fund"
their attorneys' fees could be based).93
Another recent variation, known as a "cy pres settlement," involves
making a payment in kind of goods or services, not to the plaintiff class
but to a third party (often a charity) for the indirect benefit of the class.
A 1994 case, In re Matzo Food Products Litigation,94 illustrates this pattern.
Convicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act for fixing the prices of matzo
and matzo products, B. Manischewitz Co. was sued in a class action
brought by several grocery stores on behalf of all retail stores. Under a
quickly negotiated settlement agreement, Manischewitz agreed (1) to create a "Food Products Fund," consisting of matzo products that would be
distributed to specific charities for a four-year period; and (2) to pay
plaintiffs' attorneys between $450,000 and $500,000. 95 The cynically disposed might see this settlement as an excellent way of simultaneously disposing of both stale matzos and a difficult litigation.
91. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1995).

For another recent decision rejecting a "scrip

settlement," see Buchet v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 684, 697 (D. Minn.
1994).

92. See General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 806-10.
93. See id. at 822.
94. 156 F.R.D. 600 (D.N.J. 1994).
95. See id. at 602-03. The settlement required Manischewitz to contribute $1,800,000
of its food products valued at their retail value to the settlement fund. The court was
skeptical, however, of the defendant's valuation because it valued their products at three
times their cost to the defendant. Thus, on a cost valuation basis, the charitable
contribution would cost Manischewitz only $600,000 (before any tax deduction) and yet
would yield the plaintiff's attorneys not less than $450,000. See id. at 608-04.
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Although the Matzo Food Products court was unable to swallow this
settlement, other courts have regularly accepted similar cy pres settlements.9 6 It may at first seem puzzling that they do so, but several linked
factors probably explain this pattern. First, judicial time is a scarce commodity, which courts struggle to allocate sensibly to high priority matters.
"Small claimant" class actions are seldom regarded by courts as among
their priorities. Securities class actions, for example, almost never get to
trial. One important reason for this phenomenon is that trial judges refuse to give them priority on their trial calendar. Yet, unless the "small
claimant" class action can somehow be resolved, it will drag on, consuming scarce judicial time. Indeed, such actions can be prolific generators
of motions and discovery disputes (whether because plaintiffs sometimes
exploit their "nuisance value" or because defendants with deeper financial pockets sometimes believe they can exhaust the plaintiffs' attorneys'
financial resources and force a cheap settlement). As a result, courts are
eager to see such cases settled and may tend not to examine the basis for
settlement with the same skepticism they might bring to cases or matters
they deem more important.
Second, most of the cases in which dubious nonpecuniary consideration has been the primary basis for settlement have been "small claimant"
class actions. Even if the plaintiffs received a monetary recovery, that recovery would be spread so thinly over a broad plaintiffs' class as to produce little or no meaningful benefit to any individual class member. Usually, these cases have involved either property damage (not personal
injuries) or antitrust violations causing small losses to a nationwide class
of victims.
Third, the trial court has a limited range of options: basically, it can
reject the settlement, or it can approve the settlement but then award
only very modest attorneys' fees, thereby signaling its lack of confidence
in the outcome.9 7 Because the action will still linger on if the settlement
96. Indeed, the Matzo FoodProductscourt, itself, noted that cy pres settlements "are, in
fact, routinely approved by courts." Id. at 605; see also Superior Beverage Co. v. OwensIllinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 478-79 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting increased judicial flexibility
in awarding cy pres settlements); Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1303
(D.D.C. 1986) (discussing judicial discretion to apply cy press doctrine); 2 Herbert B.
Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 10.17, at 10-40 to 10-46 (3d ed. 1992)
(discussing cy pres settlements and citing cases). Where cy pres settlements result because
funds are not claimed by unidentifiable class members (which is the most common fact
pattern), the obvious alternative is to increase the recovery to those class members who do
appear (and who seldom receive full compensation in any settlement). See id. § 10.17, at
10-40 to 1041.
97. The Delaware Chancery Court has recently followed the second approach in
several cases, approving the settlement but refusing any fee award or radically reducing the
fee award sought. See De Angells v. Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., 641 A.2d 834, 836
(Del. Ch. 1993) (approving settlement but denying any fee award), rev'd sub nom. Prezant
v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915 (Del. 1994); In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) J[ 97,749, at 97,577-78 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1993)
(reducing fee award sharply).
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is rejected, the second option imposes less of a burden on the court. But,
over time, a small fee award may in turn only encourage underinvestment
by plaintiffs' attorneys in such cases. That is, the low cost plaintiffs' attorney (whom defendants scorn as a "strike suiter') may still be able to earn
a positive economic return on such cases-but only if the attorney radically reduces the investment in the case and offers defendants a low cost
settlement, which is cheaper to them than further litigation.
In any event, the best and bottom line generalization here is not that
courts are incapable of detecting the signs of collusion, but that they will
not invest scarce judicial time in monitoring "small claimant" class actions; thus they approve some dubious settlements as the lesser evil when
dismissal on the merits is not possible. 9 8
One "old" form of collusion is not limited to the "small claimant"
class action. It involves what this Article will call a "reverse auction,"
namely a jurisdictional competition among different teams of plaintiffs'
attorneys in different actions that involve the same underlying allegations. The first team to settle with the defendants in effect precludes the
others (who may have originated the action and litigated it with sufficient
skill and zeal that the defendants were eager to settle with someone else).
A recent recurring scenario involves an inactively litigated action in state
court being brought and settled so as to preclude a decision in a more
aggressively litigated federal action. Indeed, several recent cases have upheld releases granted in connection with settlements in state courts as a
bar to a federal class action-even where the federal action raised principally federal law claims, which the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate. 9 9 Conversely, an important new Ninth Circuit decision has taken the opposite position and refused to grant preclusive effect
to such a state court settlement where the federal claims were clearly independent and unrelated to the state claims. 100
For the moment, the doctrinal tension among these cases is less important than understanding the transactional pattern. Assume a meritorious class action raising federal claims (for example, securities fraud) is
brought in federal court and plaintiffs decline to settle it on terms that
are attractive to the defendants. At this point, a parallel or "shadow" ac98. Dismissal of the class action would have been hard to justify in the Matzo Food
Products case because the defendant had already been criminally convicted of price fixing.
See Matzo Food Prods., 156 F.R.D. at 601.
99. See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994); Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1st
Cir. 1991); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, Inc., No. 89-1071, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7407
(E.D. Pa. June 29, 1989), aff'd without opinion, 947 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1991).
100. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644 (9th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 115 S. Ct.

2576 (1995). Epstein can be distinguished from Grimes and Nottingham Partnerson a variety
of grounds, including the important fact that in both the latter decisions the plaintiffs
appeared in state court to assert their positions. The Ninth Circuit also did not reach a
second claim raised by plaintiffs: that the Delaware settlement violated due process
because of inadequate representation by the principal class representative.
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don parroting some of the factual allegations in the federal action may be
filed in a state court. Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,101 a state court cannot adjudicate the federal law issues. Although claim preclusion of the federal
claims is thus not possible, issue preclusion poses a grayer question. In
principle, issue preclusion applies only to those issues that could have
been litigated in the action, but an adverse judgment in the state court on
claims that were essentially counterparts to the federal claims would probably bar federal adjudication of claims over which a federal court had
exclusive jurisdiction. 10 2 Thus, if the collusive plaintiff were to draft a
complaint that simply parrots the disclosure issues in an earlier filed federal action and were to file this copycat action in state court, the settlement of the state action would seemingly have preclusive effect on the
previously filed federal action, notwithstanding exclusive federal jurisdiction over securities fraud claims, at least when the state court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a corresponding state cause of action that relied
on the same operative facts.
Now comes the final twist: assume that incident to the state court
settlement, the class representative in the state class action grants a release covering all possible claims that the class members then hold
against the defendants. The Third and First Circuits have recently said
that the effect of such a release is broader than an adverse judgment in
the state action.' 03 Such a release, they have said, can bar all claims that
the plaintiff could have asserted against the defendants in any forum (at
least if the state court settlement does not violate the Due Process
Clause).
The practical impact of this approach is that it allows the defendants
to pick and choose the plaintiff team with which they will deal. Indeed, it
signals to the unscrupulous plaintiffs' attorney that by filing a parallel,
shadow action in state court, it can underbid the original plaintiffs' attorney team that researched, prepared and filed the action.' 0 4 The net re101. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S... § 78aa (1994), gives
U.S. district courts "exclusive jurisdiction" over suits based on the Securities Exchange Act,
or the rules and regulations thereunder (including Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.1. § 240.101-5
(1994)).
102. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 663-64; National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York
Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981).
103. See supra note 99.
104. A leading Delaware case, Prezant v. De Angelis, 636 A.2d 915 (Del. 1994)
illustrates the basic pattern of a reverse auction. Following the initial public offering of
Salton/Maxim Housewares, Inc., certain plaintiffs brought suit in federal court in Illinois
for alleged violations of the federal securities laws. Approximately one month later,
plaintiff De Angelis filed a federal securities class action in Pennsylvania and, on learning
of the pending Illinois action and apparently fearing that his own action would be
transferred to the Illinois court, he sought its voluntary dismissal. See ic. at 918. Shortly
thereafter, the same plaintiff's attorney filed a derivative action in Delaware alleging only
state law fraud claims. Meanwhile, negotiations in the Illinois action had broken down
after plaintiffs had rejected defendants' settlement offer of $1.2 million. See id. Within
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sult is that defendants can seek the lowest bidder from among these rival
groups and negotiate with each simultaneously. Much in this scenario
resembles game theory's classic "prisoner's dilemma," where the theoretical outcome is that the two prisoners, unable to agree upon a binding
105
deal between themselves, will reach a suboptimal outcome.
In overview, the critical factor essential to collusion is competition
among teams of plaintiffs' attorneys that the defendants can exploit.
Here, it happens because the parallel action in state court cannot be consolidated by the JPML with the federal action or actions. Once rival
plaintiff teams are in competition with each other, and each is able to
agree to a binding settlement of a nationwide class action, 10 6 the "reverse
auction" can begin. No explicit agreement among the participants is
needed; all that is necessary is that each team of plaintiffs' attorneys sees
that it can be divested of any participation in the action unless it reaches
a settlement with the defendants first. Already, there have been indications that such an auction, once unique to the corporate and securities
arena, is developing in mass tort cases as well. 10 7 Such "reverse auctions"
two weeks of filing the Delaware action, the plaintiff entered into settlement negotiations
with the defendants. Without plaintiff seeking discovery or defendants filing a responsive
pleading, the action was quickly settled for the comparatively modest sum of $1,225,000
(essentially the same offer that the plaintiffi in the Illinois action had refused). After the
stipulation of settlement was signed, the complaint was amended to assert federal securities
law claims as well in order even more clearly to bar the Illinois action. See id. at 919.
Although the Chancery Court approved the settlement, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected it, finding that the plaintiffs were not adequate representatives and that specific
findings must be made as to their adequacy. See id. at 925. It also noted that the Delaware
plaintiff "could not realistically have hoped to try this case, but only to settle it with the
further hope of receiving a fee award." Id. at 919.
This same pattern seems to have recurred in Delaware, but with a different result, in
the earlier-discussed MCA litigation. The Delaware Chancery Court approved a
settlement, but awarded a minimal attorney's fee because of its clear skepticism about the
action's benefit to the corporation. See In re MCA, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J[97,749, 97,577-78 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1993).
The federal district court found that the settlement of the Delaware action barred a federal
securities class action, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the entire question is now before
the Supreme Court. See Epstein, 50 F.3d at 666.
105. In the standard example, two individuals, who are factually guilty of a felony, are
interrogated by a prosecutor who seeks a confession from each. If neither confesses, the
prosecutor will be unable to obtain more than a misdemeanor confession that would result
in a one-year sentence for each. If only one confesses, the prosecutor will reward that
individual with a plea bargain resulting in a six-month sentence, but the other defendant
will receive a ten-year sentence. If both confess, they will each be convicted of a felony and
receive five years each. See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions:
Introduction and Critical Survey 94-97 (1957). Under this structure, it is logical for both
prisoners to confess and receive five years each, even though if they both held out they
would receive only one-year sentences. Thus, the outcome is Pareto-inferior.
106. In principle, a nationwide class action can be brought in a state court, although
special notice standards and a right to opt out must be recognized. See Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 123-141.
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can occur in other ways, but examining these techniques requires that we
first focus on the special dynamics of mass tort litigation.
D. The "New" Collusion
1. Inventory Settlements. - At least potentially, courts can respond to
signs of collusion (or, more precisely, "non-adversarial" settlements) by
reducing the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee award (which in virtually every jurisdiction must be approved by the court in the case of a class action). But
in the mass tort context, this may be a particularly ineffective weapon.
To understand its ineffectiveness, one must remember that the mass
tort plaintiffs' attorney typically has an inventory of cases that the attorney
represents on an individual basis. Often, the inventory may exceed several thousand cases. Normally, the. individual cases in this inventory will
move slowly through the litigation pipeline and settle only once a trial
date has been set. 0 8 Thus, the plaintiffs' attorney's tactical goal is to expedite cases, pushing them through the pipeline to the eve of trial (and
predictable settlement). Conversely, defendants in the mass tort setting
are concerned less about existing cases than future claimants, who may
dwarf the number of present claimants because of the long latency period associated with mass torts.
Given these different concerns, the possibilities for a deal between
the two sides should become evident at this point: both sides have an
incentive to trade a settlement of the plaintiffs' attorney's entire inventory (on terms favorable to the attorney) for a global settlement in a class
action of all future claims (on terms favorable to the defendants). The
advantages to the plaintiffs' attorney of such a trade are several: First,
because plaintiffs' attorneys are almost invariably compensated on a contingency basis by their individual clients, the plaintiffs' attorney can expect to receive a substantial fraction (usually around thirty percent but
sometimes more) out of the aggregate amount received by the clients
from such an inventory settlement.1 0 9 Second, the inventory settlement
telescopes into one year payments that might be delayed for many years.
Thus, it gains the attorney the time value of money over this period.
Third, some cases that go to trial might lose, and other cases might be too
weak on the merits to justifyr a settlement offer or to dare to take to trial
(and thereby risk the attorney's credibility with the court). However,
such cases can be included within the inventory settlement (which will
typically encompass even unfiled cases so long as some medical evidence
supporting the condition exists).
In return for the inventory settlement, the plaintiffs' attorney will be
expected to serve as class counsel in a class action brought as a "settlement class" against the same defendants. By definition, a settlement class
108. See McGovern, supra note 51, at 663.
109. See, e.g., Passell, supra note 79, at B6 (describing an inventory settlement of
$190 million in which one plaintiffs' attorney firm received $65 million).
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"action" cannot go to trial, and thus defendants need not fear litigation
in the event that the two sides have a subsequent falling out. The critical
step in this trade requires a special definition of the class: it must consist
only of future claimants. Otherwise, if the proposed class covered present claimants, it would look suspicious that the attorneys representing the
class had just settled similarly situated cases on a superior basis. This incongruity is avoided by defining the class as consisting of those persons
having claims against the defendants with respect to the particular product, process, accident or incident at issue who have not filed suit prior to
the date the class action is filed."i 0 Under this approach, the inventory
settlements can be effected shortly before the class action is filed.
To ensure that the plaintiffs' attorneys do not "welch" on their deal
by settling their inventory cases and then refusing to file the "future
claims" class action, the defendants may also require the plaintiffs' attorneys to sign an agreement that they will not in the future represent claimants against the defendants with regard to the same mass tort. Such an
agreement (which raises serious ethical problems)"' is, however, probably not essential. Because the plaintiffs' attorneys are disposing of all
their existing clients in the inventory settlements, they have no other current clients to represent and thus have every incentive to serve as class
counsel in the proposed "future claims" class action because it holds out
the promise of an additional fee award (as class counsel). On self-interested economic grounds, plaintiffs' attorneys would decline such a trade
of the class counsel position for an agreement not to sue the same defendants in the future only if they believed they could solicit new clients
and earn contingency fees from such cases greater than the joint payoff
from the class action and the inventory settlement. But in "mature" mass
tort cases, the competition for clients may be stiff, thus making such a
2
trade preferable."
If one accepts the premise that an inventory settlement can be used
as an inducement to the plaintiffs' attorney to enter into a non-adversarial settlement of a class action that disadvantages the class members, it
follows logically that the person most susceptible to such an inducement
will be the plaintiffs' attorney with the largest inventory of present claimants. Indeed, the more the plaintiffs' attorney maintains a high volume,
low quality inventory of cases, the more the attorney may welcome a nonadversarial resolution of cases. In actual practice, defendants do seem to
110. For an example of such a class definition that excludes all but future claimants,
see Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 319 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
111. See Koniak, supra note 4 (manuscript at 192-95). It should also be emphasized
that such an agreement implies that the plaintiffs' attorney cannot reach an objective,
disinterested decision as to whether class resolution or individual case-by-case resolution is
more in the interest of the class members (because they could not serve as individual
counsel).
112. It should be remembered that there are many asbestos defendants, and the
agreement not to sue applies only to the defendants in the particular action. Hence,
plaintiffs' attorneys are not truly liquidating their human capital in the field.
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have targeted plaintiffs' attorneys who fit this profile of high volume
"wholesalers."113
2. Double-Dipping.- Even in the absence of a separate inventory settlement, a plaintiffs' attorney can favor a mass tort class action for selfinterested reasons when the clients' interests would be better served by
opting out. This is because one perverse and important characteristic of
the mass tort class action is that it permits the attorney to receive two fees:
one as class counsel and another as the legal representative of individuals
filing claims under it. This feature is in sharp contrast to securities and
antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs' counsel has very few (if any) individual clients. The initial fee will be the class action fee award, which will
be set by the court. It will generally be equal to a percentage of the recovery that is reasonably predictable in advance.1 1 4 To be sure, if the court
doubts the value of the settlement, it may reduce the fee award. However, the second fee, which is paid by the individual client, is not generally controlled by the court and may be grossly disproportionate to the
services actually rendered by the attorney at this stage.'1 5 Individual tort
victims tend not to be legally sophisticated and may often sign standard
contingency fee contracts that award the attorney as much as forty per113. See infra text accompanying notes 187-191.
114. Different formulas exist for computing the fee award, but the outcomes under
these formulas appear in the main to be similar regardless of the formula used. See
WilliamJ. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs' Bar Awarding the Attorney's Fee in ClassAction Litigation, 23 J. Legal Stud. 185, 209 (1994). In securities class actions, the fee
award will vary somewhat among the circuits, but will generally be between 20% and 30%
of the recovery. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 273 (9th Cir.
1989) (25% benchmark fee should normally be followed); In re Oracle Sys. Sec. Litig., 852
F. Supp. 1437, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (surveying recent studies and finding 30%
appropriate); In re Activision Sec. itig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(benchmark fee award near 30%); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp.
735, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (25% fee award is norm); 1 Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards
§ 2.08, at 51-52 (1993).
115. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark?, 87 UCLA L. Rev. 29, 31-32 (1989). In the Sikne Gel breast
implants class action the settlement agreement provided that administrative costs and legal
fees could not exceed 24% of the total settlement fund. See Tessie Bordon, Settlement
Funds Go to Pay Administrative Tab, Houston Post, Nov. 1, 1994, at All. This settlement
was approved with some minor modifications byJudge Sam Pointer. See In re Silicone Gel
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). Although Judge Pointer did not expressly limit the contingency fees
that individual attorneys could charge their clients, the existence of the 24% ceiling
coupled with extensive administrative costs for notice and fund management plus the
necessity of some separate fee award to class counsel made it mathematically inevitable that
contingency fees would have to be reduced (at least if most claimants had secured their
own counsel). The settlement also provided that the court could "make appropriate
reductions" in contingency fee arrangements, and many plaintiffs' attorneys interpreted
this statement to mean that a de facto ceiling would apply. See Mike McKee, Sparring
Over $1 Billion Pot: Breast-Implant Fund Spawns Angling, Anxiety, Legal Times
(Washington), May 9, 1994, at 4. Although this approach was commendable in intent, it
may have resulted in a counterproductive incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to advise their
clients to opt out from the class action. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
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cent of the recovery received by the victim. Once liability has been established by the class action settlement, the individual attorney often has
little more to do than to file a claim establishing the client's eligibility.
Typically, this filing can be done by a paralegal in a few hours. In this
setting, commentators have argued that contingency fees are unjustified
because the attorney is no longer exposed to any contingency or risk in
116
the case.
In some recent mass tort class actions in which there was no separate
inventory settlement, the attorneys' fees that individual law firms expected to receive from their clients alone approached the size of the largest class action fee awards. 117 The size of such contingency fees seems
unconscionable in light of the limited work to be performed once liability
has been established. Generally, the mass tort class action will establish
an independent "claims resolution facility" which requires only that individuals or their representatives present the necessary medical documenta118
tion and evidence of work history to receive compensation.
The mass tort claims resolution facility itself presents still another
area where the plaintiffs' attorney may have a sharp conflict of interest.
Traditionally, defendants and their counsel have not been involved in the
claim allocation process and have been largely indifferent as to how a
settlement was distributed so long as they received a release from further
liability. 119 For plaintiffs and their attorneys, however, the issues associated with the design of such claims facilities are often fundamental.
Should the settlement fund be distributed on a first-come, first-served basis? Or should payments be prorated or otherwise paid in deferred installments to ensure that the fund remains adequate to compensate future claimants? From a self-interested perspective, plaintiffs' attorneys
have little reason to hold back settlement funds for future claimants and
considerable reason to prefer a first-come, first-served approach. The latter approach affords them early payment both for existing clients and
new clients that they are well positioned to solicit because of their role as
class counsel. As a result, this desire for an early payout heightens the
possibility that the settlement fund will be exhausted before future claimants are compensated.
3. Eligibility Restictions andRllusory Benefits. - Even if a self-interested
plaintiffs' attorney is willing to enter into a "cheap" settlement, a problem
116. See Brickman, supra note 115, at 78.

117. In March 1995, the author was told by an attorney who requested anonymity but
who was participating in the Silicone Gel litigation, see infra text accompanying notes
241-264, that some firms in that case had large enough client inventories that they
expected to receive upwards of $50 million simply from their clients without regard to any

court-awarded fee to class counsel.
118. See Francis E. McGovern, Forward, Claims Resolution Facilities and the
Settlement of Mass Torts, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1990, at 1, 1. Typically,
defendants negotiate a lump sum settlement and thus have no further liability even if the

claims actually filed dwarf all projections and require a scaling back of the benefits.
119. See id. at 4.
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remains: the court must approve the proposed settlement. In a mass tort
case involving serious physical injuries or illness, this can be a significant
hurdle. Few, if any, courts would approve a settlement that accorded desperately ill plaintiffs only nominal consideration. For example, if the sole
producer of a carcinogenic product offered only $5000 compensation to
plaintiffs suffering from a form of cancer likely to have been caused by its
product, there would likely be a public outcry (and an appeal) if the
court accepted such a settlement that seemingly placed a $5000 price tag
on human life.
Accordingly, in order to structure a "cheap" settlement in a mass tort
case, the parties must do more than simply agree on compensation levels
below the amount that parties at arm's length would negotiate. Various
tactics to this end are possible. One is to impose rigorous eligibility criteria that would disqualify many or most within the plaintiff class-but in a
manner that is not self-evident to the court or to other third parties. For
example, severely restrictive eligibility criteria can be imposed 2 0 (i.e., a
ten-year occupational exposure, without an employment break, to asbestos). Or, in a mass tort property damage case, various losses that might
have been caused by factors other than the defective product can be
broadly and generically excluded from the settlement's coverage. 12 1 In
classes likely to be dominated by future claimants, another approach is to
provide for a very low inflation factor.' 2 Thus, as illnesses and injuries
inevitably arise over a thirty-year (or longer) period, the later claimants
will find their claims being released for compensation that is clearly inadequate by then-prevailing standards. Finally, the parties can simply underestimate the number and character of the claims likely to be filed
against the settlement fund. Given the multi-decade latency periods of
many mass torts, this is easy to do even with the best of intentions, but in
the common case where the defendants agree only to make a lump-sum
settlement, the result of such underestimation is to reduce radically the
benefits that future claimants will receive. Because projections of future
claims are both expensive to prepare and susceptible to manipulation,
120. For precisely this example, see infra note 286.
121. Again, for such an example, see infra note 286.
122. This was a major issue in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 278
(E.D. Pa. 1994); see also infra notes 213-214 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
inflation on Georgine settlement). The appropriate inflation factor to use in determining
the payments to future claimants is an extremely sensitive determination. In the National

Gypsum mass tort bankruptcy, "the court adopted a three to four percent annual inflation
rate for future settlement values," rejecting the rate of six to eight percent sought by future
claimants. Dunbar & Neumann, supra note 58, at 31. Although the higher rate may better
reflect recent national experience, even it probably serves as a poor proxy for determining

the increased medical costs that the future claimant will face on becoming ill after a long
latency period. The rate of increase in medical costs has recently exceeded the overall
inflation rate by a considerable margin. See Mike Causey, HMOs May Be Best Route,
Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1995, at B2 (noting "medical cost increases that typically are double or
triple the inflation rate"). A low inflation rate leaves the claimant with an inadequate

settlement to pay those costs.
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plaintiffs' attorneys will be inclined to rely on data prepared by defendants and thus need not engage in anything resembling active collusion.
As a result, acquiesence by plaintiffs' attorneys in an underfunded settlement may be the gravest danger that future claimants face.
There are no 'doubt justifications for some occupational exposure
criteria and for some exclusions from coverage, and by definition projections will sometimes miss the mark. The critical point, however, is that
these are issues that the parties uniquely understand, but which the court
approving the settlement may only dimly perceive. Put more simply,
complex damages, eligibility, and causation issues tend to arise more
commonly and in more complex variations in mass tort cases than they
do in ordinary commercial class action litigation. As a result, when the
plaintiffs' attorney is subject to a conflict of interest, the parties may find
it easier to blind even a well-motivated court to their proposed settlement's impact because a higher level of expertise is necessary to evaluate
the settlement.
4. Settlement Classes. - Nothing better facilitates collusion than the
ability on the part of the defendants to choose the counsel who will represent the plaintiff class. To be sure, even if so chosen, plaintiffs' counsel
could behave responsibly. But the dynamics for collusion are set in motion when such a selection process is possible.
Surprisingly, this practice is today not only possible but rapidly becoming common.' 2 3 The new procedure involves negotiations between
defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys prior to certification of the class action' 24-and, in some particularly dramatic cases, prior even to the filing
of the class action. 12 5 Obviously, this approach allows the defendants to
test out settlement terms (potentially with several teams of plaintiffs' attorneys) before any action is filed. Then, when and if an agreement is
reached, the action will be filed as a "settlement class." Originally, the
term "settlement class" seems to have meant only that in certifying the
class "for settlement purposes," the court would defer any decision as to
whether the proposed class actually satisfied Rule 23's certification
criteria until after negotiations produced (or failed to produce) a settle123. Settlement class actions are not only common, but in some district courts appear
to constitute the majority of certified class actions. Preliminary data collected by Federal
Judicial Center researchers investigating class action activity in two selected district courts
indicated that out of 63 motions for class certification in the Northern District of
California during a two-year period, approximately 19 (or 30%) were certified for
settlement purposes only; correspondingly, out of 97 motions for class certification in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, approximately 18 (or 13%) resulted in certification for
settlement purposes only. See Willging et al., supra note 14, at 23-24. Viewed in terms of
the total classes that were certified, this data translates into a finding that roughly 54% of
N.D. California certified class actions and 26% of E.D. Pennsylvania certified class actions
were certified as settlement classes.
124. See Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (upholding precertification settlement), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993).
125. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 267-68 (describing negotiation of settlement prior to
filing of the class action); infra text accompanying notes 187-191.
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ment.126 Under this approach, defendants waived no rights and could
still object if the negotiations failed. Some recent decisions and the developing practice seem, however, to conflate the issue of class certification with that of settlement adequacy: if the settlement seems fair, then
the court assumes that the class can be certified (on the apparent theory
that the predominant common issue for purposes of Rule 23 is the fairness of the settlement)127

From the defendants' perspective, any attempt to reach an agreement by means of a settlement class is a "no lose" proposition: if defendants can obtain agreement from plaintiffs' attorneys and the court to a
favorable settlement, the technique advances their interests; if they cannot, they are no worse off and can still object to any attempt by plaintiffs
to obtain final class certification. More importantly, at least at the prefiling stage, the plaintiffs' attorneys with whom the defendants are negotiating are always aware that if they do not reach agreement, the defense
attorneys can move on and try their luck with a new team of plaintiffs'
attorneys. Indeed, this is the critical difference between the evolving "settlement class action" procedure and negotiations between the parties in a
conventional class action. In the latter context, if the defendants rebuff
plaintiffs' counsel, the plaintiffs' team can litigate to a judgment. In the
settlement class action, however, the plaintiffs' attorney has only a commission to settle and not to litigate. Such a plaintiffs' attorney has little
more than a right of first refusal on the terms offered by the defendants.
As this attorney must be painfully aware, a failure to exercise that option
implies only that the option may pass to whomever is next in line. Thus,
the bottom line is that the availability of the settlement class action tends
to reduce the plaintiffs' attorney's negotiating leverage.
Courts have long been aware of the potential for lawyer-shopping
that exists in informal settlement negotiations.' 2 8 The original Manual
126. See Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975); Greenfield v. Villager
Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 826, 832-33 (3d Cir. 1973).
127. This interpretation, however, plainly misreads Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23. Rule 23(a) (2) requires that for a class to be certified there must be "questions of law or
fact common to the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2). If the class is to be certified under
Rule 23(b) (3) (as most actions for money damages must be), then these common issues

must also "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." Fed. 1K
Civ. P. 23(b) (3). Also, Rule 23(b) (3) requires the court to determine that a "class action is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." Id. By focusing only on the settlement's fairness, a few courts have found the

fact of a settlement largely resolves these latter issues of "predominance" and "superiority."
See Gewrgine, 157 F.R.D. at 816; Bowling, 143 F.R.D. at 160. But see In re General Motors
Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), discussed

infra note 285 and accompanying text.
128. Consider, for example, the following judicial statement:
[A] person who unofficially represents the class during settlement negotiations
may be under strong pressure to conform to the defendants' wishes. This is so
because such an individual, lacking official status, knows that a negotiating
defendant may not like his "attitude" and may try to reach a settlement with
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for Complex Litigation strongly discouraged the use of a settlement class
action, pointing to the dangers that plaintiffs' counsel would not be able
129
to live up to its fiduciary responsibility in such a conflict-laden context.
During the 1980s, however, courts gradually retreated from the Manual's
original per se rule. In Weinberger v. Kendrick,' 30 Judge Henry Friendly
acknowledged the dangers latent in any settlement reached before the
class was certified, but reasoned that the court could "scrutinize the fairness of the settlement with even more than usual care."' 3 1
Recognizing these dangers, some decisions accepted the settlement
class only when all class members were treated identically and the prospects for conflicts among them seemed minimal. 3 2 This is clearly not
the case in the mass tort context. Here, substantial variation in the type
and severity of injury is the norm, not the exception. In part for this
reason, some courts of appeals in the early to mid-1980s reversed certifications of mass tort settlement class actions. 133
The major turning point in judicial attitudes toward the settlement
class action came in 1989 in the Dalkon Shield mass tort litigation.
Rather than viewing a settlement class as presumptively suspicious, the
Fourth Circuit instead saw the existence of a tentative settlement as a positive factor. "If not a ground for certification per se, certainly settlement
should be a factor, and an important factor, to be considered when determining certification."13 4
In force until this year, the Manualfor Complex Litigation (Second) still
urged "great caution" in certifying a settlement class action. 3 5- It

explained:
In such situations, the fairness of the settlement may be very difficult to assess. No one may know how many members are in the
class, how large their potential claims are, what the strength and
another member of the class.. . . Consequently, when the settlement is not
negotiated by a court designated class representative the court must be doubly
careful in evaluating the fairness of the settlement to plaintiff's class.
Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1971).

129. See Manual for Complex Litigation § 1.46, at 60-61 (5th ed. 1982).
130. 698 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983). For similar
statements, see also Mars Steel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 884 F.2d 677, 681
(7th Cir. 1987) (finding settlement substantively and procedurally fhir because the
plaintiffs' class would receive the expected value of its claim and notice was adequate); In

re Beef Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 174-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding partial settlement
fair and reasonable because it was necessary, included all defendants, and reduced the

burden on settling plaintiffs), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
131. Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73.
132. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 105 F.R.D. 475, 480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

133. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'g
102 F.R.D. 239, 241 (S.D. Ohio 1984). As of 1986, Professor Linda Mullenix observed that

"scant authority supports the proposition that a class can be certified for settlement
purposes only." Mullenix, supra note 11, at 1039.

134. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989).
135. Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) § 30.45, at 243 (1985).
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weakness of the parties' positions are, or how much the class
members will benefit under the settlement. Lacking this information, the court should be wary of presenting the settlement to
the class.' 3 6
These words are particularly true in the case of mass torts, where the
future claimants' problem dwarfs the problem of evaluating fairness in
ordinary class actions. Nonetheless, the new Manualfor Complex Litigation
(Third) relaxes standards still further by first noting that cost and time
savings have lead courts to "permit the use of settlement classes and the
negotiation of settlement before class certification," and then expressing
the mild caution that "settlements involving settlement classes . .. [require] closer judicial scrutiny than approval of settlements where class
certification has been litigated." 8 7 In short, the progression from the
first to the third Manual reveals a dilution in the tenor of its warnings
about settlement classes, which is concomitant with the growing percentage of the federal civil docket that mass torts represent.
When courts first accepted settlement class actions, the normal pattern was that parties litigated actively for a period of months or longer,
sparring over discovery and related motions-until reaching a tentative
agreement on a settlement. In contrast, the newer pattern has involved a
settlement reached after little or no active litigation (and sometimes
38
before the complaint is filed).,
Judicial attitudes toward the settlement class action have divided in
one important respect. Some courts have found it necessary only to determine that the settlement is fair and adequate, dispensing with, or relaxing the standard for, the specific findings required by Rule 23.13 9
Conversely, the Third Circuit has insisted upon the same findings in a
settlement class action as in one certified for trial. 14° This relaxed atti136. Id.
137. Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.45, at 243 (1995).
138. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1993); In rejoint
E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 728 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re
Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); see generally 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 96,

§ 11.27 (discussing temporary settlement classes).
139. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *76-*77 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994); see also Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316 (E.D. Pa 1994) (finding that the fairness and
adequacy of the settlement is a "predominant issue for purposes of Rule 23(b) (3)");
Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (approving settlement, noting

"egalitarian fairness" in treating class members alike), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th
Cir. 1993). In effect, this approach means that if the court believes the settlement is fair, it
can also thereby find that the "predominance" and "superiority" requirements of a Rule

23(b) (3) class action are also satisfied; these requirements are the principal doctrinal
hurdles for certification of a class action seeking money damages. See infra note 142.

140. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1995). Rule 23(a) requires findings of numerosity, typicality,
commonality, and adequacy of representation, and Rule 23(b) (3) requires additional
findings of superiority and predominance as to class actions certified under Rule 23(b) (3).
See Fed. P. Civ. P. 23(a), (b) (3).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1343

tude of some courts toward settlement classes contrasts with their generally harsher attitude toward certification of mass tort class actions when
the defendant objects. 14 1 For plaintiffs, this disparity increases the pressure to settle. For defendants, the current state of the law represents the
best of both worlds: uncertainty as to whether a "hostile" class action can
be certified, but receptivity toward settlement classes.
5. Restricting Opt Outs: Mandatory Classes and the Limited Fund Theory.
Probably the most aggressive tactic that has been attempted recently
in connection with a "friendly" mass tort settlement is the certification of
a "mandatory" class action from which class members may not opt out.
Normally, a class action seeking money damages must be certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3),142 and in such a case,
class members have an express right to opt out.14 3
Because "small claimants" have little incentive to opt out and because future claimants have little ability to do so, a "mandatory" class action principally impacts "high stakes" present claimants who would otherwise pursue individual actions. In reality, certification of a Rule
23(b) (1) (B) mandatory class is a protection for defendants against the
"danger" that high stakes individual claimants, dissatisfied with the terms
of the settlement class, will opt out. If this were to happen, defendants
would lose the benefit of the settlement because they might have to pay
twice: once to the claims resolution facility established by the settlement,
and again to individual claimants who opt out.'4 Yet, the existence of
141. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
142. Rule 23(b) (3) provides that a class action may be certified if "the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b) (3). In shorthand, these are known as the "predominance" and "superiority"
requirements.
143. Rule 23(c) (2) provides that in any class action maintained under subdivision
(b) (3), the court shall "advise each member that.., the court will exclude the member
from the class if the member so requests by a specified date." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2). The
right to opt out is also protected by the Due Process Clause, but only to an uncertain
degree. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Brown v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994);
infra notes 407-439 and accompanying text.
144. Of course, defendants can (and do) protect themselves against this danger by
including a provision in the settlement agreement entitling them to back out if a specific
percentage or number of class members chooses to opt out. See Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,325 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that defendants had chosen not to
exercise this right). The S'iome Gel settlement also contained such a provision, and the
district court noted, even as of 1994, that the number of opt outs "raises the specter that
one or more defendants may elect to withdraw from the settlement in view of the risks and
costs of potential litigation with these claimants." In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17, *23, and *65 (N.D.
Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). Such a withdrawal or "walkaway" provision is analogous to the common
provision in a merger agreement permitting the acquiring firm to elect to cancel the
merger if more than a specified percentage of the stockholders of the acquired firm elect
to exercise their statutory right of appraisal.

19951

CLASS WARS

1383

substantial opt outs may be the best evidence that the original settlement
was inadequate (and possibly collusive).
Attempts to obtain certification of a mandatory class action under
Rule 23(b) (1) (B) usually seek to rely on the justification that, absent
pooling and proration among all claimants, the defendant's limited assets
soon will be exhausted to the prejudice of future claimants, who will not
receive compensation. There are at least two short answers to this justification: First, bankruptcy handles this pooling function much better, and
with superior safeguards and procedures, than does the class action.'I
In particular, claimants in bankruptcy are protected by the "absolute priority" rule, which precludes the debtor's shareholders from participating
in the reorganized company until all creditors have been paid in full. 146
Second, the prediction that one's assets are insufficient to handle future
claims is easily made, particularly by self-interested defendants. When the
court accepts this claim, the defendant may be able to escape with a settlement that scales back its tort liability, whereas in bankruptcy, it would
be forced to transfer virtually all its equity to its creditors. 14 7 Until rea "limited
cently, possibly for these reasons in part, attempts to certify
148
fund" class action have generally been reversed on appeal.
Other techniques for restricting opt outs also have been used recently. If a large number of class members do opt out, defendants may
claim that the objectors to the settlement misinformed them about the
litigation and request the court to invalidate all existing-requests to opt
out from the class. If they are successful, a second notice and opt out
period will be provided, but the impact may be to exhaust and demoralize the objecting attorneys who labored to canvass their individual clients.
In addition, the court can require that a disclosure statement be circulated informing the class members that in the determination of the court
they have been misinformed by materially misleading communications
earlier provided to them. For example, in Georgine v. Amchem Products,
145. See infra text accompanying notes 457-470.
146. In principle, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits confirmation of a plan of
reorganization that permits a junior class to participate in the distribution unless the
claims of all senior classes are paid or satisfied in full. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2) (1994).

In reality, shareholders do obtain a modest share in the reorganized company alongside
the former creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over

Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 125, 181 (1990). Still, even if the equity receives 10 to 15% of the

reorganized company because of its nuisance value, this pattern contrasts sharply with the
Aheam v. Fibreboard class action, see infra text accompanying notes 215-240, where
stockholders made no more than a nominal contribution to the class action settlement.
147. See infia text accompanying notes 163-171.
148. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1011 (3d Cir. 1986); In re N. Dist.

of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 857 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). But see Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cv526, 1995

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11062 (E.D. Tex.July 27, 1995) (discussed infra text accompanying notes
215-240).
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Inc.,1 49 Judge Reed both invalidated some 236,323 individual opt outs
and refused to permit plaintiffs' attorneys to execute forms on behalf of
their individual clients.
Although plaintiffs' attorneys specializing in individual trial work
have self-interested reasons to advise their clients to opt out, the better
remedy might be to permit the settling parties to try to lure these opt outs
to opt back in.150 Otherwise, the draconian remedy of en masse invalidation seems capable of confusing clients and exhausting individual plaintiffs' attorneys.
6. Initial Summay. - Part I has made a depressingly simple point:
conflicts of interest permeate the mass tort field. These conflicts are not
only between attorney and client, but between present claimants and future claimants. Because of the inevitable heterogeneity among class
members in personal injury class actions and also because of the uniquely
exposed position of future claimants, the conflict problem is probably
more intense and aggravated in mass torts than in other areas of class
action or high volume litigation. Yet these conflicts largely have been
ignored in the recent commentary on mass torts, obscured behind a mist
of rhetoric about public law approaches and the need to protect the federal docket from inundation.
Even if courts wanted to monitor these conflicts closely, it is doubtful
that they currently have the tools to do so. Attempts to estimate the impact of inflation a half-century away or to project the number of future
claims likely to arise are little more than a stab in the dark. Yet, as will be
seen next, there is very little evidence that courts want to engage in such
monitoring.
II. CASE STumns rN MAss TORT CLAss ACTIONS
Context counts. Critics invariably overgeneralize by treating all mass
tort cases alike. Not only does the behavior of the parties differ from
context to context, but judicial behavior in particular seems to change,
depending in large measure on the degree of pressure that a generic type
of litigation places on the court. This section will focus on three distinct
subcontexts: (1) asbestos litigation; (2) silicone gel breast implants; (3)
mass disaster litigation; and (4) mass tort property damage litigation.
A. Asbestos Litigation
1. Background. - Although, like a massive, unending river, asbestos
litigation has flowed through the courts, it at least had a definable start149. 160 F.R.D. 478, 500-02 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
150. That is, after the court approved a revised disclosure document, defendants
could circulate it to the class members who had previously opted out and request them to
cancel their earlier opt out decision. Silence by the class members would leave them in the
position of having opted out. This approach divides the logistical burden of canvassing the
class members between the two sides.
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ing point: the Fifth Circuit's holding in 1973 that asbestos manufacturers
could be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from asbestos exposure. 15 1 By 1992, less than twenty years later, an estimated 200,000 personal injury claims, each typically naming multiple defendants, had been
filed or were pending nationwide. 152 Yet, even this number may represent only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. By some estimates, upwards of
twenty-one million Americans have been exposed to asbestos in a manner
that risks serious health problems,' 55 and estimates as high as an additional 250,000 to 500,000 deaths from asbestos exposure have been
responsibly made.1M Nor has the pace of case filings begun to slacken.
15 5
By 1990, the rate of case filings was increasing at an exponential pace.
Because asbestos cases tended to be geographically concentrated
(basically in eastern and Gulf coastal areas where shipyards, which once
used asbestos abundantly, were located), federal courts there first began
to experiment with aggregative processing techniques in asbestos litigation. The most innovative and successful experiment was that employed
by Judge Robert Parker of the Eastern District of Texas. Faced with over
2000 aggregated claims, Judge Parker selected 160 representative cases
and tried them in three phased stages before three juries.' 5 6 In Phase I,
the first jury ruled basically on the question of liability; in Phase II, two
newjuries were presented evidence on plaintiffs' exposure to defendants'
products. Finally, in Phase III, the same two juries considered contributory negligence issues' 57 and then, sitting separately, awarded damages
for two different groups of claimants. The actual individual plaintiffs received the verdict that the jury awarded them, but the awards in these
representative cases were then averaged and the other claimants, whose
cases were not tried, received the average amount for their subgroup.
The result conserved both judicial time and the notoriously expensive
151. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
152. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1004.
153. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 736 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re
Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
154. See id. at 746; see also Steven L. Schultz, Note, In reJoint Eastern & Southern
District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposal for Use of Federal
Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 553, 560 n.39 (1992) (citing
estimate of 500,000 likely deaths).
155. Between 1989 and 1990, the number of asbestos-related personal injury case
filings in federal court increased by 66%, from 8230 in 1989 to 13,687 in 1990. See
Schultz, supra note 154, at 555 n.9.
156. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(consolidating asbestos cases for trial on common issues).
157. See Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 815, 822
(1992); see also Trangsrud, Mass Trials, supra note 4, at 80-82 (criticizing use of multiple
phases in mass tort actions).
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transaction costs of asbestos litigation. 158 All this was accomplished

through consolidation of cases and without the use of the class action
format.
Subsequently, Judge Parker's consolidation and sampling approach
was replicated on an even larger scale in a Baltimore trial that covered
some 8500 cases.1a 9 Although commentators applauded this consolidation approach for its ability to distinguish among categories of injury
(and thus avoid the gross distortions when inventories of cases are settled
based on often arbitrary allocation formulas), 6 0 neither defendants nor
61
mass tort practitioners have shown any enthusiasm for this approach.'
Trial lawyers prefer to pursue punitive damages in individual actions, and
the defendants (who appealed Judge Parker's decision to use sampling
techniques) appear to prefer the delay and negotiating leverage that a
62
congested docket affords them.'
2. The Bankruptcy Alternative. - Beginning in the early 1980s, a
number of asbestos producers, including Johns-Manville Corporation,

the industry's largest firm, sought the protection of bankruptcy to obtain
relief from cascading asbestos claims.' 63 According to the Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
eleven out of the twenty-five major asbestos manufacturers had sought
bankruptcy protection by 1991.164 At the time, these bankruptcies were
controversial within the bankruptcy bar because of their "novel premise
that the corporation was entitled to bankruptcy protection not because it
was insolvent, but because continuing trends in asbestos litigation made a
bankruptcy reorganization the best way to manage the payment of present and future claims."' 6 5 That asbestos producers sought bankruptcy
reorganization should not have been surprising. Facing a future of seem158. See supra note 15.
159. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1004 n.235, 1054.
160. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 157, at 826-41.
161. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 37, at 1054.
162. In addition, as discussed infra at notes 183-191 and accompanying text,
defendants benefitted from the decision to consolidate and stay all pending federal
asbestos cases in 1990.
163. At least fifteen major asbestos producers filed for bankruptcy reorganization
during this period, beginning with Unarco Industries in July 1982 and Johns-Manville
Corporation in August 1982. For a partial list, see Notice of Class Action, Global
Settlement and Third-Party Claimant Class Settlement and Hearing at 17, Ahearn v.
Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cv526, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11062 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995)
[hereinafter Aheam Class Action Notice] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For
representative decisions, see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.),
mandamus denied, 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 29 B.R. 741
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984).
164. See Asbestos Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 69, at 14, reprinted in
Asbestos Litig. Rep. at 22705.
165. Smith, supra note 61, at 373; see also Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy?
Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy aw-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 Iowa L. Rev.
199, 202-10 (1985) (discussingJohns-Manville bankruptcy).
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ingly endless, repetitive, and expensive individual cases, these defendants
understandably wanted a quick fix that would resolve all asbestos liabilities in one proceeding. The hope was that a transfer of assets could be
made to a mass tort bankruptcy trust, which could then use low-cost arbitration procedures to resolve eligibility and damage issues among the
claimants. In addition, asbestos defendants undoubtedly hoped that
under this arrangement their shareholders could retain a significant
had become the standard outcome in
share of their equity, because that166
other bankruptcy reorganizations.
That bankruptcy reorganization would prove more advantageous to
defendants than litigation quickly proved an unfounded hope. JohnsManville Corporation transferred eighty percent of its ownership to its
bankruptcy trust. 1 67 Yet, even this contribution proved inadequate.

Funded with nearly $5 billion in assets, the Manville Personal Injury
Settlement Trust opened in 1988. Two years later, it was effectively insolvent.'6 8 Although it had been estimated that some 83,000 to 100,000
claims would be filed during the life of the Trust (extending well into the
twenty-first century), 240,000 claims were in fact filed by the end of 1994,
169
and several hundred thousand more claims were expected to be filed.
From a public policy perspective, the principal lesson from the
Manville reorganization is that, unless restricted, present claimants will
deplete virtually any settlement fund in short order, leaving future claimants empty-handed. Yet, ironically, future claimants receive both more
substantive protection (i.e., the absolute priority rule) and considerably
more procedural protection in bankruptcy than they enjoy today in class
action settlements.' 70 Thus, although the bankruptcy experience under166. Although the "absolute priority" rule in bankruptcy entitles creditors to be paid
in full before shareholders retain any share in the bankrupt entity, the empirical reality is
that shareholders possess a nuisance value which they can exploit to obtain participation in
the 10 to 15% range in corporate reorganizations. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note
146, at 179-90.

167. See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 485 (E. &S.D.N.Y.
1995).
168. See Smith, supra note 61, at 368-69.
169. See JointE. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. at 485-86.
170. For example, while subclasses in a class action are largely discretionary with the
trial court, bankruptcy gives far more formal procedural protection to classes of creditors
(including the right to a class vote). When a class of creditors votes against a plan of
reorganization, the plan may only be approved under the so-called "cram down" provisions
of Chapter 11, which basically require the court to find that the absolute priority rule has
been complied with and that all members of the dissenting class have been paid in full.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994). In contrast, Rule 23 requires neither approval by the class
members nor satisfaction of absolute priority. The relatively open-textured liberality of

Rule 23 has recently caused it to be viewed as an alternative mechanism by which even

corporate bondholders might be forced to accept a reorganization plan that would not
satisfy the absolute priority rule. See Richard L Epling, Are Rule 23 Class Actions A Viable

Alternative to the Bankruptcy Code?, 23 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1555, 1568-69 (1993).
Two recent asbestos mass tort proceedings, one resolved in bankruptcy, the other in a
class action, provide a useful contrast. In In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 759
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lines the vulnerability of future claimants, it also suggests that a bankruptcy proceeding may be a superior alternative to a class action.
For defendants, the practical lesson from the Johns-Manville experience with mass tort bankruptcy is that it is neither cheap nor final. When
the Manville Trust became insolvent, Judge Jack Weinstein engineered a
class action to restructure and increase the payments to the Manville
Trust from the newly organized Manville Corporation. 17 1 Absent finality,
the attractions of mass tort bankruptcy thus looked minimal to the corporate planner, and so the search turned to other alternatives.
3. The Return of the Asbestos ClassAction. - During the mid-1980s, the
asbestos industry pinned its hopes primarily on alternative modes of dispute resolution. The Asbestos Claims Facility, an industry-wide consor72
tium, and its descendant, the Center for Claims Resolution (CCR),'
sought during this period to encourage expeditious resolutions of claims
in order to avoid the expense of litigation. Its premise was that because
over sixty percent of asbestos-related expenses went to attorneys' fees and
costs, early settlement could economize on this component.' 73 Yet, the
more claims they settled, the more plaintiffs' attorneys invested in search
activities to discover new claimants. From the defendants' perspective,
informal resolution also brought about a deterioration in the quality of
claims, as individuals without visible symptoms or incapacity, but with a
telltale pleural thickening on their pulmonary walls, increasingly
predominated within the claimant population.' 74 Attempts by defendants to establish "pleural registries," which deferred payment to
unimpaired asbestos claimants while preserving their tort claims if their
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), mandamus denied, 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984), the court appointed a
special representative for future claimants. In contrast, in Georgine v. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 317-19 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the court found it unnecessary to recognize
special subclasses or even to appoint a guardian ad litem. Even if subclasses are
recognized, however, there is no provision for a class vote, and the reaction of class
members to the settlement is generally discounted by the court.
171. See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re Findley,
993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
172. See supra note 83. The CCR was formed in 1988 when the asbestos-related
bankruptcy of some major participants in the Asbestos Claims Facility forced the Facility's
dissolution. In addition, philosophical differences arose among its members, some of
whom wished to take a harder, more adversarial stance toward plaintiffs. See Deborah R.
Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L Rev. 1587, 1608-09 (1995).
173. For this 60%+ estimate, see supra note 15. In theJohns-Manville bankruptcy, the
court estimated the amount of compensation received by victims to be even lower (namely,
only 30 cents out of every dollar expended). SeeJointE. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R.
at 749.
174. Known as "pleural plaques," such pulmonary calcification or thickening is
generally believed to be caused by exposure to asbestos, and may foretell more serious
future illness (including cancer), but is not by itself incapacitating. See id. at 739-41.
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injuries worsened, proved unsuccessful. 175 Not surprisingly, few asbestos
victims preferred deferral to an immediate cash payment (with the right
in most jurisdictions to bring a later suit if their condition deteriorated).
Meanwhile, pressure for change was building within the judiciary. In
1990, an informal network of ten federal district judges attempted to establish an "ad hoc nationwide coordinating committee" to resolve the as176
bestos case load crisis through case consolidation and management.
Although the Sixth Circuit refused to accept this unauthorized innovation, 17 7 the judges' joint action led to further developments. In March
1991, the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, appointed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist in 1990, released its report, which concluded that "this
litigation impasse cannot be broken except by aggregate or class proceedings."'17 8 It recommended that Congress create "a national system for
resolving asbestos claims which at the very least permits consolidating all
179
asbestos claims in a single forum."
Based on this hint that nationwide consolidation was now appropriate, eight federal district judges with heavy asbestos caseloads petitioned
the JPML in 1991 to consdlidate all asbestos personal injury cases in the
federal system in a single forum.' 8 0 Despite having refused a similar request on five previous occasions,' 8 ' theJPML decided now to go with the
flow, curiously emphasizing the risk of further bankruptcies if it did not
82
do-so.1
By an order dated July 29, 1991, the JPML transferred all pending
personal injury asbestos cases to Judge Charles R. Weiner of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.18 3 Two days, later, on August 1, 1991, Judge
175. See Hensler, supra note 172, at 1608; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 83, at
13-15.
176.
Lawsuits,
177.
178.

See Stephen Labaton, 10 Federal Judges Agree on Plan to Consolidate Asbestos
N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1990, at 1.
See In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 915 F.2d 190, 191 (6th Cir. 1990).
Asbestos Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 69, at 19, reprinted in Asbestos

Litig. Rep. at 22708.
179. Id. at 30, reprinted in Asbestos Litig. Rep. at 22713.
180. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).

181. See id. at 417.
182. See id. at 421-22. As discussed infra, bankruptcy may be a much better system
for dealing with future claims. The JPML also, however, appropriately stressed the

absurdity of multiple awards of punitive damages to present claimants, which can work to
deny recovery to future claimants.
183. Revealingly, Philadelphia was also the federal district court with the most
asbestos cases (5703) then pending on its civil docket. See Lisa Gibbs, Strategy Changes in

Asbestos Cases, Miami Rev., Sept. 12, 1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
ARCNWS File. Thus, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appears to have been the district
court under the greatest pressure to achieve a global settlement. The transfer to the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988), which permits
transfer for pretrial purposes, such as discovery and pretrial motions. In reality, however, it

is well understood that relatively few cases are remanded to the transferor court, but are
usually settled or resolved by the transferee court. See Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 44,

at 509-10 (citing data).
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Robert Parker, Chair of the Judicial Conference's subcommittee with re-

sponsibility for asbestos litigation and a former member of the Ad Hoc
Committee appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist,'8 wrote to Judge Weiner and, in the course of a generally hortatory letter, outlined the task
before him:
We now have an opportunity to prove that the federal
courts are not impotent. It is incumbent upon us to establish
that we are viable as an institution and that we can provide modem solutions for modem problems. If we fail to rise to the task,
I fear far reaching consequences.
I deeply believe we are not irrelevant-that we do have a
role in our society that is greater than refereeing one-on-one
litigation in an expensive and cumbersome manner ....
I view your role as one of the commanding generals. You
are the Eisenhower of this D-Day operation. The rest of us are
colonels prepared to take orders in this joint effort ....
The

magnitude of this assignment is unprecedented in federal court
history.
I would encourage you to at all times maintain a focus on
the problem as a whole and not let the lawyers mire you into
individual or small group considerations. If you let them, they
can dominate your time to the point of rendering the transferee
judge ineffective as far as the overall solution is concerned.
Case management as applied to individual cases or consolidated
groups simply will not work on this problem.
I would encourage you to be reluctant to grant exemptions
to transfer. The fact that some judge may have X number of
cases scheduled to go to trial two months or six months from
now and on that basis (contrary to the MDL Order) gains an
exemption from this process, in myjudgment, is counterproductive. I think we have to continually focus on the larger problem.
This focus will produce dynamics that should work toward the
larger solution. 185

184. See supra notes 69 and 164 and accompanying text.
185. Letter from The Honorable Robert M. Parker, Chief Judge, United States
District Court, Eastern District of Texas, to The Honorable Charles R. Weiner, United
States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania 1-2 (Aug. 1, 1991) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). This letter was also circulated to a number of other federal judges
prominent in mass torts litigation, including Judge Jack Weinstein, who filed it with the
clerk of the district court for the Eastern District of New York. Both Judges Parker and
Weiner had earlier been active in calling for concerted judicial action to resolve the
asbestos litigation crisis. See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 746-49
(E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing both judges as taking leading roles), vacated on other
grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1998). Hence, the JPML was referring all asbestos personal injury cases to a known
participant in the prior debate. In quoting this letter, there is no intent to suggest any
breach ofjudicial ethics or other impropriety, the point is rather the degree to which it
shows that the bench has come to self-consciously see itself as an interest group, which
needs to act (and bargain) collectively.

1995]

CLASS WARS

1391

Clearly, this letter contemplated that Judge Weiner would stay all
pending asbestos litigation, granting very few "special hardship" transfers
back to the court from which individual cases were transferred. In blunt
terms, Judge Parker advised that pressure must be kept on one side (the
plaintiffs' attorneys) to induce a global settlement. So admonished,
Judge Weiner did indeed slow the pace of asbestos litigation in the federal courts-to the point that fewer than one dozen asbestos cases in federal court appear to have been tried to a verdict or fully settled between
the July 29, 1991 transfer date and July 1992.186
More importantly, the Parker/Weiner correspondence indicates that
asbestos litigation had transcended the usual bilateral context of private
litigation and had become a public policy concern in which the judiciary
was determined to play a proactive role. The consolidation of asbestos
litigation was then the culmination of a coordinated campaign by federal
district judges to pressure plaintiffs (and their attorneys) to enter into
global settlement discussions with defendants. In short order, nationwide
defendants' and plaintiffs' asbestos steering committees were formed,
and, throughout the remainder of 1991, exploratory talks continued between the two sides.
Contemporaneously with these developments, defendants' behavior
toward pending asbestos cases changed sharply. Because without Judge
Weiner's consent plaintiffs could no longer proceed to trial in federal
court, defendants (and particularly the largest industry consortium-the
CCR) began to stonewall, resisting any individual settlements. Despite
repeated requests from plaintiffs' attorneys to allow a transfer of their
cases back to their original jurisdictions, Judge Weiner remained adamant. Gradually, his message became clear: no individual settlements
would occur outside a global resolution of all asbestos claims. Because
many asbestos victims were desperately ill and dying, this tactic greatly
increased the pressure on the plaintiffs' steering committee. Nonetheless, in November 1991, the plaintiffs' steering committee rejected the
defendants' steering committee's offer of a global settlement. In truth,
this rejection should not have been surprising. With respect to asbestos
litigation, the plaintiffs' bar has always been split between "litigators" and
"settlers"-those attorneys with a "high quality" clientele having serious
injuries and those with a massive, but diverse, inventory of cases. Divisions on the plaintiffs' steering committee appear to have mirrored those
within the plaintiffs' bar.
What happened next, however, was surprising. Recognizing that the
plaintiffs' steering committee had been split over whether to accept their
proposals, the CCR decided to approach the two co-Chairmen of the
186. See Andrew Blum, Asbestos Group Asks for Halt to MDL, Nat'l L.J.,July 13, 1992,
at 7 (reporting that a majority of the 18-member plaintiffs' steering committee appointed
by Judge Weiner had filed a motion with the JPML asking that the MDL proceeding be

dissolved, citing in part the alleged fact that fewer than a dozen federal cases had been
fully resolved in the interim).
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plaintiffs' steering committee, Gene Locks and Ron Motley, 187 and attempt to negotiate a separate settlement with their firms covering all future personal injury claimants in the United States who had been exposed to asbestos. Although it is speculative to guess why the CCR
targeted these two law firms, both controlled large inventories of asbestos
cases and would benefit greatly from an inventory settlement of them. 18 8
In any event, the CCR, which had previously indicated its unwillingness to
settle inventories with plaintiffs' firms in light ofJudge Weiner's stay order, entered into negotiations with these two law firms to settle their entire inventory of asbestos cases. Ultimately, these inventory negotiations
resulted in the CCR defendants agreeing to settle claims held by the
14,000 clients of these two firms for a total of just over $215 million.' 8 9
Because the court never permitted discovery of either attorney, the contingent fees that both firms stood to receive is not known, but ofi the
standard assumption of a one-third contingency fee, the participating law
firms would have received over $71 million. Nor would this be their only
benefit from the litigation. The CCR also agreed to pay any attorneys'
fees that the court decided to award to class counsel. 9 0 In return,
Messrs. Locks and Motley agreed that even if the class action settlement
fell through, they would not file new claims against the CCR defendants
that did not meet the highly restrictive medical criteria for compensation
included in the proposed class action settlement.' 9 1
187. In his deposition in Geoigine, Mr. Lawrence Fitzpatrick, Chief Executive Officer
of the CCR, testified that: "We decided to target two law firms for our initial settlement
discussions. Those firms were the firms of Ness, Motley and Greitzer & Locks." Deposition
of Lawrence Fitzpatrick, Chief Executive Officer of CCR, inJoint Appendix at 1191-94,
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 94-1925 (8d Cir. Feb. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Joint
Appendix] (on file with author).
188. Mr. Fitzpatrick testified at his deposition in response to a question as to why CCR
had targeted these two firms that "Ness Motley had probably the most number of cases" Id.
at 1192. Other attorneys active in mass tort litigation have commented to the author that
the firm of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole is generally recognized as the
largest firm (in terms of cases handled) in the asbestos field and is also active in much
other mass tort litigation. Mr. Gene Locks of Greitzer & Locks has described his firm to
the author as having the largest inventory of cases in the Philadelphia region.
189. The Ness, Motley firm (on behalf of itself and other firms that had referred
asbestos cases to it) was to receive $138,077,100 for its clients, and the Greitzer & Locks
firm was to receive $77,417,000 for its clients. See Exhibit SP303, Total Settlement
Amounts Payable to Ness, Motley and Affiliated Counsel and to Greitzer and Locks, in
Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 1399.
190. See Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and the
Defendants Represented By the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint Appendix, supra
note 187, at 824, 421.
191. See Deposition of Michael Rooney, President of CCR, inJoint Appendix, supra
note 187, at 1197-98. For the district court's description of this "futures provision," see
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc, 157 F.R.D. 246, 299-301 (E.D. Pa. 1994). There is a
substantial question, nonetheless, whether this agreement violated ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5.6(b) (1992) ("A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making... an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of
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4. The Georgine ClassAction.19 2 - The next step was even more extraordinary: On January 15, 1993, the two sides simultaneously filed the
complaint, the answer, ajoint motion for class certification, and the 106page Stipulation of Settlement in Georginev. Amchem Products,Inc. in federal district court in Philadelphia. Uniquely, the case was over before it
had begun-a comprehensive settlement without discovery, motions, or
preliminary litigation of any kind. As might be expected under such circumstances, the parties jointly moved the court "for conditional certifica19
tion of a class action for the purposes of settlement."
The parties' speed was matched by that of the court. On February 1,
1993, two weeks after the complaint's filing, Judge Weiner conditionally
certified the proposed class-without bothering to hold a hearing, hear
evidence, or require notice to class members. 19 4 At the same time, Judge
Weiner did, however, appoint another judge, District Judge Lowell A.
Reed Jr., to conduct hearings on the fairness of the proposed
settlement. 19 5
After extensive hearings and much discovery (but not of the two lead
counsel), Judge Reed issued an order in August 1994 that both certified
the class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) and approved the proposed settlement as fair and adequate. 196 In addition, the
court enjoined all class members from "initiating or maintaining any asbestos-related personal injury or death claim(s) or lawsuit(s) against any
CCR defendant" in any court, state or federal, except as expressly permit197
ted by the Stipulation of Settlement.
The substantive terms of the Georgine settlement are as surprising as
the process by which it was reached. The settlement was carefully framed
to catch only future claimants, but to catch all of them. Specifically, the
class was defined to include
[a]ll persons... who have been exposed in the United States or
its territories..., either occupationally or through occupational
exposure of a spouse or household member, to asbestos... for
which one or more of the defendants may bear legal liability
and who.., have not, as ofJanuary 15, 1993, filed a lawsuit for
the settlement of a controversy between private parties."). See Koniak, supra note 4
(manuscript at 142 nn.174 & 175, 192-93) (analyzing this issue).
192. In discussing this action (in which the author appeared as a pro bono expert
witness), the author is deliberately refraining from commenting on the specific conduct of
the settling parties or the legal ethics of any attorney. The focus is instead on those issues
that have recurring significance. Others have examined the ethical issues in considerable
detail. See Koniak, supra note 4. For the fullest journalistic account of Georgine, see Roger
Parloff, The Tort that Ate the Constitution, Am. Law., July-August 1994, at 75.
193. Joint Motion of Plaintiffs and CCR Members for Conditional Class Certification,
in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 302, 303.

194. See Order No. 11, Granting Joint Motion for Class Certification, in Joint
Appendix, supra note 187, at 112.
195. See Order No. 12, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 113.
196. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

197. Preliminary Injunction, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 1049, 1050.
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asbestos-related personal injury or damage . . . against the
defendant(s)."198

This definition obligingly allowed the asbestos plaintiffs' bar to continue
to litigate or to settle their existing cases and thereby predictably minimized opposition to the settlement among them. By and large, this strategy worked, as the plaintiffs' bar protested, but only a few plaintiffs' firms
undertook the substantial costs of objecting to the settlement. Faced with
the federal court's stay order and sensing the strong desire of the court to
approve the settlement, most saw little alternative (even if the settlement
were rejected) and so grudgingly settled their inventory of cases with the
CCR defendants.
Nonetheless, grounds for objections to the settlement are glaringly
obvious. First, the substantive terms of the class action settlement clash
sharply with the contemporaneous inventory settlements reached by the
same plaintiffs' attorneys. Under the inventory settlements, all claimants
received compensation (even in the case of lesser injuries), but under the
class action only the most seriously injured of asbestos victims will receive
compensation-and only then under constraints that could delay actual
receipt indefinitely. Essentially, the class action settlement created an insurance system covering all future claims, but provided compensation
only for those claims that matured into incapacitating illnesses. Moreover, the settlement processed all future claims through a claim review
process managed directly by the CCR defendants, in which the claimants
would have to prove both a specific medical condition that was compensable under the settlement and occupational exposure to the asbestos
products of a member of the CCR, based on criteria far stricter than that
required by tort law. For example, in the case of lung cancer, occupational exposure to asbestos of between eight and fifteen years (depending
on the victim's job classification) would be required and such exposure
must have occurred "at least twelve... years prior to [m]anifestation of
the lung cancer." 199 Clearly, either lesser periods of exposure or a more
recent commencement of exposure would ordinarily suffice in the normal tort system if the claimant were suffering from any of the various
cancers or pleural illnesses normally associated with asbestos. In fact, objectors to the settlement presented medical testimony that approximately
half the claims that are filed in the tort system, and paid by the CCR in
the tort system, would not qualify for payment under the exposure and
medical criteria set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement. 200 Dr.
Christine Oliver of the Harvard Medical School also testified that up to
198. Geoigine, 157 F.R.D. at 319.
199. Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants
Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at
324, 355-56.
200. See Testimony of Dr. Victor Roggli, injoint Appendix, supra note 187, at 1363
(stating that claims for pleural disease that would fail
the settlement's criteria constitute at
least a plurality, and probably a majority, of all asbestos-related diseases).
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fifty percent of the victims that she diagnoses with asbestos-related lung
201
cancer would not satisfy the settlement's medical criteria.
As with other mass tort settlements, Georgine worked off a grid system, which specified a limited range of damages that the CCR would
award for the various asbestos diseases recognized by the Stipulation of
202
Settlement
Compensable
Negotiated Average
Maximum
Medical Category
Mesothelioma
Lung Cancer
Other Cancer
Non-Malignant

Minimum Value
$20,000
10,000
5,000
2,500

Value Range
$37,000-60,000
19,000-30,000
9,500-12,500

Value
$200,000
86,000
32,000

5,800-7,500

30,000

The key figure here is the floor on the average range; although actual
awards could go higher or lower, CCR was not obligated to pay more than
this lower figure on average to victims who satisfied the medical and exposure criteria (i.e., $5800 to a person with confirmed asbestosis that reduced his lung capacity by, hypothetically, seventy percent).203

The limited compensation payable under Georgine comes into clearer
focus when its settlement grid is contrasted with theJohns-Manville settle20 4
ment approved by United States District Court Judge Jack Weinstein:

201. See Testimony of Dr. Christine Oliver, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at
1379.
202. See Exhibit B to Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and
Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint Appendix, supra
note 187, at 438. This exhibit is reproduced in the court's opinion. See Georgine, 157
F.R.D. at 337. Victims who were found by the CCR to have "extraordinary" claims could be
awarded more than the "maximum" value specified above, but only a limited number of
claims (no more than 3% of compensable cancer claims and no more than 1% of
compensable asbestos claims) could be found to be "extraordinary" in any one year. See
Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants Represented by
the Center for Claims Resolution, injoint Appendix, supra note 187, at 324, 392-93. Nor,
of course, was there any obligation on CCR to consider any claim "extraordinary."
203. A claimant who is dissatisfied with the settlement offered by CCR can reject the
offer and pursue an individual action in the tort system-but this right to exit the
settlement is limited to 2% of the lung cancer victims, 1% of the "other cancer" victims,
and .5% of the "non-malignant" victims in any particular year. If more seek to exit the
settlement, the excess above these levels must wait in line, possibly for years. See
Amendment to the Stipulation of Settlement of January 15, 1993 Between the Class of
Claimants and Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint
Appendix, supra note 187, at 511, 516-18.
204. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 495-96 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995). This decision notes that the settling parties "expect that most claimants
will settle their claims at scheduled values." Id. at 495. Johns-Manville was responsible for
a larger market share than any individual CCR defendant (and possibly than the aggregate
of all CCR defendants), but it was bankrupt, while all CCR defendants remained highly
solvent.
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Scheduled Disease Category
Bilateral Pleural Disease
Nondisabling Bilateral
Interstitial Lung Disease
Disabling Bilateral
Interstitial Lung Disease
Other Cancers
Lung Cancer (One Lung)
Lung Cancer (Two Lungs)
Malignant Mesothelioma
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Scheduled Value
$12,000
$25,000

Maximum Value
$30,000
$40,000

$50,000

$300,000

$40,000
$60,000
$90,000
$200,000

$200,000
$400,000
$400,000
$500,000

In sharp contrast to Georgine (which justifies the lack of compensation to victims without cancer or disabling asbestosis on the ground that
they have sustained only minor injuries), the Johns-Manville settlement
recognizes the reality of asbestosis disease and permits a maximum recovery for it of $300,000, which amount exceeds the highest recovery possible for a malignant cancer (i.e., $200,000) under Georgine. Comparing
the two tables, one sees that, in the ordinary case, a disabled victim of
asbestosis will receive $50,000 under the Johns-Manville settlement but
only between $5800 and $7500 under Georgine.
Of course, any contrast between the Georgineand Johns-Manville settlement values must acknowledge that Johns-Manville was a much larger
defendant than any of the CCR members and probably represented a
greater share of the asbestos industry than they did in the aggregate. Unlike the twenty CCR defendants, however, Johns-Manville was bankrupt
and needed to repay financial and trade creditors as well as tort victims.
In this light, the contrast between a mass tort class action (Georgine) and
mass tort bankruptcy (Johns-Manville) provides a roadmap for the solvent
corporation that suggests that the class action route will enable it to escape much of its tort liability without risking the loss of corporate control
that is often incident to a bankruptcy reorganization.
The Georgine settlement also imposed strict limitations on the

number of qualifying claims that may be paid in any year.2 0 5 Known as
"case flow maximums," these limitations were specified for individual disease categories. Thus, in year one, the CCR defendants were required to
pay no more than 700 lung cancer cases, 700 mesothelioma cases, and
200 "other cancer" cases.2 06 If more qualifying claims are filed, a queue
results, and claimants may be required to wait for years (and possibly
205. See Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and Defendants
Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at
324, 382; Exhibit A to Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class of Claimants and
Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint Appendix, supra
note 187, at 436-37.
206. These figures are the limitations on these specific categories. In addition, the
CCR defendants were required to make additional, but smaller, payments to a residual
category of "other" claimants. See Exhibit A to Stipulation of Settlement Between the Class
of Claimants and Defendants Represented by the Center for Claims Resolution, in Joint
Appendix, supra note 187, at 436-37. Cumulatively, the CCR defendants could not be
required to pay more than 5755 mesothelioma cases, 4185 lung cancers, and 1445 "other

19951

CLASS WARS

1397

never be paid). For example, between 1989 and 1993, CCR appears to
have in fact paid about 25,000 claims a year.20 7 If this rate were to continue, a substantial backlog of cases would soon result. Faced with indefinite delays, some victims might soon be forced to accept private settlements well below even the judicially approved levels.
To sum up, the Georgine settlement first screens out most persons
who would normally receive compensation in the tort system (and who
did in fact receive compensation under the inventory settlements paid by
the same defendants), and then, for those who do qualify for compensation, it imposes "case flow maximums" under which plaintiff victims could
face a long and uncertain wait; finally, the compensation offered falls well
below the typical recoveries in the tort system. The contrast between the
recoveries afforded present claimants in the tort system and those offered
future claimants under the Georgine settlement is dramatically illustrated
by evidence that the objectors to the settlement presented at the fairness
hearing.20 8 Starting with the admitted fact that the Ness, Motley firm
(one of the two firms serving as lead counsel in the class action) settled its
client cases for $138,077,100,209 the objectors computed that if the clients
in these inventory settlements had recovered the maximum average payment that a similarly situated class member would receive under the
Georgine class action, they would have received only $89,660,000. So
viewed, the difference of $48,417,100 represents a fifty-four percent premium that the individual clients in the inventory settlements received
2 10
over the maximum average payment under the class action.
This disparity between the inventory settlements and the class action
settlements pales, however, in comparison to the disparity between claimcancers" over the first few years of the settlement (which could only be extended beyond
that point with defendants' consent). See id.
207. See Center for Claims Resolution: All Filings By Calender Year By Disease, in
Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 1400-01. The district court itself acknowledged that
the CCR defendants had settled 128,000 claims from 1989-1993 and could expect to pay
225,000 claims over the next ten years. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D.
246, 279 (E.D. Pa. 1994). These figures may understate the actual figures because much of
the five-year prior period overlapped with the period of the federal court stay on asbestos
litigation, during which the CCR defendants resisted settlements.
208. See Exhibit 0-170, Comparison of Greitzer & Locks Inventory Settlements with
Georgine Negotiated Average Value Range and Comparison of Ness Motley Inventory
Settlements with Georgine Negotiated Average Value Range, Georgine v. Amchem Prods.
Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-0215) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The author helped prepare this exhibit and testified at the settlement hearing
with respect to it. For a fuller analysis of this point, see Koniak, supra note 4 (manuscript
at 122-37). The Georgine court found, however, that Exhibit 0-170 did not provide
"sufficient information." Gwrogine, 157 F.R.D. at 310.
209. See supra note 189.
210. Even this comparison understates the disparity because an unknown percentage
of the class members would be disqualified under the strict medical and exposure criteria
applicable to the settlement. For example, most persons with non-malignant conditions
receive no cash compensation under the settlement, while a substantial percentage of the
inventory settlements fall into this category and were compensated.
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ants with malignant conditions and those without. Ultimately, class counsel in Georgine simply waived compensation for most class members with
non-malignant conditions in return for cash payments to those class
members with serious malignant conditions. The rationale for this extraordinary act of waiving the rights of some clients to benefit other clients was that "exposed" class members could not predict their future injuries and would prefer to waive compensation for "minor" injuries and
reserve it for major life-threatening illnesses. But is this true? Would an
individual with a normally compensable injury waive compensation in order to receive greater compensation in the possible (but unlikely) event
that the condition would worsen into a very serious or fatal injury? Economically, the assumption that individuals would voluntarily make such a
choice is the equivalent of predicting that individuals would insure only
for catastrophic illness and would waive any compensatory recovery for
lesser injuries in favor of an exclusive focus on death and disability. As an
2 11
empirical matter, this seems a very shaky prediction.
Normatively, it is even more suspect. Although a legislature or some
politically accountable body might decide to provide compensation to
only the worst off on paternalistic grounds, a private attorney, acting as
class counsel, seemingly has no entitlement to abandon the interests of
one group of clients to benefit another. Indeed, the very fact that such
trade-offs could be reached highlights the need for subclasses and separate representation of different categories of claimants. Determined not
to impede a global resolution, however, the district court rationalized
each of these conflicts: subclasses were not needed, the non-malignant
future claimants were dealt with fairly because they might receive cash
compensation if their injuries worsened, and the differential between the
amounts paid in inventory settlements and the class members was
2 12
irrelevant.
211. To believe that individuals would willingly trade compensation for severe and
often disabling illnesses for greater compensation to be received only in the case of usually

fatal illnesses (i.e., mesothelioma and lung cancer) requires that we believe that they would
display an extreme level of risk aversion and ignore the equivalent impact on their

dependents of their long-term disability. Even if some individuals would behave in this
fashion, it is unlikely that all or most would. The more logical premise is that, in making
insurance decisions, class members who had been occupationally exposed to asbestos
would consider the financial impact on their families if they were unable to work (and,
even worse, the negative cash flow their long-term disability would represent).

212. The district court found that "the fact that non-impaired pleural claimants in the
inventory settlements received immediate cash compensation where similarly situated

claimants under Georgine would receive a different bundle of rights, with no immediate
cash payment, was not evidence that [c]lass [clounsel were burdened by an impermissible
conflict of interest." Georgine, 157 F.R.D at 298. Tojustify this disparity, the court asserted
that the present claimants had gone to class counsel with a "'realistic expectation that
their cases were going to be resolved in the tort system,' "while future claimants had not.

Id. (quoting testimony of ProfessorJohn P. Freeman). This statement leaves unanswered
the critical question: why would future claimants ever want their claims to be settled at
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Finally, in terms of its discrimination against future claimants, the
most revealing deficiency in the Ceergine settlement was its failure to contain any adjustment for inflation. Under the settlement, the amounts to
be received by future claimants are fixed for the first ten years, regardless
of increases in the cost of living. Thereafter, payment ranges may be increased in the eleventh year, up to twenty percent, but only if the parties
negotiate new values (or if binding arbitration establishes new values in
the event that the parties cannot agree). Historically, however, consumer
prices have increased at a much faster rate.2 13 Even the Georgine court
conceded that the CCR defendants had
failed to produce evidence that
2 14
rebutted the objectors on this point.
In overview, Georgine's failure to deal responsibly with the issue of
inflation reminds us that the interests of future claimants are not homogenous. Some will become ill early; others only after a long latency period.
If adjustments are not made for inflation, future claimants will be treated
very differently under a settlement that purports to make equal payments
to each. In addition, the late-maturing claimant also bears the considerable risk that the number of claims made will exceed that projected, with
the result that the case flow maximums in the Georgine settlement will
have been exceeded in the interim.
5. Aheam v. Fibreboard.- Georgine might be dismissed as an aberration-if it were not swiftly followed by other class actions that replicated
its techniques. Aheam v. Fibreboard Corp., 215 filed months after Georgine
but negotiated contemporaneously with it, was also designed as a future
claims class action with the class again being defined to exclude all persons with pending claims against Fibreboard.
Aheam is both similar to and different from Georgine in important
ways that require a closer analysis. Long a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
lower values outside the tort system (at least when the defendants were highly solvent, as
the CCR defendants were agreed to be)?

213. During the 1970s, the Consumer Price Index for urban consumers (CPI-U)
increased 103.4%, and during the 1980s, this same rate of increase was 64.4%. See Request
by White Lung Association, et al. To Take Judicial Notice of Consumer Price Index
Statistics and Explanation of Relevance of Those Statistics at 5-6, Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-0215) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (memorandum fied by Public Citizen litigation Group in Georgine). To

understand the impact of this minimal 20% adjustment, it means that in year 20 (i.e.,
2014) the maximum negotiated average value that could be paid to lung cancer victims
would be $36,000. If, however, the inflation rate over the next 19 years were 100%, it
would take $60,000 to hold constant the real dollar award of $30,000, which the same

claimant would receive today. See id. at 8. Moreover, the 20% figure in the settlement is
only a ceiling on what might be negotiated (or arbitrated) and not a guarantee. Finally,
the cost of medical expenses has increased at an even faster rate than consumer prices, see
Causey, supra note 122, at B2, and asbestos victims are uniquely exposed to increases in
medical expenses. In short, Georgine presents a vivid illustration of the subtle ways in which
mass tort settlements discriminate against future claimants.
214. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 278. Nonetheless, the court added that the settlement

did not have to be perfect to be approved.
215. No. 6:93cv526, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11062 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 1995).
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Louisiana Pacific Corporation, Fibreboard was spun off by its parent as an
independent publicly owned company in 1988 at a point when its potential insolvency as the result of asbestos liabilities was already a clear and
present danger.2 16 By that time, over 50,000 asbestos-related actions had
been filed against Fibreboard and the number has since soared to approximately 200,000.217 Following the transfer by the JPML of all asbestos-related personal injury litigation to Judge Weiner in 1991,218
Fibreboard, like the CCR defendants, unsuccessfully sought to negotiate
a global settlement of all its asbestos-related cases with the nationwide
2 19
plaintiffs' steering committee.
For Fibreboard, a global settlement was particularly urgent, because
already it had unpaid obligations in excess of $1 billion for asbestos cases
that it had settled earlier, and it was experiencing difficulty in convincing
its insurers to pay these claims. Faced with asbestos liabilities well in excess of its net worth, Fibreboard began a complex three-party negotiation
with its insurers and several selected plaintiffs' attorneys. With the collapse in the spring of 1992 of efforts by all asbestos defendants to reach a
global settlement with the plaintiffs' steering committee, Fibreboard began negotiations with the Ness, Motley firm to reach a settlement covering simply itself. By December 1992, Fibreboard and Ness, Motley
reached an inventory settlement covering "approximately 20,000 existing
asbestos personal injury claims. "2 20 Pursuant to this agreement, Ness,
Motley agreed to recommend the settlement provisions to future claimants that it represented. 22 1 Eventually, by August 6, 1993, this settlement
agreement was extended to cover some 45,000 pending asbestos-related
222
personal injury claims against Fibreboard.
On August 9, 1993, at the same time that this massive inventory settlement was reached, United States District Judge Robert Parker, the
same judge who earlier had recommended to judge Weiner that he force
a global settlement on plaintiffs in Georgine,223 appointed the Ness,
Motley firm along with two other attorneys "to act as negotiating counsel
216. See Report of the Guardian Ad Litem, Eric D. Green at 68, Abeam (No.
6:93cv526) [hereinafter Report of the Guardian Ad Litem] (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
217. See Abeam Class Action Notice, supra note 163, at 16. Some 17,200 new actions
were filed against Fibreboard in 1988 alone, the year it was spun off. See id.
218. See supra text accompanying note 183.
219. See Abeam, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11062, at *10.
220. Aheam Class Action Notice, supra note 163, at 23.
221. See id.
222. This revised agreement was expressly made subject to approval by the federal
court as fair and reasonable. See id. at 24.
223. See supra text accompanying note 185. Like Philadelphia (the forum for
Georgine), the Eastern District of Texas was a district inundated with asbestos litigation. See
supra note 71. Judge Parker had previously tried Cimino v. Raymark, Indus., Inc., 751 F.
Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), an innovative approach to consolidating asbestos cases. See
supra text accompanying notes 156-158.
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on behalf of... a class of future claimants." 224 Less than three weeks
later, on August 27, 1993, Fibreboard and these newly-appointed class
counsel informed the court that they had reached an agreement in principle covering all future claims. The actual class action was filed on September 9, 1993, and on that same date, Judge Parker certified, for settlement purposes only, a future class of persons with asbestos-related
personal injuries who had not asserted such claims against Fibreboard
prior to August 27, 1993 (the date the agreement in principle was
reached) .225
In short, as in Georgine, the same plaintiffs' law firm simultaneously
represented both present claimants in an inventory settlement and future
claimants in a class action. The official class action notice estimated that
the total number of present claimants represented by Ness, Motley in the
inventory settlement "may exceed 50,000," in which case, it said, the aggregate amount of the present claims represented by Ness, Motley would
approximate $500 million. 226 This notice also estimated that plaintiffs'
counsel would receive on average contingent fees equal to "approximately one-third of the payout to such present claimants," thus implying
that plaintiffs' counsel stood to receive approximately $167 million under
these settlements. 2 27 More importantly, most of these inventory settlements were effectively made contingent upon the approval of the class
action settlement.2 28 As a result, class counsel had a strong interest in
approval of the class action settlement, even if it was not in the best interests of the future claimants.
In fairness, the Ahearn settlement received close judicial supervision
and did not involve the same glaring disparities as in Georginebetween the
terms received by the present claimants and those applicable to future
claimants.2 29 Nevertheless, the substantive terms of the Ahearn settle224. Aheam Class Action Notice, supra note 163, at 24.

225. See id. at 27.
226. Id. at 30.

227. Id. It should be emphasized that this entire amount would not go to one firm
because Ness, Motley handled cases on referral from over 100 co-counsel in Aheam. See id.

228. Alternatively, the inventory settlements became operative on a favorable
outcome in an action that Fibreboard had filed against its insurance carriers. Still, the
bottom line here is, as the Aheam Class Action Notice states, "[a]pproval of the Global

Settlement Agreement will operate to trigger payouts in excess of $300 million to present
claimant clients of Global Health Claimant Class Counsel." Id. at 30.
229. Judge Parker had had extensive experience in asbestos litigation and had been a
member of the Ad Hoc Commission appointed by ChiefJustice Rehnquist. See supra text
accompanying notes 156-158 and 184-186. Parker also appointed Judge Patrick
Higginbotham of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to act as

Settlement Facilitator. See Aheam Class Action Notice, supra note 163, at 23. Judge
Higginbotham recommended a mandatory class action covering future claimants. See id.
at 24. Unlike Gewngine, the Ahearn Trust will base compensation at least in part on
historical settlement values for the category of injury, see id. at 40, and will not exclude
lesser injuries (including pleural plaques). See id. at 39. Claimants who reject the
compensation offered 'by the trust are permitted to sue the trust (but only after an
extended mediation process and non-binding arbitration). In the event a litigant rejects
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ment were extraordinary for the limited cash contribution they required
of Fibreboard. Under the settlement, Fibreboard's two principal insurers
will deposit $1.525 billion into a trust fund for future claimants, to which
Fibreboard will add a mere $10 million. This token contribution might
be understandable if Fibreboard were otherwise insolvent, but, apart
from its asbestos liabilities, Fibreboard appears to be a thriving company.
The guardian ad litem appointed by the court to protect the future claimants concluded that Fibreboard's value (once its asbestos liabilities were
stripped away) might be as high as $250 to $300 million, and other expert
testimony placed it in the range of $230 to $240 million. 2 0 If we assume
Fibreboard has a net worth of $250 million, then its $10 million contribution represents only four percent of this net worth.
Probably the most dramatic evidence of the impact of this settlement
on Fibreboard was the reaction of its stock price to its announcement.
During 1992, Fibreboard's common stock fluctuated from a low of 2 1/8
per share to a high of 9 3/8.231 This depressed value no doubt reflected
the overhang of asbestos liabilities. But as the possibility of a settlement
increased, Fibreboard's stock price climbed, and, during the month the
settlement was announced, it soared, running up from 11 7/8 to a high
of 22 7/8.232 By the end of the year, Fibreboard's stock price reached a
high of 35 5/8-nearly three hundred percent above its highest closing
price in the month before the settlement. 23 3
Such a dramatic stock price movement suggests that there has been a
wealth transfer: Fibreboard's shareholders have gained, and its tort creditors (and insurers) have lost. More importantly, this stock price reaction
contrasts sharply with what would have happened in a mass tort bankruptcy, where tort claimants sometimes receive eighty to ninety percent
of the stock of the reorganized entity.2 4 Instead, Fibreboard and its
the trust's offer and sues, damages are capped at $500,000 per claimant and punitive
damages are disallowed. See id. at 41-43.
230. See Report of the Guardian Ad Litem, supra note 216, at 68-69.
231. See id. at 68.
232. See Standard &Poor's, Daily Stock Price Record: American Stock Exchange 53
(3d Qtr. 1993). On the date of the settlement's announcement, August 30, 1993,
Fibreboard's stock gained $4.75 to close at $20.25 in heavy trading on the American Stock
Exchange. Correspondingly, the stock of its principle insurers-Chubb and CNAdeclined on the New York Stock Exchange. See Fibreboard Settles Asbestos Claims with
Insurers, UPI, Aug. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; see also Peter
Kerr, 2 Insurers Settle on Asbestos, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1993, at D1, D2 (reporting that
Chubb and CNA. agreed to pay Fibreboard $3 billion to cover individual asbestos claims).
This one-day trading gain of over 25% probably understates the total gain to Fibreboard's
shareholders because the settlement was actually struck on August 27 and the deal had
been in active negotiations for weeks.
233. Fibreboard's high and low stock prices forJuly of 1993 had been 13 and 111/2,
respectively. The settlement was announced to the market on August 30, and Fibreboard's
low price in that month had been 11 7/8. See Standard & Poor's, supra note 232, at 53.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 163-171 (discussingJohns-Manville).
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shareholders escaped with only a $10 million contribution to the class
action settlement.
The even more controversial aspect of Aheam was, however, Judge
Parker's decision to certify the class as a mandatory class under Rule
23(b) (1) (B).235 Finding that defendant's insurance proceeds (which
were obtained in a much-contested parallel settlement with Fibreboard's
insurers) constituted a "limited fund," which would be exhausted before
all individual claimants could be satisfied, the court certified the action as
a mandatory class, which has the practical effect of denying class members the right to opt out.2 3 6 Although it remains an unresolved question

whether the right to opt out from a class action that primarily seeks a
money judgment can be effectively extinguished in this fashion,2 3 7 the
curious and unique feature of Ahearn is that the company itself remained
highly solvent and yet contributed
only a trivial proportion of its own
23 8
assets to the settlement fund.
Effectively, Aheam reveals the settlement technique in Georgine
pushed one critical step further so that a not-yet bankrupt corporation
can limit its liabilities to its insurance policies (at least with the help of
cooperative plaintiffs' attorneys). Although pooling a defendant's assets
when they are inadequate to satisfy all its creditors makes sense, Ahearn
permits the defendant to limit tort creditors to an asset pool to which it
makes virtually no contribution. In turn, a consequence of deeming the
corporation's insurance policies to create a "limited fund" is that it creates a perverse incentive to underinsure. That is, under Aheam's rule, a
defendant may choose to purchase less liability insurance than it otherwise would, because there is an advantage to inadequate insurance
reserves: namely that they can constitute a "limited fund" and justify a
mandatory, non-opt out class action. In allowing Fibreboard to escape
235. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (1) (B) permits a mandatory class action to
be certified where "the prosecution of separate actions ... would create a risk of...

adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications

or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23 (c) (2) (A).
236. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) (2) (A) provides that class members may
choose to opt out of a Rule 23(b) (3) class action. No similar right to exit exists with regard

to any other class action.
237. The answer depends ultimately on how the Supreme Court chooses to interpret
its decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see also Brown v. Ticor
Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that allowing resjudicata to bar
plaintiff's claims for monetary damages would be a violation of due process because

plaintiff had not had the opportunity to opt out of the settlement reached in an earlier
class action), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994). For discussion of the right to opt out,

see infra text accompanying notes 407-439.
238. Absent insurance coverage, Fibreboard's assets would have been clearly
insufficient to pay all asbestos claims that it faced. But as discussed above, the Fibreboard
settlement was virtually limited to its insurance policies with Fibreboard contributing an
additional amount ($10 million) that represented about 4% of its net worth. See supra
text accompanying note 230.
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with only a $10 million contribution to the class action settlement, the
Ahearn court effectively placed Fibreboard's shareholders ahead of its tort
creditors-a result altogether different than the result in mass tort bankruptcies (such as Johns-Manville) where the tort creditors received the

23 9
vast majority of the corporation's equity value.

In fairness, the non-opt out provision in the Ahearn settlement probably was demanded by Fibreboard's insurers, who seemed to have been
unwilling to settle absent some mechanism for achieving global peace.
Understandably, their fear was that they could be held liable twice (i.e.,
once to class members and then again to opt outs). But the insurers'
fears hardly justified granting Fibreboard equivalent immunity from future claimants, particularly when the Ahearn settlement fund may well be
inadequate to cover all future claimants.2 40 Paradoxically, while the
Ahearn settlement grants certainty and repose to the shareholders of the
corporate defendant, it imposes risk and uncertainty on its tort creditors,
who are exposed to cutbacks and potentially lengthy queues depending
upon the number of future claims. In this light, in marked contrast to
mass tort bankruptcies, the mass tort class action can be used to reverse
the historic legal relationship between debt and equity-perversely shifting risk from diversified and logically risk neutral shareholders to nondiversified and normally risk averse tort creditors.
B. Silicone Gel Breast Implants Litigation
The Silicone Gel breast implants litigation 2 4' stands in sharp contrast
to asbestos mass tort litigation in several respects. Unlike asbestos (the
oldest and most "mature" of mass torts), breast implant litigation was a
new form of tort litigation, in which outcomes and settlement values were
not yet easily predicted. From a procedural perspective, the settlement
process in the Silicone Gel litigation provides a commendable example of a
mass tort litigation that was structured reasonably and supervised intensively by the federal court. Settled at approximately $4.23 billion, the settlement hardly seems collusive; indeed, it is the "man bites dog" story that
239. See supra text accompanying notes 146, 166-167.
240. See Report of the Guardian Ad Litem, supra note 216, at 40 (concluding that
"the rights of some victims to full historic compensation are likely to be impaired, as the
Trust attempts to respond to the claims of others"). The settlement itself contains
"spendthrift" provisions that limit the proportion of trust assets that can be paid in any one
year (to protect future claimants). See Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 6:93cv526, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11532, at *142-*43 (E.D. Tex.July 27, 1995). As in Georgine, the impact of
these provisions is to subordinate the less severely injured to those with more serious
injuries in the event that funds are insufficient to pay all claimants. See id. at *143. Again,
this raises the issue of how a single plaintiff's attorney can prefer one client's interests to
those of another client.
241. For the decision approving the settlement of this class action, see In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). For earlier decisions, see 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993); 793
F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
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shows that mass tort class actions need not necessarily result in non-adversarial, low cost settlements. 2 42 Yet ultimately, the Silicone Gel experience
teaches pessimism, not optimism, because it provides an object lesson in
the fragility of mass tort settlements-at least when present claimants are
able to opt out. Finally, from a judicial management perspective, the
breast implant litigation is a prime example of an "immature" mass tort,
one that lacks an extensive history of outcomes in individual cases. In
part for this reason, the parties cannot reliably estimate even the number
of present claimants, much less anticipate future claims. The result has
been a disaster for all sides, which underscores the dangers of certifying
an "immature" mass tort class action.2 48
Breast implant litigation is a recent phenomenon, which increased
dramatically in volume following the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) January 5, 1992 ruling that placed a temporary moratorium on the
use of breast implants for cosmetic purposes.2 44 As in other mass tort
areas, a bitter conflict rapidly developed between the personal injury trial
bar and the class action specialists who quickly appeared on the scene.
Within weeks of the FDA's ruling, Stanley Chesley of Cincinnati, a wellknown but controversial class action plaintiffs' attorney, filed a nationwide negligence class action in his home jurisdiction (the Southern
District of Ohio), which was quickly certified as a class action by the district court without a hearing.2 45 Rival plaintiffs' attorneys specializing in
2 46
individual trial work publicly predicted an impending sellout.
But one did not materialize. Although the rival factions of plaintiffs'
attorneys each asked theJPML to consolidate all breast implant litigation
in a forum favorable to their side (Ohio or California), the Panel declined. Instead, realizing the level of acrimony within the plaintiffs' bar,
the Panel consolidated all breast implant actions in a neutral forum that
242. Under the settlement, claimants stood to receive between $105,000 and $1.4
million each, despite relatively little consensus as to the causal linkages between breast
implants and disease. See David R. Olmos & Henry Weinstein, Breast Implant Settlement
in Peril, LA. Times, May 5, 1995, at Al.
243. For the sensible distinction of "immature" from "mature" mass torts (and the
suggestion that only the latter be resolved in class actions), see McGovern, supra note 51,
at 659, 690-94. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit's recent mandamus decision in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.Sd 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), which reversed the certification
of a mass tort class action, occurred in the context of an obviously immature mass tort.
There, a class action was asserted on behalf of hemophiliacs infected by the AIDS virus as a
consequence of using defendant's products. Yet, only 13 individual actions raising similar
claims had reached trial, and defendants had won 12 of these. See id. at 1296. The
Seventh Circuit panel justified its decision in terms of the "extortionate" leverage such a
class action unjustifiably gave plaintiffs, see id. at 1298-99, but this factor may be present in
many (and even most) mass tort class actions. A narrower rationale might have been its
immaturity.
244. See Daniel Wise, Bar Besieged with Queries on Breast Implant Claims, N.Y. LJ.,
Jan. 30, 1992, at 1.
245. See Frankel, supra note 82, at 82.
246. See id. at 82, 90.
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no litigant had suggested (the Northern District of Alabama) before
Judge Sam Pointer, who was widely recognized as a leading expert among
trial judges on class action procedures. 2 47
Judge Pointer wisely decided to appoint a seventeen-member plaintiffs' steering committee to direct all pre-trial activity. Carefully balancing
the membership on this committee to reflect all the principal factions
(who had already engaged in a heated public debate), Judge Pointer appointed three co-chairmen, diplomatically dividing power between
Stanley Chesley and representatives of the personal injury trial bar.2 48 In

addition, procedural safeguards not present in other recent mass tort litigation were followed: special guardians for subclasses were appointed,
special opt out and late entry provisions were accepted, and the plaintiffs'
steering committee met regularly to monitor the negotiations. 2 49
Compared with other mass tort settlements, the breast implant settlement was negotiated in a virtual fishbowl of public disclosure and debate.
Once a tentative settlement had been negotiated, a "Statement of
Principles," which outlined the proposed settlement, was widely distributed by the plaintiffs' negotiating committee among plaintiffs' lawyers,
victims' groups, and potential class members. Victims' groups were also
invited by the court to a preliminary hearing on the settlement.2 50 When
the dust finally settled, a complicated settlement, involving forty different
benefit levels, had been negotiated, requiring the defendants to contribute a record total of approximately $4.23 billion over a multi-year
period.251
This contrast between the "cheap" settlements in Georgine and Ahearn
and the record settlement in Silicone Gel seemingly suggests that the legal
rules and procedures governing the settlement process may matter-and
247. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101
(J.P.M.L. 1992). Judge Pointer was also a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation appointed in 1990 by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See supra note 69.
248. See Andrew Blum, Committee Named, Nat'l I.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 2.
249. For descriptions of the settlement negotiations, see Frankel, supra note 82, at
90-91; Henry Weinstein, When Law, Tragedy Intersect, LA Times, Mar. 26, 1994, at Al;
Benjamin Weiser, Feud in Breast Implant Cases Stirs Debate on Tactics, Wash. Post, May
11, 1994, at DI.
250. See Alan B. Morrison & Brian Wolfinan, Representing the Unrepresented in
Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief 61-62 (March 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
251. The court describes the $4,225,070,000 settlement as "reputed to be the largest
such settlement ever." In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). The defendants are
obligated to contribute approximately $4.23 billion over a 30-year period, of which amount
$1.2 billion must be paid into the Current Disease Compensation Program. See id. at
*21-*22. Dow Coming was scheduled to contribute approximately $2 billion. See id. at
*79; Judge Asks Lawyers to Renegotiate Breast Implant Suit, N.Y. Tnes, Aug. 2, 1995, at
A14. From the outset, however, there were doubts about Dow Coming's financial ability to
meet its commitment, as neither its insurance carriers nor its two parents had agreed to
contribute or guarantee its contribution.
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greatly. For example, had there been only a two- or three-member team
of plaintiffs' attorneys appointed to control the case in Silicone Gel (as in
Georgine and Aheam), the possibility of collusion would have been considerably stronger, and certainly the process of reaching a non-adversarial
settlement would have been simpler. Of course, other factors may also
help explain the Silicone Gel settlement. For example, because the class
was defined to include both present claimants and future claimants (unlike Georgine and Aheam), highly motivated class members existed to
monitor the appointed attorneys. Networks of injured victims also developed to oversee the settlement process and communicate with class members, which is likely to happen only when the class is defined to include
"high stakes" plaintiffs with present claims.
Curiously, the plaintiffs' substantive case in Silicone Gel may have
been substantially weaker than in the asbestos litigation, because of the
absence of clear scientific evidence of the causal relationship between
breast implants and specific injuries. 252 That a record settlement resulted against such a backdrop strongly suggests that process differences
are a powerful explanatory variable. 253 But this interpretation, although
plausible, may be too glib because there is an alternative, darker interpretation of the Silicone Gel settlement.
If the Silicone Gel settlement represents a fair and uncorrupted outcome, it has also proven a fragile and unstable one. In any lump sum
settlement, the amount that individual claimants will receive necessarily
depends on the number and type of the claims that are filed. When the
global settlement was first announced in September 1993, class members
were initially informed that they would receive between $200,000 and $2
million (depending on their generic type of injury and other individual
252. Several epidemiological studies have failed to find a causal connection between
breast implants and any specific illness, and an FDA Advisory Panel recommended in 1991
that implants should remain on the market. See Gina Kolata, Legal System and Science
Come to Differing Conclusions on Silicone, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1995, at D6. The most
recent of these studies, conducted by physicians at the Harvard Medical School, finds no
association between implants and illness. See Gina Kolata, New Study Finds No Link
Between Implants and Illness, N.Y. TimesJune 22, 1995, atA18. It should be understood,
however, that plaintiffs' legal theories were not limited to claims that breast implants
caused illness, but also that they masked detection of other illnesses, such as breast cancer,
by preventing detection through mammography. See Statement by David A. Kessler,
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration and D. Bruce Burlington, Director, Center
for Devices and Radiological Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health and
Human Services, Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental
Relations, Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Federal
Document Clearing House, Aug. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
253. To be sure, the settlement's size may also provide support for Judge Posner's
thesis that mass tort class actions generate extortionate leverage. See In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995). Another explanation is that the courts
themselves were not under the same pressure to reach a global settlement (at any cost) in
the Silikoe Gel litigation as they were in asbestos cases, because individual suits were less
likely to have a material impact on the federal docket. This forms the alternative
hypothesis: that pressure on the judicial system yields poor settlements for victims.
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factors). 2m Later, these estimates were scaled down to a floor of $105,000
and a ceiling of $1.4 million,2 5 but even these estimates depended on
the number of claims actually filed. Thus, to protect class members, an
important provision in the settlement agreement specified that class
members would receive an additional opportunity to opt out if a higher
than anticipated rate of claim filings forced the benefits to be scaled back
from these estimated levels.
Sensible as this delayed opt out right was in the case of an "immature" mass tort where predictions of claim filings were necessarily more
speculative, it created a material risk for defendants that from the outset
placed the settlement under stress. Having agreed to contribute approximately $4.23 billion, defendants still faced additional liability in individual actions brought by opt outs. For defendants, this implied that any
underestimation of the likely number of claims could set off a chain reaction under which benefits would be scaled down and class members
would in consequence opt out in substantial numbers to bring individual
actions.
Exactly this scenario appears to have happened. As of the spring of
1995, some 435,000 claimants had filed for eligibility to receive benefits
under the settlement,2 6 while only 7800 domestic class members and
6500 foreign claimants had opted out.25 7 The filing of over 400,000
claims clearly exceeded defendants' expectations and implied that a scaling down of the promised individual benefits would be necessary unless
defendants agreed to increase their contributions. In early May 1995,
Judge Pointer announced that these claims appeared likely to "substantially exceed" the funds committed by the defendants and asked the parties to negotiate a revised or enriched settlement. 25 8 Later that summer,
the full extent of the necessary scaling back became evident: at best, class
members would receive only twelve to sixteen percent of their scheduled
benefits, at worst, less than five percent. 25 9
For defendants, this development posed a hard choice: if they did
not contribute more funds, an unknown, but probably substantial,
number of claimants would predictably opt out and commence individual
254. See Thomas M. Burton, Breast-Implant Claims Fund May Need $3 Billion More,
Preliminary Study Says, Wall St. J., May 17, 1995, at A4.
255. See Silicone Gel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *5, *20; Olmos & Weinstein,
supra note 242, at Al.
256. See BarnabyJ. Feder, Dow Coming's Bankruptcy: The Impact on Implant Suits,
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1995, at F9. Of these approximately 400,000 claimants, some 137,000
claimed to have already experienced compensable illness. See Olmos & Weinstein, supra
note 242, at A13.
257. See Silicone Ge, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *17.
258. See David S. Hilzenrath, Renegotiation Order May Undo $4 Billion Implant
Settlement, Wash. Post, May 5, 1995, at Fl.
259. Thus, those expecting to receive the maximum ($1.4 million) or the minimum
($105,000) would now expect $70,000 or $5250, respectively. See Michael Unger, Breast
Implant Claim Fund Falls Far Short, N.Y. Newsday, June 17, 1995, at A6.
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actions. Even if they did increase their contribution, some scaling back of
benefits might still be necessary if new claims materialized, and any such
reduction would predictably trigger opt outs. As a result, defendants had
clearly failed to achieve a global peace. Worse yet, preliminary analyses
estimated that as much as an additional $24 billion
contribution would be
2 °
necessary merely to pay the present claimants. 6
In response, the principal defendant-Dow Coming-filed for
bankruptcy reorganization on May 15, 1995.261 Although Dow Coming
followed in the path of other manufacturers that have elected bankruptcy
reorganization to resolve mass tort liabilities, its incentives for electing
bankruptcy appear to have been substantially different and novel. Unlike
corporations that have opted for bankruptcy when faced with a mass tort
class action, Dow Coming seemed intent on preserving the mass tort class
action settlement; indeed, its tactical aim seems in part to have been to
lock claimants within it by eliminating any incentive to opt out. Because
the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays tort litigation
against the debtor,2 62 opting out gains a claimant little and costs the
claimant the right to participate in the settlement (if it remains intact).
Once claimants were frozen into the class action, benefits could then be
reduced without triggering a major increase in opt outs and hence individual litigation against it.263 Those who had already opted out would be
compensated eventually through the bankruptcy action (possibly with
Dow Coming stock), but at the point Dow Coming elected bankruptcy
this number seemed insufficient to shift control of Dow Coming away
2
from its parents. 6
260. See Court Analysis: $4.25 Billion Inadequate for Implant Claims, Sacramento
Bee, June 17, 1995, at A14 [hereinafter Court Analysis: $4.25 Billion Inadequate]. A
month earlier, the additional contribution had been estimated at $3 billion. See Burton,
supra note 254, at A4.
261. See BarnabyJ. Feder, Dow Coming in Bankruptcy Over Lawsuits, N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1995, at Al.
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
263. Class members can, of course, opt out to file against co-defendants, but Dow
Coming has long been the largest producer of silicone breast implants. See Feder, supra
note 261, atAl.
264. Just prior to its bankruptcy filing, Dow Coming estimated that there were 1500
individual actions pending against it by women who had opted out of the settlements. See
Thomas M. Burton, Dow Coming Considers Filing for Chapter 11, Wall St. J., May 5, 1995,
at A3, A4. Large as this number may seem, it pales in comparison to the number of
asbestos actions pending against the CCR defendants (who did not elect to file for
bankruptcy protection). Moreover, many of these implant cases probably had weak
litigation merits. Judge Pointer found in approving the settlement that some 14,300
persons had opted out, of whom 6500 were outside the United States. See In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521,
at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). Such foreign claimants have little chance at a substantial
recovery if foreign law is applicable to their claim. Hence, only the 7800 domestic opt outs
could bring a viable action (if they became ill with a silicone-related illness). In short, the
domestic opt outs were small in proportion to those who might opt out. The critical point
is that if Dow Coming had delayed its bankruptcy petition until after benefits were scaled
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Outside bankruptcy, Dow Coming faced the worst of both worlds: a
large class settlement plus individual litigation brought by a substantial,
but indeterminate, number of opt outs. Within bankruptcy, Dow
Coming was protected from opt outs and could resist pressure to make
additional contributions to the class action settlement. More importantly, by combining a class action with a bankruptcy filing, Dow Corning's management achieved objectives that would be impossible under
either technique alone. Standing alone, bankruptcy could enable Dow
Corning's management to achieve a complete global resolution of its liabilities, but at the possible cost of its management losing control of the
company (as Johns-Manvile had illustrated). Standing alone, a class action could enable Dow Coming to achieve a cheaper settlement (as Georgine illustrated), but at the cost of remaining vulnerable to opt outs, particularly if benefits were scaled back. Used together, the combination of
bankruptcy and a class action effectively converted a standard Rule
23(b) (3) opt out class action into a de facto mandatory class action.
Moreover, because few claimants under the class action would thereafter
opt out (at least to sue Dow Coming), the bankruptcy reorganization
need not shift control of the firm (as prior mass tort bankruptcies have
done).
C. Mass DisasterLitigation
The asbestos, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and breast implant litigations were all national events, covered by the media, watched by other
judges concerned about their own dockets, and closely followed by several hundred attorneys. Ordinary mass disaster cases occur and are litigated on a much smaller scale. 2 65 Nonetheless, the concentrated character of the mass tort bar has meant that new techniques learned in the
national context have quickly been re-applied in more localized mass tort
litigation.
back or after it had become obvious that the class action settlement was about to "crater,"
then a much larger number of claimants would have opted out at that point and been
swept into the bankruptcy reorganization process; this could have shifted control of Dow
Coming away from its two parents if these tort claims were settled for stock (pursuant to
the usual procedures in mass tort bankruptcies by which settlement trusts are created).
See supra text accompanying notes 165-166.
265. Mass disaster class actions involving a single discrete explosion, crash or accident
have in the past been more common than mass exposure class actions. Because a single
accident usually involves greater homogeneity among the victims and is less likely to
involve latency periods and future claimants, it is more susceptible to class treatment. For
an example of a mass accident class action, see In re Shell Oil Refinery, 155 F.R.D. 552
(E.D. La. 1993) (settlement of $170 million approved for personal injury and property
claims). A key reason that defendants prefer a class action in this context is that they can
seek a mandatory, non-opt out class for punitive damages. For a recent example, see
Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement, In Re GCC Richmond Works Cases,
Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 2906 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa County,
Aug. 15, 1993) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (certifying "Mandatory Punitive
Damage Class" with regard to release of sulphuric gas by chemical plant).
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A good illustration is supplied by the 1995 settlement of a mass disaster class action, Hayden v. Atochem North America, Inc.2 66 The undisputed

facts showed egregious environmental violations: basically, an agrichemical plant in Bryan, Texas had exposed the local community to arsenic
contamination since the early 1970s, polluting the air, soil, surface water
and groundwater. 2 67 In 1992, a class action seeking only property damages was filed against the current and former owners of the plant as a
Rule 23(b) (3) opt out class action. 26 Although the class was initially certified as an opt out settlement class, the settling parties reconsidered their
position once Georgine, Ahearn, and other recent cases had shown them
the feasibility of resolving personal injury claims through the vehicle of a
mass tort class action. In April 1995, the parties reached a revised settlement that converted the case from an opt out class action under Rule
23(b) (3) into a non-opt out class action under Rule 23(b) (2) and extended the settlement to cover personal injuries, including both present
and future claims, as well as property damages. 269 To accomplish this
critical conversion to a Rule 23(b) (2) class action, 2 70 the parties used a
technique that was novel to mass tort cases but well known in labor litigation: they inserted a provision for injunctive relief into the proposed settlement in order to fall outside Rule 23(b) (3).271 Specifically, the de266. The facts discussed in the text are taken from the Notice of Pendency of Class
Action, Proposed Settlement of Class Action, and Fairness Hearing, Hayden v. Atochem N.
Am., Inc. (In re Bryan, Tex., Chem. Exposure Litig.), No. H-92-1054 (S.D. Tex. April 10,
1995) [hereinafter Hayden, Notice of Pendency] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
This litigation has been the subject of some press attention, largely because of the decision
of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, a public interest law firm, to oppose the proposed
settlement. See Wade Lambert, Public-Interest Law Group Fights Some Class Settlements
as Unfair, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1995, at B4.
267. The class periods for personal injuries, wrongful death and medical monitoring
claims ran fromJanuary 1, 1973 to April 10, 1995. See Hayden, Notice of Pendency, supra
note 266, at 1.
268. See id. at 2. Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, the principal objector to the
proposed settlement, pointed out in its amicus curiae brief that the First, Second, Third
and Fourth Amended Complaints in Hayden sought class certification under Rule 23 (b) (3)
and did not include personal injury claims. Only the Fifth Amended Complaint, filed in
1995, alleged personal injuries. See Brief ofAmicus Curiae Trial Lawyers'For PublicJustice
In Opposition to the Proposed Class Settlement at 4 & n.4, Hayden (No. H-92-1054)
thereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (on file with the Columbia aw Review).
269. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 268, at 5-6. The class action was certified as
a settlement class action under Rule 23(b) (2) on April 10, 1995. See Hayden, Notice of
Pendency, supra note 266, at 3.
270. The basic significance of a Rule 23(b) (2) class action is that there is no right to
opt out (which exists only in the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action). Rule 23(b)(2)
requires the parties seeking class certification to show that "the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).
271. For an early decision finding in the context of a labor and antitrust dispute that
courts should prefer certification under Rule 23(b) (1) when injunctive relief is sought, see
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (when a
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from using the Bryan plant to produce,
fendants agreed to be enjoined
272
use, or handle arsenic.
Given that the continued release of arsenic into the surrounding atmosphere almost certainly would violate a variety of federal environmental statutes carrying criminal penalties, this concession amounted to little
and ordinarily would not have worked to convert a class action that was
predominantly for money damages into a Rule 23(b) (2) class action
(from which opting out is not permitted). Most courts have long used a
"predominance" test that looks to the primary relief sought in distinguishing Rule 23(b) (2) from Rule 23(b) (3) class actions. 2 73 Still, plaintiffs characterized their class action as one for medical monitoring (arguably a form of equitable relief) and in fact settled for relatively modest
monetary relief: namely, a $55 million settlement fund, 274 which amount
will in theory both support a medical monitoring program and compensate class members for both property damage and present and future personal injury claims, as well as pay plaintiffs' unusually high attorneys
fees. 275 Despite these suspicious signs, the settlement nonetheless re2 76
ceived preliminary judicial approval.
choice exists, court should certify class of present and future NBA basketball players under
Rule 23(b) (1), and not Rule 23(b) (3), in order to ensure that there is no right to opt out),
aff'd 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
272. See Stipulation of Settlement at 22-23, Hayden (No. H-92-1054) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Defendants also claimed that the principal defendant was on the
brink of insolvency. This argument was highly debatable because an economist testified
that the defendant (Elf Atochem North America, Inc.) had a net shareholder investment
of $529 million, but it supplied the basis for a "limited fund" argument which, as in Ahearn,
might independently support a mandatory class action. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra
note 268, at 7-8.
273. See awrenceJ. Restieri,Jr., Note, The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification
of Classes Seeking Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages After Ticor TitleInsurance Co. v.
Brown, 63 Fordham L Rev. 1745, 1747 (1995). For decisions employing this
predominance test, see Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement System, 780 F.2d 776, 780 (9th
Cir.) (action should be certified under Rule 23(b) (2) where primary relief sought was
injunctive even though money damages also sought), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986);
Duran v. Credit Bureau of Yuma, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D. Ariz. 1982) (certifying action
under Rule 23(b) (3) where primary motive was recovery of damages); see also 1 Newberg
& Conte, supra note 96, § 4.14, at 4-48 to 4-49 (discussing test).
274. See Hayden, Notice of Pendency, supra note 266, at 1 (cash payments in
settlement total $55,070,000 plus "possible additional funds derived from pending
litigation against third parties"). The "possible additional funds" depend on the outcome
of litigation brought against the defendants' insurance carriers. However, the settlement
also provides that Atochem will keep 48 3/4% out of the first $90 million received from
insurance carriers, even though future claimants may not have received anything. See id.
at 4. Thus, it is possible that Atochem will be reimbursed nearly in full from its insurance
while some claimants with "extraordinary claims" will receive nothing.
275. Class counsel will seek attorneys' fees from the settlement fund in an amount not
to exceed $18,358,333 and actual expenses in an amount not to exceed $3.25 million. See
id. at 6. These two amounts, if received, would amount to slightly more than 39.7% of the
$55,070,000 settlement fund.
276. On April 10, 1995, United States District CourtJudge Calvin Botley certified the
class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2) for settlement purposes. A fairness hearing was
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What makes the Hayden litigation truly shocking, however, is less its
attempt to bar opt outs than its willful indifference to future claimants.
Although the settlement carefully divided the settlement fund between

property claims and personal injury claims, 277 it left the allocation be-

tween future and present claimants entirely to the future discretion of a
special master. By the settlement's terms, most of the settlement fund
will be allocated to a "Personal Injury Fund" that will primarily compensate all class members for the increased risk of injury as a result of their
exposure. 278 However, because the latency period for arsenic exposure is
up to forty years,2 79 and an estimated 26,000 class members are covered
by the settlement,2 8 0 it is inevitable that some future claimants wil incur
actual arsenic-related illnesses in the remote future. Such claims for actual personal injury are defined as "extraordinary claims" by the settlement, and the special master is given substantial discretion in processing
and recognizing them. No funds are specifically allocated for future
claimants, but the special master is instructed to "make an initial evaluation of all extraordinary claims submitted during the first nine months
[of the settlement] and .

.

. create a reserve from the Personal Injury

Fund for the payment of extraordinary claims based on extraordinary
claim awards." 281 Predictably, the settlement provides that if the fund for
personal injury claimants proves inadequate, claims will be scaled back
2 82
and defendants will have no additional liability.

In overview, such an undefined allocation procedure simply sweeps
the difficult problem of future claims estimation under the rug, postponing it until afterjudicial approval has been secured. If the estimation of
future claims is implausibly low, no one is in a position to object (and
present claimants receive a higher payment); in contrast, if it is too high,
present claimants have a strong incentive to protest. The consequence is
held on June 8, 1995, but no final decision had been rendered as of September 1, 1995.
See id. at 3.
277. Thirty percent of the settlement fund (after deduction of attorneys' fees and
expenses) is allocated to a property damage fund. This amount cannot be reallocated to

future personal injury if the personal injury settlement fund proves inadequate. See
Exhibit A, Protocol for Distribution of the Settlement Fund at 5, in Haydn, Notice of

Pendency, supra note 266.
278. Section XII of the Protocol for Distribution of the Settlement Fund sets forth an
elaborate formula to quantify the risk to present claimants based on the duration of their

exposure and their relative proximity to the plant. See id. at 8-9. Actual injuries or
illnesses resulting from arsenic exposure are treated as "extraordinary claims" by Section

XIII and their handling is largely entrusted to the discretion of the special master. See id.
at 11.
279. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 268, at 6 (citing affidavit of plaintiff's own
expert Dr. Stuart Lloyd Shalat).

280. See id. at 5 (citing plaintiffs' counsel's estimate than the class "has approximately
26,000 residents and somewhere around 5,300 residential properties and perhaps three

thousand to thirty-five hundred other types of properties").
281. Exhibit A, Protocol for Distribution of the Settlement Fund
Notice of Pendency, supra note 266.
282. See id.

at 12, in Hayden,
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that substantial corporations escape with a modest lump sum settlement
from which class members cannot opt out, while future claimants are left
to gamble on the adequacy of a settlement fund that does not even reserve specific amounts for them. Ultimately, the Hayden outcome reflects not only the triumph of defendants over plaintiffs, but also that of
present claimants over unrepresented and still unknown future
claimants.
D. Mass Tort ProductLiability Cases
An instructive contrast to the foregoing mass tort personal injury
cases is supplied by the recent experience in mass tort product liability
cases. As a generalization, such cases involve the same operative facts as
in a personal injury class action, except that they are inherently "small
claimant" cases. The class members in such cases have either suffered a
decline in the value of a defective product that they purchased or have
experienced other property damage because of the product's malfunction. In the typical case, an automobile model is alleged to have a safety
defect that resulted in both personal injuries and property damage.
Although class actions for personal injuries in such cases are still rare to
non-existent,2 88 a property damage class action makes comparatively
good sense because the interests of the class members are relatively homogenous. Each has suffered relatively equivalent property damages,
and use of the class action would obviously economize on costly duplicative litigation.
The irony, however, is that it is in this property loss context that
courts have recently been the most vigilant. Within the last year alone,
courts have rejected proposed nationwide class action settlements in
cases involving the Ford Bronco II,284 a General Motors pickup truck with
"side-saddle" gas tanks that allegedly exploded in minor collisions, 28 5 and
a defective polybutylene (PB) plumbing system that had been installed in
several million American homes.2 8 6
283. This is probably because such a class action would have great difficulty satisfying

the "commonality" requirement of Rule 23(a) (2) or the "superiority" requirement of Rule
23(b) (3). See infra text accompanying notes 362-382.
284. See In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CA MDL-991, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1995).

285. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (overturning settlement approved by the district court). Earlier, a
Texas appellate court rejected a parallel settlement involving only Texas residents who
purchased GM pickup trucks. See Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1994).
286. See Settlement Agreement, Beeman v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-47363 (Tex. Dist.
Ct., Harris County 1994) [hereinafter Beeman Settlement Agreement] (undated draft, on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Filed as a nationwide class action in a Texas state
court in September 1993, this action was brought against Shell Oil, DuPont, and Hoechst,
who were the principal makers of polybutylene plastic pipe, which had been installed in
over six million American homes. See Adam Bryant, Plastic Pipe Makers Plan to Settle
Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1994, at D4. The action resulted in a settlement class and a
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What explains the relatively close scrutiny given these settlements?
Possibly their facts were more egregious,

28 7

but the same pattern of settle-

ment classes and separate inventory settlements was present in both contexts. Thus, plaintiffs' attorneys in these settlements do not appear to
proposed settlement under which the defendants would be obligated to pay eligible claims
(if made) of up to $750 million. If claims exceed this amount, defendants could elect to
pay additional claims, or, if they refuse, plaintiffs could sue in state court under a tolled
statute of limitations. See Beeman Settlement Agreement, supra, at 12-13, 16-17. The
actual payment by defendants would, of course, depend on the extent of the claims made,
but the parties described this settlement as the largest property damage class action
settlement in U.S. history. See Bryant, supra, at D4. Nonetheless, both the settlement
agreement and the negotiation process leading up to it revealed some of the same
suspicious features that have characterized mass tort personal injury class actions: namely,
inventory settlements and severe eligibility restrictions. For example, the objectors to the
Beeman settlement alleged that since January 1994, the defendants had paid
"approximately $88 million to proposed plaintiff's counsel" with regard to the latter's
individual cases, resulting in estimated contingency "fees of approximately $40 million" (in
addition to the proposed class action attorney fee award of $24.25 million). Letter from
Robert B. Gerard, Esq., Counsel to the Objectors in Beeman, toJohn C. Coffee,Jr. (Dec. 20,
1994) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Allegedly, these inventory settlements were
reached only with "proposed class counsel that support Beeman." Id. In addition, the
settlement agreement, itself, contained a variety of technical exclusions that would
disqualify an indeterminate number of potential class members from eligibility for full
replumbing. For example, because polybutylene pipe is heat sensitive, it often fails near
water heaters, but any failure within a specified distance of a water heater was expressly
excluded by the settlement agreement from receiving full replumbing. See Beeman
Settlement Agreement, supra, at 18. Objectors estimated that less than 17% of the
individual clients that they represented would qualify under the "quirky" terms of the
Beeman settlement agreement. See Letter from Robert B. Gerard, Esq., Counsel to the
Objectors in Beeman, toJohn C. Coffee,Jr. (Dec. 22, 1994) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). Ultimately, after the usual war of recriminations between the opposing camps of
plaintiffs' counsel, the court declined to approve the settlement in February 1995 (but did
not write an opinion). See Maryann Haggerty, Settlement is Thrown Out in Suit Over
Plastic Pipes, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1995, at Fl.
287. The FordBronco ff litigation may represent the extreme example of a settlement
offering only illusory benefits to class members. At issue was the alleged tendency of the
utility vehicle "to roll over completely at relatively moderate speeds." Milo Geyelin & Neal
Templin, Ford Attorneys Played Unusually Large Role in Bronco II's Launch, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 5, 1993, at 1. Under the proposed settlement, the class members would receive a
"Utility Vehicle Package," consisting of (1) a video describing the vehicle and how it should
be driven; (2) a sun-visor sticker that warned the driver how to operate the vehicle; and (3)
an owner's guide supplement-and no cash. See Ford Bronco ff, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3507, at *2. In addition, each member of the settlement class was invited to receive a free
inspection, but repairs were at the customer's expense. These "benefits" seem largely
intended to give rise to an "assumption of risk" or contributory negligence defense in any
subsequent personal injury litigation against Ford if the driver arguably failed to comply
with the manufacturer's instructions.
Although the FordBronco !!settlement was rejected, similar attempts persist to certify
mass tort property damage class actions involving little or no discernible monetary benefit
for class members. See Nichole M. Christian, Chrysler Pact Could Block Minivan Suits,
Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1995, at B3 (discussing proposed class action settlement that would
require Chrysler to replace faulty door latch handles, as Chrysler had already ageed to do
in voluntary settlement with a federal agency, but would not provide cash compensation,
except for $5 million in requested plaintiffs' attorneys' fees).
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have been more subject to conflicts of interest than those attorneys representing the class in recent asbestos class actions. In this light, the distinctive feature of property damage class actions was that rejection of the
settlement imposed little cost on the court. Little impact on the federal
docket was likely if the settlements were disapproved. After all, few individual plaintiffs would bear the litigation costs of suing for the decline in
the value of their car or pickup truck because of a safety defect. In contrast, asbestos, breast implant, and Agent Orange cases did have the potential to swamp the federal docket because individual plaintiffs possessed "high stakes" claims and could obtain representation on a
contingency fee basis.
Other factors may also explain the difference in judicial reaction.
Chief among these factors is the lack of urgency surrounding property
damage settlements. In some of these cases, rejection of the settlement
has simply led to its renegotiation and enhancement. 28 8 But even if not,
no class member is left impoverished. In the personal injury context,

288. In the Beeman polybutylene litigation, discussed supra at note 286, the Texas
court's rejection of the settlement led to the filing of a nationwide federal class action,
which the plaintiffs claimed could result in an estimated $7 billion in damages. See Jenny
Luesby, Shell & Hoechst to be Sued in U.S. Over House Pipes, Fin. Times, July 7, 1995, at
4. DuPont, which was scheduled to pay an estimated $70 million under the rejected
settlement, quickly agreed to contribute up to $120 million to the revised settlement. See
Peter Fairley, DuPont Gets Conditional Okay for Polybutylene Settlement, Chemical Wk.,
June 7, 1995, at 13. Such a $50 million increase within several months of the original
settlement's rejection may suggest that the original settlement was cheap. Then, in August
1995, Hoechst Celanese and Shell Oil agreed to a class action settlement under which they
agreed, apparently on terms similar to those of the earlier settlement, to pay eligible claims
(if made) of up to $850 million. This settlement, in conjunction with the DuPont recovery,
would imply a $970 million total settlement, or a seeming $220 million improvement in
less than a year. See David Rotman, Hoechst Celanese, Shell Agree to $850-Million Pipe
Settlement, Chemical Wk., Aug. 9, 1995, at 13.
Assesments of the polybutylene litigation are complicated, however, by the fierce
battle among the defendants. At the time that DuPont agreed to a revised $120 million
settlement in Alabama state court, it also received as a condition of its settlement immunity
from cross-claims by the other defendants. On this basis, objectors to this revised
settlement argued that DuPont had effectively "capped" its liability at 8% of the cost of
plumbing repairs and was liable for that amount only if the other defendants contributed
the remaining 92%. See Letter from Arthur H. Bryant, Executive Director, Trial Lawyers
for PublicJustice, to John C. Coffee, Jr. 4 (Sept. 20, 1995) (on file with author). On this
basis, DuPont would not have increased its contribution, but only reduced its maximum
exposure, and class members would have gained little from this revised settlement.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the charges and countercharges among the
parties in Beeman, but their disputes once again point out both the difficulties that courts
face in monitoring mass tort settlements (where the parties alone possess the critical
information) and the possibility of reverse auctions by which defendants may reach nonadversarial settlements with a "friendly" or dissident plaintiffs' attorney. Here, it is at least
arguable that DuPont has cut a favorable deal with a cooperative plaintiffs' attorney that
makes both class members and other defendants worse off.
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however, courts are impelled by the perception that
compensation must
28 9
be expedited to the seriously injured and dying.

Nonetheless, all these factors point toward a common conclusion: In
dealing with mass tort personal injury class actions, courts are both more
conflicted and pressured. Remove these pressures, and they become
more skeptical of class action settlements, which, both procedurally and
substantively, seem to be not very different from those that they have
approved.
E. A Preliminay Evaluation
What are the early lessons of the recent experience with mass tort
class actions? First, recent cases underscore the difficulties inherent in
dealing with future claimants. The destabilizing force that caused the
Silicone Gel global settlement to unravel was the failure of the parties to
estimate accurately the number of claims that would be filed. Given that
an estimated 650,000 to 1,000,000 women received silicone implants during the 1970s and 1980s,2 90 it may have understandably surprised defend-

ants that 440,000 claimants (or well over forty percent) filed within
months of the settlement's approval. 29 1 Defendants had estimated that
$1.2 billion would be sufficient to cover the first round of payments to
29 2
present claimants, but wound up raising this estimate to $24 billion.

Moreover, this underestimation could only grow as additional women
would predictably file claims in the future upon discovery of illness. Arguably, the inaccuracy of these predictions may have been the consequence of the "immature" status of breast implant litigation. Only seventy-eight identifiable breast implant cases were pending in the federal
courts (plus an estimated two hundred "related" actions) at the time the
JPML consolidated all breast implant litigation in 1992 before Judge
Pointer.2 93 Such a limited experience provided insufficient information
29 4
to estimate the number and types of claims likely to be asserted.
Still, there may be a more basic reason why the parties grossly underestimated the claims likely to be filed: it was in their mutual self-interest
to do so. Some $1 billion of the $4.23 billion Silicone Gel class action was
289. For a representative decision, expressing exactly this theme, see In rejoint E. &

S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
290. See Feder, supra note 256, at F9.
291. Of the 440,000 women who registered under the settlement, some 70,000 of
them appeared "to qualify for immediate compensation, far beyond the 6,000 originally
anticipated." Linda Himelstein et al., A Breast-Implant Deal Comes Down to the Wire,
Bus. Wk., Sept. 4, 1995, at 88, 88. Thus, present claimants exceeded projections by more
than tenfold and the number of eventual future claimants necessarily remains uncertain.

292. See Court Analysis: $4.25 Billion Inadequate, supra note 260, at A14.
293. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1098
n.1 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
294. Interestingly, it was possibly easier to estimate the likely number of claims in
Siicone Gel than in a mass exposure case (such as asbestos) because the approximate
number of implants sold was known. See Morrison & Wolfman, supra note 250, at 28.
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reserved for attorneys' fees and expenses, and this fund was to be "divided among a core group of 21 lawyers and thousands of referring attorneys. " 295 Receipt of these fees required that the settlement hold together, and this incentive could have induced plaintiffs' attorneys to
accept a low estimate of likely claims as to which a more disinterested
person would have been more skeptical. 296 To be sure, Silicone Gel is the
almost unique case in which there was no hint of impropriety surrounding the settlement process. But for precisely this reason, it suggests that
the contingent nature of the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees may leave them
without an adequate incentive to contest an underestimate by defendants
of likely future claims. Both sides then have reasons to suppress their
misgivings about the adequacy of the settlement fund.
For defendants, the practical lesson from the Silicone Gel experience
may be a perverse one from a public policy perspective: i.e., never grant a
delayed opt out right, because it can expose defendants to double liability
under both the class action and individual actions. Indeed, the Silicone
Gel experience may confirm defendants in their recent practice of seeking to define the class to include only future claimants (who predictably
will not seek to opt out during a brief initial opt out period ending well
before their symptoms manifest themselves). To curtail claimant eligibility, defendants may increasingly negotiate individual defendant-by-defendant settlements, rather than industry-wide settlements. 297 Defendants will, however, likely persist in seeking an early resolution of future
claims before the typical settlement price spiral that accompanies the
evolution of a mass tort.298 As a result, a dangerous combination seems
likely to recur: early certification of a nationwide class action before
there has been sufficient experience in individual cases to establish market values coupled with increasing restrictions on the plaintiffs' right to
opt out.
295. Gina Kolata, A Case ofJustice, or a Total Travesty?: How the Battle Over Breast
Implants Took Dow Coming to Chapter 11, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1995, at Dl.
296. Current estimates suggest that benefits under the settlement will be cut back so
that class members will receive at most 12% to 16% and at worst less than 5% of the
scheduled efforts. See Unger, supra note 259, atA6. Errors of this magnitude are difficult
to attribute solely to negligence or poorjudgment. Defendants may have been content to
create an inadequate settlement fund, which terminated their liability, and plaintiffs'
attorneys had only limited incentives to contest this inadequacy.
297. As of early September 1995, the Sime Gel settlement appeared to be headed in
this direction as some corporate defendants had begun separate negotiations with the
plaintiffs' attorneys. See Barry Meier, Risks in Separate Deals on Breast-Implant Suits, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 1, 1995, at D3. For claimants, this involves two distinct risks. First, many may
be unable to identify the maker of the implant they received, and thus individual
defendant settlements effectively translate into increased eligibility requirements. Second,
there is increased risk that an individual settlement fund may prove inadequate. In effect,
industry-wide pooling protects claimants against disparities in outcomes because of the
differing claims experiences of individual defendants. See infra note 299.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
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The Dow Coming bankruptcy also underscores for defendants the
potential attractions of bankruptcy and a class action, used in combination, to deter opting out. If employed early enough before a substantial
the class action, bankvolume of individual litigation has begun outside
2 99
ruptcy need not threaten corporate control.
Another perverse effect of Silicone Gel may be to discourage judicial
attempts to limit plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The settlement approved by
Judge Pointer placed an outer twenty-four percent ceiling on legal and
administrative costs and suggested that individual contingency fees might
be restricted to this same ceiling 0 0° The sensible premise to this policy
was that because liability had been established under the settlement, the
individual attorney should not receive a greater contingency fee.3 01 Unconscionable as it may seem that an attorney should receive one-third or
more of this riskless recovery under a retainer agreement with the client,
the impact of this apparent ceiling may have been to encourage opportunistic opting out by self-interested plaintiffs' attorneys. That is, a plaintiffs' attorney representing an individual client entitled to $1,000,000
under the settlement could anticipate a fee of only $240,000 under the
Silicone Gel settlement's presumed ceiling (assuming a private retainer
agreement between the attorney and client under which the attorney was
authorized to charge more). If, however, the attorney induced the client
to opt out and maintain an individual action, and if that action resulted
299. The Silicone Gel experience may also teach defendants to arrange for "settlement
class" actions to be filed against them alone and not against their entire industry. Both
Georgine and Silicone Gel were industry-wide class actions, and in that context it is far less
credible to claim that the entire industry's insurance resources constitute a "limited fund."
In contrast, Ahearn may teach defendants to seek individual class settlements and then ask
the court to certify the class as a mandatory class based on the individual corporation's
"limited" assets. In addition, such individual settlements inherently tighten eligibility
requirements as each claimant must prove that he or she purchased from that defendant.
See supra note 297.
300. The Silicone Gel breast implant settlement provided that no more than 24% of the
total fund, or $1.01 billion, could be spent on administrative or legal costs. See Bordon,
supra note 115, at All. Uniquely, this provision required that all legal fees, including
individual contingency fees, come from the separate fund, and not from individual clients.
See McKee, supra note 115, at 4. In turn, this implied that, as the administrative costs of
sending notice to class members or administering the settlement fund rose, fee awards to
plaintiffs' attorneys would have to full. See Bordon, supra note 115, at Al1. Although the
24% ceiling applied to aggregate expenses only andJudge Pointer pledged himself to seek
to honor private contingency contracts between attorney and client, the combination of
high administrative costs plus the need to award a separate fee to class counsel (from this
same fund) made some reduction in contingency fees likely. Indeed, the settlement
agreement provided that the judge could "make appropriate reductions" in privately
negotiated contingency fees in order to stay within the ceiling. See McKee, supra note 115,
at 4. Plaintiffs' attorneys in the Silicone Gel case read the settlement as intending to limit
most contingency fees to 24% (or less). As an inevitable result, an incentive arose for
plaintiff' attorneys to advise their clients to opt out from the class action in order to
escape the settlement's 24% ceiling, even if the client would fare better under the class
action.
301. See Brickman, supra note 115, at 113.
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in a verdict or settlement for the same $1,000,000, the attorney would
now earn $400,000 (or perhaps more, depending upon the private retainer agreement between the client and the attorney, which today often
provides a forty percent contingent fee). Indeed, the attorney could still
do better even if the client did worse (for example, forty percent of an
$800,000 outcome would be $320,000). Unfortunately, sensible fee reform may encourage socially undesirable and inefficient opting out that
advances the attorney's interests rather than the client's.
Conspicuously absent in all these cases has been any effort to deal
seriously with the problems of future claimants. Across the board, the
issue of inflation has been quietly and uniformly repressed, and the settling parties in recent class actions have not attempted to project the
number of future claims (and types of claims) with anything approaching
the seriousness of the effort made in recent mass tort bankruptcy
cases. 30 2 Only Aheam gave any recognition to the special position of future claimants by appointing a guardian ad litem. Still, it is clearly an
inadequate response to appoint a special representative after the settlement agreement has been struck.
Beyond the absence of procedural protections for future claimants,
the larger question involves what future claimants conceivably gain from
these settlements. Aheam here supplies the best illustration. As with
other mass tort class actions, its settlement essentially established an insurance fund to cover future claimants whose injuries mature into a compensable form over a multi-decade period. In Aheam, this insurance fund
consisted of the company's insurance resources (made available after a
clearly intense and negotiated settlement with Fibreboard's two principal
insurers) plus a trivial $10 million contribution by Fibreboard. In return,
Fibreboard received future immunity from all asbestos claims. Had the
class action settlement not been reached, the same insurance resources
would have been potentially available (although Fibreboard might again
have had to sue and settle with its insurance carriers to obtain payment)
and the future claimants would have also had access to the full economic
resources of Fibreboard. Thus, the class members appear to have traded
Fibreboard's liability for nothing to which they did not already have a
right. The only benefit to class members in this setting is the reduced
possibility that the company's insurance resources would have been exhausted by the time their claims matured. That is, "early" future claimants might have depleted these resources to the detriment of "later" future claimants. Although this is not a trivial problem, it could potentially
be solved by injunctive relief restricting the payout of insurance resources
to early claimants (and thus does not justify a complete release to
302. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Johns-Manville and
National Gypsum mass tort reorganization proceedings). In part, this difference may
reflect the bankruptcy courts' lesser concern with the status of the federal civil docket.
Even more likely, it reflects the fact that future claimants must contend with other creditor
classes in bankruptcy proceedings for shares of the same economic pie.
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Fibreboard itself in return for a token $10 million contribution). Put
differently, no reason seems apparent why all future claimants should absolve Fibreboard from liability simply because early future claimants
might otherwise exhaust the insurance fund.
In rebuttal, some may argue that a rash of sudden claims in a particular period could have forced Fibreboard into bankruptcy. Bad as bankruptcy might seem for shareholders, Fibreboard's tort creditors would
likely have emerged better off from it. Based on the experience in the
asbestos bankruptcies, most of the debtors' value in bankruptcy would
have been contributed to a mass tort settlement fund. 08 Nor should it
be assumed that bankruptcy would have necessarily resulted, as management might have found additional financial resources with which to pay
claims. Bankruptcy is easy to threaten, but management will be predictably slow to make good on this threat because bankruptcy also jeopar8 04
dizes their own continued employment.
PART III.

THE

SEARCH FOR REMEDIES

Potentially, there are a variety of levers by which courts could seek to
discourage collusive settlements and protect the underrepresented in
mass tort class actions. These range from strict constitutional standards
to more modest adjustments in federal rules and certification procedures. What is clear, however, is that the traditional levers used by courts
to align the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys and class members work
poorly in the mass tort context. For example, the court's primary regulatory tool in the class action context has been its ability to adjust its fee
award to reflect the plaintiffs' attorney's success (or lack thereof).305 But
in the mass tort context, the popularity of inventory settlements undercuts this judicial lever and permits potentially corrupting side payments.
Moreover, mass tort class actions now produce recoveries exceeding the
billion-dollar level. In such a context, even a modest percentage of the
recovery may result in a fee award of such a magnitude that it brings the
declining marginal utility of money into play. That is, the defendants'
willingness to agree to a fee award of, say, $80 million (in return for a less
than fully adversarial settlement) cannot be as easily overcome by the
prospect of an even larger fee recovery if the case were more aggressively
litigated.
This Part is organized sequentially. First, it assesses those standards
and doctrines that might prevent or discourage a court from certifying a
future claims class action. Second, it considers possible standards to govern class certification and the selection of lead counsel. Third, it exam303. See supra text accompanying notes 163-171.
304. See infra note 468 and accompanying text.
305. Commentators have long viewed the fee award standard as the court's primary
weapon by which to regulate the private attorney general. See Coffee, Understanding the
Plaintiff's Attorney, supra note 13, at 690-92; John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in

Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale LJ. 473, 473-74 (1981).
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ines techniques that would effectively enable class members to opt out of
the class action. Fourth, it proposes standards for the "settlement class
action." Finally, it discusses the relative merits of bankruptcy and the
mass tort class action.
The common premise to this analysis is not that each plaintiff should
receive his or her "day in court" in the form of an individual trial. Rather,
recognizing that idealism and pragmatism must be balanced, this Part
begins from the premise that judicial competence is limited. Because
courts cannot anticipate developments over a multi-decade period, judicial attempts to create an insurance system through a class action settlement are likely to go awry, with the result that at least the more distant
future claimants will be undercompensated. Some measure of litigant
autonomy is thus desirable not only for its own sake, but because group
litigation will predictably shortchange future claimants.
To a degree, this may state a justification for benign neglect, for allowing the ordinary litigation system to muddie through imperfectly, but
with some cases ending up in a mass tort bankruptcy (where the claimants have greater substantive and procedural rights). However, that option is both politically infeasible and certain to encounter judicial hostility. Thus, this Part proposes a means by which the class action can be
combined with arbitration to reduce the logistical burden on courts.
Under such a "constrained autonomy" model, the majority of claims are
resolved through group litigation, but the "high stakes" claimant and the
future claimant are provided with an escape hatch by which to assert their
individual claims (albeit in a restricted forum).
A. The Justiciability of Future Claims
The utility of the mass tort class action to the defendant today probably hinges on its ability to resolve future claims8 06 The attractions of the
class action over a bankruptcy reorganization to the defendant are obvious: (1) defendants can reach a settlement before the action is filed,
whereas in bankruptcy there will typically be uncertainty as of the filing
date as to what percentage of the firm's value must be given to the settlement trust set up to benefit victims; (2) the debtor corporation can escape the absolute priority rule and special class voting rules of bankruptcy; 0 7 (3) bankruptcy courts may reopen the proceeding and

demand additional allocations from the reorganized corporation when
the trust fund approaches insolvency; 0 8 and (4) the legal status of future
306. Part II of this Article has hopefully illustrated this point. Both Georgine and
Aheamn were framed as exclusively "future claims" class actions. See supra text
accompanying notes 192-204, 215-240.
307. See supra notes 145-147, 163-171 and accompanying text.
308. The most recent example is National Gypsum Co., which emerged from an
asbestos-related bankruptcy inJuly 1993. By the fall of 1994, the settlement trust created to
resolve asbestos claims was asserting that its assets fell $160 million short of the level
necessary to fund expected claims; its trustees are now seeking this amount from National
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claims in bankruptcy remains unresolved, with some decisions implying
that some future claims cannot be discharged by the bankruptcy court. 0 9
Understandable as it is that defendants want litigation closure from
the typically spiralling costs of future claims, constitutional limits may
constrain the ability of a federal court to provide it. The primary doctrinal obstacle is Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which permits federal courts to exercise jurisdiction only over "cases" and "controversies." Traditionally, this constitutional barrier has been employed to
deny subject matter jurisdiction in two quite distinct contexts, both of
which have applicability to the mass tort class action. First, numerous
cases have held that federal courts may not hear "friendly," "feigned," or
collusive lawsuits, in which there is no legitimate dispute between the parties. 10° Such actions both misuse judicial authority (because the court's
perception of the facts and legal arguments is distorted by the absence of
true adversaries), and confuse judicial decisionmaking.3s 1 Settlement
class actions may sometimes present precisely this form of feigned litiganorm, but discussion of this issue will be deferred
tion that violates this
3 12
until a later section.
Second, the deeper policy rationale for the "case or controversy" requirement is to preserve the separation of powers by limiting the matters
that the judicial branch may address. 3 13 The traditional rhetoric of the
case law says that federal courts may not decide "abstract or hypothetical
Gypsum. See Martha Brannigan, National Gypsum Makes An Unlikely Takeover Target,
Wall St.J., Mar. 6, 1995, at B4; see also In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp.

473, 485-87 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing insolvency of Johns-Manville Settlement
Trust).
309. There appears to be a conflict among the circuits on this point. See infra notes
837-341 and accompanying text. At least in some circuits, only claims that have accrued
under state or federal law are cognizable claims that may be discharged in a bankruptcy
reorganization. See Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 941-42 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that since plaintiffs' injuries were not manifest until after the bankruptcy,
their claims had not "accrued" under federal law and therefore could not be discharged);
In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (only claims that have accrued
under state law may be discharged in bankruptcy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
310. See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Teamsters Local 513 v.
Wojcik, 325 F. Supp. 989, 991-92 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
311. "'[Concrete adverseness,'" the Court has said in this regard, "'sharpens the
presentation of issues.'" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
312. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 790 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) ("some courts have even expressed concern that...
[settlement class action] cases do not present a case or controversy for Article I
purposes."); infra note 441 and accompanying text.
313. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992); F/as, 392 U.S.
at 95 (case or controversy requirement assures that "federal courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government").
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questions."3 14 At bottom, this limitation prevents activist judges from
making essentially legislative policy judgments as to which they typically
have neither expertise nor legitimacy. Accordingly, a plaintiff must have
more than an ideological interest in a dispute to have standing,3 15 but
rather must have a "'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' "3 16 The Supreme Court has framed a tripartite test for determining when this requisite personal stake exists, which requires that (1) the
plaintiff have suffered a concrete injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.3 17
Do future claimants have the requisite "injury-in-fact" to give them
standing? In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,318 the Court said that an injury
in fact had to be "(a) concrete and particularized... and (b) 'actual or
imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."'"319 Obviously, one can

assert that highly contingent and delayed future claims in mass tort cases
are not sufficiently "actual or imminent" to meet this standard. Here,
however, it is necessary to refine and break down the somewhat overbroad concept of future claims.3 20 In overview, future claimants can be
subdivided into three distinct subcategories: (1) persons who have suffered a legally cognizable injury but (for whatever reason) have not yet
filed suit; (2) persons who have been exposed to the toxic or defective
substance, drug, or product but have not yet manifested injury;32 1 and
(3) persons who have not yet been exposed or injured but who will be in
the future as a result of conduct by the defendants that has already oc.curred.3 22 This last category arises typically when the product or sub314. NewJersey, Dep't of Envt'l Protection & Energy v. Heldor Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d
702, 707 nn.6-7 (3d Cir. 1993).
315. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1986).
316. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).

317. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
318. 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995)
(discussing Lujan standing doctrine).
319. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

320. There is no standard definition of this term. Two recent commentators defined
a future claim as "a claim against a debtor for an injury or disease that has not yet become
manifest at the time the debtor has filed for bankruptcy, but is based upon the occurrence,
prior to the bankruptcy, of one or more material events, acts, or failures to act." Ralph R.
Mabey &Jamie A. Gavrin, Constitutional Limitations on the Discharge of Future Claims in

Bankruptcy, 44 S.C. L. Rev. 745, 750 (1993). As discussed, some courts would not accept
this definition.
321. This category could be further subdivided into those who have suffered an
injury, which is detectable (such as pleural plaques in the case of asbestos victims), but
have no awareness of it, and those whose injuries are not yet detectable at all (but who
simply have a statistically higher risk of future injury because of their exposure).
322. This fact pattern arises inevitably in cases involving environmental
contamination or latent property damage. If a community has been exposed to a
contaminant involving a long-term risk (i.e., a pesticide or air pollution containing a toxic
chemical), defendants may seek to structure a settlement that will apply to future
homeowners as well who thereafter acquire property or move into homes within the
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stance remains in use (contrary to the fact patterns in the asbestos or
silicone gel breast implants cases where the product had been withdrawn
from the market); this category will predictably loom larger in future
cases involving alleged tobacco addiction and injuries from secondary exposure to tobacco smoke. As discussed below, this third category is the
one that can be most clearly excluded under a constitutional analysis.
As a practical matter, however, the critical category is the second
one: the "exposure only" victims who lack symptoms at the time of the
settlement. Defendants have zealously sought to cover such "exposure
only" plaintiffs in recent settlement class actions, and indeed probably
would not have settled had this category been excluded. For example, in
Georgine, the complaint expressly asserted that the "exposure only" plaintiffs had sustained no physical harm as a result of their exposure to asbestos, but sought relief instead for (1) their increased risk of developing
asbestos-related disease; (2) their fear and mental anguish at the prospect
of developing asbestos-related disease; and (3) their need for medical
monitoring and surveillance to detect asbestos-related illness at an early
stage. 323 If intangible and contingent injuries such as these, which essentially spring from an increased base expectancy rate of future illness,
amount to a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing, then it
would seem that few meaningful barriers remain. Indeed, on this basis, a
settlement class action today might also resolve, consistent with Article
III, the future claims of all citizens in the United States who have been
exposed to secondary tobacco smoke.
But what practical lines can be drawn that would find such claims to
be nonjusticiable? Probably the simplest "bright line" standard would be
to look to state law and assert that if a claim, as pleaded, was not cognizable under state law, then it also should not be a sufficient "injury-in-fact"
for purposes of Article III. Today, in most state jurisdictions, exposure
alone to toxic substances does not give rise to a legally cognizable injury
for fear or emotional distress.3 24 These decisions have generally held that
increased risk of future injury, or fear of such injury, does not constitute
an independent ground for the recovery of damages, absent some "direct
affected location. In this author's view, such a future claim clearly flunks any acceptable
Article III test.
323. See Class Action Complaint, in Joint Appendix, supra note 187, at 267, 285.
324. Generally, these cases require that there must be some physical injury to justify
an award of damages for emotional distress. See Ball v.Joy Technologies, Inc., 958 F.2d 36,
38-39 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992); Sterlingv. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188, 1205-06 (6th Cir. 1988); Adams v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589,
593 (5th Cir. 1986); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 906 (D. Minn. 1990),

vacated, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp.
1528, 1534 (D. Kan. 1990); In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (D.
Haw. 1990). On the other hand, some decisions dealing with insurance issues recognize

that "the body incurs microscopic injury as asbestos fibers become lodged in the lungs and
as surrounding tissue reacts to the fibers thereafter." Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Some cases have said that even a "subclini-

cal injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute
the actual loss or damage to a plaintiff's interest required to sustain a
3 28
cause of action."
Ironically, the same district court that decided Georgine had earlier
found that "exposure only" plaintiffs lacked Article III standing in the
absence of an actual asbestos-related injury.3 27 Yet, when faced with the
Georgine settlement class, the court reversed its prior position. Noting
that in Association of DataProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,3 28

the Supreme Court had liberalized its test for Article III standing, abandoning its former "legal interest" test, which required an examination of
the legal merits of plaintiff' claim in favor of an "injury-in-fact" test, the
Georginedistrict court concluded that the newer "injury-in-fact" test could
3 29
be satisfied simply by the fact of exposure.
Although the Data Processing decision may well have liberalized the
"injury-in-fact" test, it does not follow that mere exposure alone is always
sufficient. In particular, the authority relied upon in Georginecan be easily distinguished. Those cases that have found mere exposure sufficient
to confer Article III standing have largely arisen in two very different contexts: injunctive actions and bankruptcy proceedings. The leading example of the former context is Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmentalStudy
Group, Inc.,33 0 in which the Court did find that exposure to a toxin could
331
It
confer standing to sue to enjoin enforcement of a federal statute.
325. 38 Am.Jur. 2d Fright, Shock and Mental Disturbance § 55 (1968).
326. Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985); see also
Zulkowski v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 852 F.2d 78, 76 (3d Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
Schweitzer held that a "manifest injury is a prerequisite for a FEILA action for an asbestosrelated injury"); Deleski v. Raymark Indus., 819 F.2d 377, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting
that under NewJersey and Pennsylvania law neither the enhanced risk of disease nor the
fear and emotional distress resulting therefrom are compensable unless accompanied by
present physical symptoms of illness or injury).
327. See Robinson v. Vaughn, No. 91-7646, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19518, at *4-*5
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 1992); Alim v. Vaughn, No. 91-4348, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12503, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1992); Hannibal v. Lyons, No. 89-5845, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8261, at *2
(E.D. Pa.July 2, 1990).

328. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (noting
that in order to confer standing, the injury must be "distinct and palpable" and not
abstract, conjectural, or hypothetical). Data Processingis, of course, a decision primarily
concerned withjudicial review of federal administrative action, a context far removed from
civil litigation for money damages.

329. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1437, 1447-48, 1454 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
330. 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978). Another example of such an injunctive action is Helling
v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2480-81 (1993), where a prisoner successfully alleged that
exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke amounted to an "injury-in-fact" for purposes of a

cruel and unusual punishment claim.
331. The statute (the Price-Anderson Act) limited the liability of a plant owner in the
event of a nuclear accident, and, after addressing standing, the Court upheld the Act
against all asserted constitutional infirmities. Addressing the standing issue, the Court said
that "[c] ertainly the environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution of
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noted that "the emission of non-natural radiation into appellees' environment would also seem a direct and present injury."3 2 But injunctive actions stand apart from actions for money judgments because most injunctive actions will unavoidably affect unrepresented future claimants. Thus,
for example, an injunction redrawing school boundaries in a desegregation case necessarily and inevitably affects future claimants, many of
whom have not yet even been exposed to the unlawful condition or danger. Given that such future claimants will inevitably be affected, it may be
appropriate to recognize their standing and unnecessary to provide them
a right to opt out. Precisely for this reason, Rule 23 permits non-opt out
class actions when the plaintiff seeks relief that will necessarily affect absent parties.383
The bankruptcy context is even more distinguishable, for several reasons. First, the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution vests Congress
with broad power "to establish... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."s3 4 Congress thus has broader
power here than elsewhere, 3 5 although the Fifth Amendment imposes
some due process limitations even in this context.33 6 Despite the differences in congressional authority (and the critical fact that Congress has
acted by passing the Bankruptcy Code), the irony is that future claimants
currently receive more protection in bankruptcy than in a class action.
Today, in bankruptcy, the majority of recent cases have found that a legally cognizable claim in bankruptcy does not arise simply because negligent or reckless conduct by the defendant occurred prior to the time of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Rather, these decisions have held
that there must be some pre-petition relationship between the future
claimants and the bankrupt entity in order for the future claimants to
the two lakes in the vicinity of the disputed power plants is the type of harmful effect which
...

[satisfies] the 'injury in fact' standard." Duke Power Go., 438 U.S. at 73-74.

332. Id. at 74.
333. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (B), (b) (2), (c) (3). Nonetheless, some argue that
future claimants should not even be included in Rule 23(b) (2) class actions. See Elizabeth
R. Kaczynski, Note, The Inclusion of Future Members in Rule 23(b) (2) Class Actions, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 397, 403 (1985).
334. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
335. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).
336. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935).
There has been a lively debate on the nature and stringency of these Fifth Amendment
limitations. Compare Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The
Problem of Future Claims, 38 Vand. L Rev. 1369, 1377-80, 1392-93 (1985)
(characterizing constitutional difficulties facing use of representatives for future claimants
in the bankruptcy context as "significant but not insurmountable") and Mabey & Gavrin,
supra note 320, at 771-84 (concluding that Fifth Amendment's substantive and procedural
due process standards do not prohibit discharge of future claims) with Gregory A. Bibler,
The Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 Am.
Bankr. UJ. 145, 168-75 (1987) (noting that "practical difficulties of identifying and giving
constitutionally adequate notice to thousands of contingent future claimants are almost
certainly insurmountable").
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have standing.33 7 Some of these decisions also require that the claim was
within the "fair contemplation of the parties" at the time of the bankruptcy filing.33 8 When the claim was not within the parties' "fair contemplation," they have said, the bankruptcy reorganization will not act as a
bar and the future claimant can still sue the reorganized entity years later
339
when the claimant's injury first manifests itself.
To be sure, not all courts have agreed, and some decisions have been
more liberal 0 and still others more conservative3 1 in defining when a
claim arises under the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, this intermediate
standard, which requires both the existence of a pre-petition relationship
and that the claim be within the parties' "fair contemplation," makes
good sense and could easily be applied to govern justiciability in the class
action context as well. From a policy perspective, the mass tort class ac-

337. See, e.g., Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1994); In
re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168
B.R. 434, 439-40 (S.D. Fla. 1994). But see In reJensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930-31 (9th Cir.
1993) (rejecting Chateaugay Corp.'s "relationship" approach in favor of a "fair
contemplation" test).
338. See Jensen, 995 F.2d at 930-31; Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005.
339. In Chateaugay Corp., the Second Circuit reasoned that if the future claimant there
(the EPA) could succeed in keeping its "claim outside of bankruptcy," it could thereafter
present the same claim "against the reorganized company that it anticipates will emerge
from bankruptcy." Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1005. For the argument that
"forseeability" is the appropriate standard for bankruptcy, see Kevin J. Saville, Note,
Discharging CERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does A Claim Arise?, 76 Minn. L
Rev. 327 (1991).
340. A few decisions have adopted a "conduct" test that looks to the date of the
misconduct. Under this standard, it would be enough that the defective or toxic product
was produced prior to the time of the bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins
Co., 839 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.) (Dalkon Shield claims found cognizable because
produced prior to filing), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988); In re Edge, 60 B.R1690,
699 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (negligent dental treatment claims found cognizable
because they arose at the "earliest point" in the relationship between the parties); In re
Johns-Manville Corp, 36 B.R. 743, 750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (asbestos claims found cognizable
on the basis of exposure alone), mandamus denied, 749 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1984). These
decisions precede those employing the relationship test and have not been followed
recently.
341. A few (much criticized) decisions have used the point at which a claim would
accrue under state law and thus typically require that some damage or injury have
occurred to the victim. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936,
941-42 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that because plaintiffi' injuries were not manifest until
after the bankruptcy, their claims had not "accrued" under federal law and therefore could
not be discharged); In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (only claims
that have accrued under state law may be discharged in bankruptcy). This standard does
interfere with the power of a bankruptcy court to deal with contingent claims, but would
make relatively greater sense when applied to the class action context. As noted earlier,
Article I's standards can be interpreted more liberally in bankruptcy because it is
specifically addressed by the Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 334-335.
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tion and the mass tort bankruptcy contexts are functional substitutes, and
the same limitations should apply in both contexts.3 42
At first glance, the relationship test announced in these bankruptcy
cases may seem to impose only modest restrictions. Indeed, cases applying this relationship standard have suggested in dicta that exposure will
suffice to establish the requisite relationship.3 43 But this does not mean
that any form of exposure need suffice. Once one recognizes that a relationship must exist between plaintiff and defendant at the time of the
action to satisfy Article III, it follows that not all forms of exposure will
suffice to establish this element.
Some distinctions seem obvious. Consider, for example, how the
Silicone Gel litigation might have been analyzed under such a standard. A
recipient of breast implants has obviously been "exposed" in an intrusive
and intimate way through a surgical procedure. This fact should satisfy
both the pre-petition relationship standard and the "fair contemplation"
standard (particularly in the latter case given the substantial publicity surrounding the health hazards associated with breast implants before the
time at which litigation was settled).34 Similarly, recent mass tort episodes involving the Dalkon Shield or defective heart valves would also
meet this standard.m5
In contrast, in a hypothetical case involving secondary exposure to
tobacco smoke or to a toxic pesticide through its release into the air, the
same relationship should not be found to exist because those exposed
would include not only employees and purchasers of the product, but the
potentially limitless class of anyone coincidentally located in the vicinity
of the release.-3 The status of asbestos cases under this standard is more
342. Given that the bankruptcy decisions do ultimately rest on constitutional
concerns about the dischargeability of future claims, they should not be dismissed as mere
statutory decisions. Most commentators have recognized the constitutional foundation of
these decisions. See, e.g., Mabey & Gavrin, supra note 320, at 760-89.
843. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.R. 434, 489-40 (S.D. Fla. 1994); see also
Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1994) (dictum).
344. A timing issue surrounds the point at which the relationship must be found to
exist. If the law looked to the moment of the settlement's approval, this would permit
consideration of publicity and other efforts at notice mandated by the court.
345. In In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989), future claimants injured by the Dalkon Shield were found to be barred by the
bankruptcy automatic stay. Although the case does not emphasize the nature of the
relationship, it seems likely that the degree of exposure involved in this case would satisfy

both the prior relationship and "fair contemplation" standards emphasized in Piper
Aircraft, Lemelle, andJensen. See supra notes 337-338. Similarly, in Bowling v. Pfizer, 143

F.R.D. 141, 147 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993), the
injured class members in that mass tort class action had received defective heart valves. A
more substantial personal intrusion is difficult to imagine. Thus, the facts of many mass
tort cases in which standing has been recognized in future claimants are consistent with
this proposed standard.
346. Besides employees who are occupationally exposed, immediate neighbors of a
factory releasing a toxic emission or leaking toxic chemicals might also satisfy the requisite
relationship test. The critical element would be that the possibility of injury from the
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questionable. On the one hand, because the occupational exposure of
many workers was long and sustained, the requisite relationship could be
found to exist in their case. On the other hand, virtually every U.S. citizen has been exposed to asbestos.m 7 A relationship that every U.S. citizen shares with the defendant is hardly a meaningful relationship, and, if
exposure alone gave rise to the requisite Article III "injury-in-fact," there
would be universal standing. Such a result-universal standing in all U.S.
citizens-seems starkly at odds with the traditional prudential limitation
on standing under which federal courts "'limit access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.' "34
This Article's contention that Article III should require a significant
pre-settlement relationship between the future claimants who will be
bound by the settlement and the defendant faces one significant doctrinal obstacle. In In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,34 9 the
Second Circuit rebuffed the attempts of Vietnam veterans who sought to
attack collaterally an earlier massive class action settlement of claims relating to "Agent Orange," a toxic defoliant used in the Vietnam War. The
veterans claimed that they could not be bound by the earlier settlement,
both because they had not received constitutionally adequate notice of
the settlement and because they lacked a justiciable claim at the time of
the settlement insofar as they had not then manifested any symptoms
from their exposure (and thus arguably lacked the requisite "injury-infact" necessary to have their claims adjudicated).50 The Second Circuit
rejected these claims, relying in part on Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmental Study Group, Inc.,35 1 for its conclusion that the veterans had sustained the necessary "injury-in-fact." Other decisions, however, have been
more skeptical as to whether future claimants should be included within
3 52
a proposed class.
release or emission be within their "fair contemplation." Secondary exposure to tobacco
smoke presents a similar but even more extreme example in which exposure alone should
not satisfy a "relationship" test.
347. The objectors in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa.
1994), cited studies concluding that "probably everyone in the world" has been exposed to
asbestos. Reply Brief of Appellants at 17, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 93-CV-0215).

348. Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)).
349. 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
350. See id. at 1434-35.
351. 438 U.S. 59 (1978); see also supra notes 330-332 and accompanying text
(discussing Duke Power Co.).
352. Some of these decisions declining to include future claimants raise due process
concerns, while others rely more on prudential grounds for denying inclusion in the class
to future claimants. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 89 (3d Cir.)
("[W]e do not think that future faculty members, whose possible claims are only
speculative and can only be formulated in a highly abstract and conclusory fashion, should
provide, and possibly be prejudiced by, membership in the class.. . ."), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979); Foster'v. Bechtel Power Corp., 89 F.R.D. 624, 626-27 (E.D. Ark. 1981)
(noting that due process considerations preclude inclusion of future claimants in the
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So where are we left? On the policy level, the preferable rule may be
the more conservative one stated in those bankruptcy decisions that find
only claims that have accrued under state law to be cognizable under
Article III.353 In most state jurisdictions, this standard would require

some present and recognized injury, thereby excluding the bulk of future
claimants. Although this rule has been criticized in the bankruptcy context because it may deny the court the power to reorganize a company
that is subject to contingent future claims, this critique has less applicability to the mass tort context, because, as this Article later argues, 54 this is
precisely the function that a class action is least capable of successfully
performing. Still, on the practical level, the case law on justiciability in
class actions may have already gone beyond this point, so that only the
Supreme Court would impose such an "accrued state claim" gloss on Article III. Nonetheless, at least outside the Second Circuit, federal courts
could and should still look to the broader line of bankruptcy decisions
that require both a significant, pre-filing relationship between the parties
and that the future injury be then within the plaintiffs' "fair contemplation." Even within the Second Circuit, the degree of exposure remains
relevant, and a secondary tobacco smoke or pesticide exposure case is not
necessarily controlled by the Agent Orange precedent, which on its facts
probably involved a more sustained exposure with clearer recognition by
the class members of the possibility of injury. Finally, even Agent Orange
does not confer Article III standing on class members who have not yet
been exposed at the time of the action's filing.
Still, Georgine and Agent Orange suggest that federal courts will resist
any effort at curtailing thejusticiability of future claims in mass tort class
actions when to do so threatens their ability to control their dockets.
Symptomatically, the more restrictive bankruptcy cases arose in a context
where courts had greater constitutional authority to define the standard,
but less caseload pressure inducing them to be all inclusive. 35 5 At least
class); Moore v. Western Pa. Water Co., 73 F.R.D. 450, 453 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (describing
future claimants as "an amorphous, phantom group, "incapable of identification" and
declining to include them within class) (citation omitted); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 196, 200 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (refusing to include future claimants on fairness
grounds); see also Kaczynski, supra note 333, at 398 n.7 (future claimants not includable in
a Rule 23(b) (3) class action).
353. See cases cited supra at note 341. As noted in the discussion at supra text
accompanying notes 335-336, Congress has power to define standing more broadly in the
bankruptcy context. Hence, the more restrictive "accrued state claim" standard could
apply only outside bankruptcy, with bankruptcy courts.left free to use a more liberal
standard under which to reorganize companies.
354. See infra text accompanying notes 457-470.
355. The rhetorical differences between the bankruptcy decisions and the class action
cases are also revealing. Consider the following language from Schweitzer v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir. 1985):
[I]f contingent claims were held to include possible future tort claims, then every
hypothetical chain of future events leading to liability, regardless of how likely or
unlikely, might be the basis for a contingent claim ....Thus, in our case, every
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on policy grounds, there are persuasive reasons why those circuit courts
that have not yet faced the issue should apply the bankruptcy standards to
the class action context in order to restrict future claims class actions:
First, future claims classes lack the " 'concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.'

"356

That is, because such a class is

inchoate and without existing members having a strong personal stake in
the outcome, there will seldom be class members able or willing to monitor their attorneys. Future claims class actions present, then, the extreme
example of lawyers operating without clients.
Second, doctrinally, Article III justiciability requires that plaintiffs
show "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."3 57 Here, a
fundamental problem with "exposure only" classes is that appropriate
compensation for the injury of exposure is an elusive concept. Any current cash award will inevitably overcompensate those who do not develop
more severe subsequent illness and undercompensate those who do.3 58
All that reasonably can be done is to establish an insurance fund, but this
requires courts to engage in precisely the kind of predictive decisionmaking that strains and usually exceeds their competence. Judge Posner
made precisely this point in declining to permit future claimants to participate in a mass tort bankruptcy proceeding, stating that it arguably
"would be a quixotic undertaking far beyond the realistic boundaries of
judicial competence to make sufficiently generous provision for upwards
of a hundred thousand unidentified claimants to justify extinguishing
their claims involuntarily."3 59 Put simply, to give adequate redress in a
future claims class action, the court must both estimate the number and
character of the claims that will be received and the likely inflation rate
applicable to the future period. Recent experience suggests that courts
have limited ability to perform this task.3 60 Bad as the performance of
employee who had worked near asbestos and whose address was known would be
a known creditor ....
We believe that our interpretation, which avoids such
thorny constitutional issues, is the proper view of Congressional intent.
356. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
357. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 787, 751 (1984) (citation omitted).
358. Nonetheless, some mass tort class actions have sought primarily to compensate
class members for the risk to which they were exposed. See supra notes 266-282 and
accompanying text. This may again show the bias of plaintiffs' attorneys in favor of present
claimants over future claimants.
359. In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1120 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner
further noted that the rights of future claimants would be better protected if they were
able to bring individual actions represented by "the very active plaintiffs' asbestosis bar."
Id. at 1117.
360. For example, when the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust was confirmed
in 1986, it was estimated that the Trust would receive approximately 83,000 to 100,000
claims during the course of its lifetime (which was expected to extend well into the next
century). See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 479 (E. & S.D.N.Y
1995). However, by early 1994, some 240,000 claims had already been filed, and several
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courts in asbestos cases has been, these cases are the paradigm of a "mature" mass tort case in which courts have some idea about the likely future filing rate and the value of claims in the legal marketplace. The
unravelling of the Silicone Gel settlement shows that in the case of an "immature" mass tort, neither the parties nor the court can predict even the
rate of case filings during the first year of the settlement.3 6' Were the
court instead facing a class action dealing with a new carcinogen or a
drug with toxic side effects, it would lack any basis upon which to estimate
the number of future claimants.
B. Class Certification and the Future Claimant
Constitutional contentions may be more persuasive when repackaged more narrowly as arguments about the certifliability of a class action
under Rule 23. Clearly, mass tort class actions have strained the boundaries of Rule 23, and there are a variety of ways that courts could draw
those boundaries more conservatively, in part to avoid constitutional confrontations. Several different theories need to be considered under this
heading: (1) that a future claimants class action should not be certified
under the language of Rule 23; (2) that a future claimants class action
should be certified only when the court finds a probability of success on
the merits; and (3) that only a "limited" class action should be certified
on the issue of liability, but typically not on the issues of causation or
damages. Ultimately, this Article endorses a variant on the third of these
options as the approach most likely to protect the future claimant without
inundating the federal courts.
1. The Authority of the Class Representative. - Black letter law holds
that the named plaintiff in a class action "cannot represent a class of
whom they are not a part."3 62 This means that the class representative

can represent the class "only to the extent of the interests they possess in

hundred thousand more were expected. See id. Yet, more care was taken in this case to
estimate future claimants than in any other asbestos case. For further evidence of the
limited capacity of epidemiological studies to predict accurately, see supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
361. Moreover, in Si/icone Gel the estimation problems were simpler than in most mass
tort cases because the number of women with breast implants was known and fixed.
362. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962) (citations omitted).
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common with members of the class."3 63 In short, only a "typical" repre3 65
sentative s " can serve as an adequate representative.
In this light, who constitutes a "typical" and "adequate" representative for a class of future claimants? In Georgine, the complaint listed several "exposure only" plaintiffs and asserted that, although they had suffered no physical harm at that point from their exposure to asbestos, they
were entitled to relief for their fear and mental anguish at the prospect of
future illness and for their special needs for medical monitoring and surveillance.3 66 These allegations would probably be sufficient if the class as
a whole were seeking relief only for these psychic injuries. In reality, however, relief is invariably also sought for more serious injuries (lung cancer, asbestosis) that only a portion of the class will later develop.
Thus, the underlying issue surfaces: can the class representative represent a class of future claimants and settle their claims for serious (but
future) injuries from which the class representative does not suffer (and
probably will not suffer)? The problem here is not simply one of "typicality," but of the necessary limits on the authority of the class representative. Read closely, Judge Friendly's decision in NationalSuper Spuds v. New
York MercantileExchange3 67 suggests that the agent's authority is necessarily bounded by the pleadings. Accordingly, if the pleadings allege that
the class representative was injured in one transaction involving a specific
set of facts, the class representative lacks authority to settle or compromise claims involving another set of facts.3 68 In mass tort cases, as noted
above, the pleadings typically allege that the representative of the future
claimants is subject to fear, anguish, and an increased risk of illness, but
they do not (and cannot) allege that the representative will suffer from
more serious illness and disease in the future. Arguably then, the class
363. National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 17 (2d Cir.
1981).
364. This "typicality" requirement is set forth explicitly in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(3), which requires the court to find that "the claims . . . of the
representative parties are typical of the caimsl... of the class." Some commentators, of
course, view the class representative as a mere figurehead. See, e.g., Jean W. Bums,
Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 Hastings
L.J. 165 (1990). Conversely, others view the class representative as having a close
relationship to the adequacy of representation issue. See, e.g., Howard M. Downs, Federal
Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy of Representation (Identity of Claims) and the
Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 Ohio St. LJ.607 (1993).
365. The "adequacy" criterion is set forth in Rule 23(a) (4). In National Super Spuds,
Judge Henry Friendly found that the two requirements overlapped. See National Super
Spuds, 660 F.2d at 17 n.6.
366. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
367. 660 F.2d at 16-18.
368. The class representative can, however, settle claims based on legal theories not
pled in the complaint (and over which the court would even lack subject matter
jurisdiction) ifthey arise out of the same predicate facts. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v.
Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982).
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representative cannot settle claims based on predicate facts that are not
alleged (i.e., the claimants' future illness).
Judge Friendly's view in NationalSuper Spuds that an atypical plaintiff
36 9
cannot meet the "adequacy of representation" standard in Rule 23 (a)
rests on a sound perception of the conflicts of interest that arise under
any contrary rule. In the mass tort context, real conflicts are easy to visualize between a named plaintiff (who may or may not become seriously ill
in the future) and those future claimants who do incur serious disease.
For example, a class representative who has been exposed to a toxic product but who has only a five percent base expectancy rate of lung cancer as
a result may logically prefer a settlement that emphasizes current cash
compensation or medical monitoring for all claimants over a substantial
cash award to only those who do become seriously ill. Precisely to this
degree, such a plaintiff is not an adequate representative for those who
do become seriously ill. Inherently, there is a considerable difference
between the status of a person exposed to a risk and that of one who has
had the risk actually materialize. To ignore this difference is to equate
the holder of a lottery ticket with the winner of a lottery.
Of course, much depends here on whether one takes an ex ante or an
ex post perspective. From the former perspective, the class members are
similarly situated in that they are equally exposed to the risk, and the
named plaintiff arguably might be described as an adequate representative. From the ex post perspective, however, the named plaintiff is hardly
"typical" of the persons who later become seriously ill. In this context,
the problem with the ex ante perspective is that it proves too much. Logically, from an ex ante perspective, the plaintiff need not even have yet
been exposed to the toxic substance or defective product. After all, all
citizens stand in risk of future exposure to many toxic products (such as
asbestos or tobacco smoke), and the fact of exposure may only marginally
increase the base expectancy rate of illness for those so exposed (say,
from one percent to five percent). The case for an ex post perspective
rests on the need for named plaintiffs who have an identity of interests
with each major outcome group.3 70 At least in a class action that is primarily for monetary relief, a close nexus should be required between the
injuries sustained by at least one subclass of named plaintiffs and those to
be sustained by the worst-off members of the future claimant class before
the named plaintiff. is deemed to be an adequate representative under
Rule 23(a) (4).
869. See National Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 17 n.6.
370. Although the case law has been fairly tolerant on the issue of typicality, even the
most tolerant cases have required that "the interests of the class representative and the
class are commonly held for purposes of receiving similar or overlapping benefits from a
settlement." 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 96, § 11.28 at 11-58.
The issue of typicality tends to overlap heavily with the issue of adequacy of
representation. For the view that an "atypical" named plaintiff cannot be an adequate
representative, see NationalSuper Spuds, 660 F.2d at 17 n.6.
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Admittedly, this argument that a person subject only to a risk of injury cannot be an adequate or typical representative for the future claimants who in fact suffer severe injuries conflicts with some decisions that
have been more permissive on this issue. 7 1 But these decisions tend to
be institutional reform cases seeking primary injunctive relief. Ultimately, mass tort actions for monetary relief are both very different and
more problematic in their value for plaintiffs. A person who is an adequate representative for an injunctive action may not be so for a money
damages suit. 72 Why? Simply put, injunctive actions do not create the
same difficult allocation problems in terms of how the settlement fund is
to be distributed.
Although a purist might argue that no named plaintiff can be an
adequate representative for at least remote future claimants, a reasonable
solution would be to insist on classes having distinct subclasses for present
and future claimants. This accomplishes several objectives: (1) current
claimants, who typically have high stakes claims, are not likely to be as
passive as future claimants and may monitor the negotiations actively; 73
(2) multiple counsel with responsibilities for distinct subclasses may impede collusion; and (3) the future claimants, if properly represented, will
have an interest in a serious attempt to estimate the number and character of future claims and the impact of inflation.
2. "Superiority". - Under the language of Rule 23, the most obvious
argument by which to restrict the scope of a future claims class action
involves the "superiority" test of Rule 23(b) (3), which requires that the
court find before certifying the class that "a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 7 4 In evaluating this standard, Rule 23 further instructs the
court to consider "the interests of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions" and "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."

75

As discussed above, these difficulties are likely to be overpowering when
mass tort injuries have long latency periods. A rational future claimant
would prefer an individual action if it will likely pay him or her more than
the class relief. Thus, where the class relief appears to be below the going
371. See, e.g., Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 61 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
"differing degree and nature" of plaintiffs' injuries does not undermine class certification);
Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that named plaintiff may

share common harm with class by virtue of personally facing "threat of injury").

372. Indeed, exactly this point was made by the Third Circuit panel in the Baby Neal

case, which noted that "the individual differences in the children's circumstances might
indeed militate against certification if the action sought certification under 23(b)(3)
because a court would need to evaluate those differences in the event that the plaintiffs
prevailed and were entitled to monetary damages." Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 63.
373. The Silicone Gel present claimants provide such an example. See supra text
accompanying notes 249-251.
374. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
375. Id. 23(b) (3) (A), (D).
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rate in individual actions (as in Georgine), it is difficult to understand why
a class member would prefer less to more. In addition, the settlement
fund is an inviting target for a host of present claimants and their attorneys, who on a piecemeal basis have repeatedly "raided" such funds in the
3 76
asbestos context and driven them into insolvency.
When should a class action resolution be seen as "superior to other
available methods" for the resolution of a mass tort episode? One requirement should be that the settlement establish an actuarially reliable
insurance fund, which is adequately funded. Here, the first problem is
that experts themselves do not agree on the likely number of future
claims in most mass torts cases. Even in the case of the "mature" field of
asbestos litigation, recent "estimates for mesothelioma deaths range from
15,500 to 300,000, while the estimates of deaths from asbestos-related
lung cancer range from 30,758 to 1,440,000."17 7 In such an environment,
a lump sum settlement under which the defendant deposits a fixed and
limited amount based on an estimate of the likely future claims should
not be approved. Rather, the settlement should be either open-ended or
should at the least provide a continuing opportunity for class members to
opt out and sue in individual actions in the event that benefits need to be
scaled back.3 78
Next, to determine that an action is "superior to other available
methods," the court should be able to find that the individual class members will do at least as well on a net basis as if they pursued individual
actions. Here, the fact that the settlement will pay less than individual
claimants have
historically received should normally preclude a finding of
"superiority."3 79 Finding that a settlement is "fair and adequate" cannot
be a substitute for finding that it is "superior" to other alternatives.
When, then, is the class action likely to satisfy the "superiority" requirement? First, by focusing on the net recovery to class members, the
court is entitled to deduct the typically greater contingency fees that attorneys will require in individual actions from the typically greater recovery. Under these circumstances, even a smaller gross recovery in the class
376. See supra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.

377. Dunbar & Neumann, supra note 58, at 1.
378. Precisely this protection in the form of a continuing right to opt out if benefits
were reduced was provided in the Sime Gel settlement, where the court was clearly aware
that the fund might be inadequate. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *22-*23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1,
1994).
379. On this issue, the Georgine court sidestepped the problem by finding that even
though claimants in individual actions would receive cash compensation when class
members would not, this was not a barrier because future claimants had "different
expectations" about their rights. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 157 F.R.D. 246, 298
(E.D. Pa. 1994). Finally, the Gwrgine court deemed the "superiority" requirement to be
satisfied by its finding that the settlement provided class members with fair compensation.
See id. at 316.
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action can be superior.38 0 Second, where there are small claimants, the
court arguably can give some weight to their more exposed status insofar
as they may be unable to find representation outside the class action.3 8 1
Third, evidence that insurance resources may be exhausted by individual
claims, thereby leaving later claimants unpaid, can be relevant, because a
class action allows the court to pool limited insurance resources and apply them equitably over the projected period during which future claims
will arise.3 82 Corporate solvency is much less likely to be an argument
favoring the use of the class action, however, because the corporation
(and its creditors) always retain the option of using the bankruptcy process to pool limited assets.
3. Probabilityof Success. - Judge Posner's decision for the Seventh
Circuit in In re Rhone-PoulencRorer Inc.3 83 can be read to imply that a mass
tort class action should not be certified in the absence of a finding that
the action has a probability of success on the merits. Indeed, a close reading suggests thatJudge Posner might expect the trial court to balance the
class action's merit against the impact of its pendency on the defendants.
Judge Posner's concern was that even though the defendants in RhonePoulenc Rorer had won 92.3% of the previous trials (thirteen out of fourteen), a class action could force them to settle because the jury would
"hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its hand."3 8
Existing case law, however, poses a serious doctrinal obstacle to this
approach. Under Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin,3 85 any consideration of the
merits may be prohibited in deciding whether to certify a class.3 86 Arguably, Eisen can be distinguished because the Court's real concern in that
case was that the trial court had used its merits finding as a substitute for
Rule 23's express criteria. To do so, the Court said, "contravenes the
Rule by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class
380. The time delay pending recovery is a more problematic factor. Although it was
heavily emphasized in Georgine, see id. at 310-311, 316, 322, it seems a bootstrap argument
in that case when the delay in getting to trial within the tort system was largely due to the
federal stay order that enjoined all asbestos-related personal injury litigation in federal

court. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
381. Ironically, in Georgine, the reverse was true: small claimants with pleural plaques
received no cash compensation under the class action settlement, but would normally
receive a cash payment in individual actions. See Georgine, 157 F.R.D. at 272-73, 291-92.

Thus, the interests of small claimants can point in either direction.
382. Again, insurance was not an issue in Goane where the CCR defendants were all
highly solvent. The court specifically found that the CCR defendants could meet their
obligations under the settlement. See id. at 291.
383. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
384. Id. at 1300. Of course, by the same token, thejury could also hold the fate of the
plaintiffs in its hand.
385. 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974).

386. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., "Albuterol" Prods. Liab. Litig., 161
F.1RD. 456, 460 (D. Wyo. 1995) (finding that consideration of merits of plaintiffs' claims is
"expressly prohibited" when deciding whether to decertify' class).
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action without first satisfying the requirements for it."38 7 Clearly, this was
not what Judge Posner intended; his approach would seemingly use a
merits review as an additionalcondition, not a sufficient one.
Even if Rule 23 does not today permit such an inquiry, the policy
justifications for Judge Posner's approach as an additional condition
seem strong. Interestingly, such a test effectively distinguishes between
"mature" mass torts and "immature" ones, because early in their evolutionary cycle, new mass torts usually have only limited settlement value
and a substantial prospect of defeat at trial s88 However, in the case of a
"mature" mass tort (such as asbestos), the prospect of success has increased to the point of near certainty, and at that point class certification
would logically follow. From a policy perspective, this approach makes
sense because the consequences of an adverse decision on the liability
issue in the case of an "immature" mass tort would be highly unfortunate.
Imagine that a trial on the central issue of liability is held in a nationwide
class action of a new "immature" mass tort, and defendants win on their
claim that there is no causal relationship between their product and the
plaintiffs' injuries. A year later, new scientific evidence is discovered
which establishes a causal connection. Unfortunately, the adverse decision may preclude the plaintiffs (who include future claimants) from
bringing litigation for decades to come. Delaying the certification of the
class action until the scientific evidence dearly supports plaintiffs (if indeed that is the outcome) thus may benefit future claimants over the
long run.
4. Limited Class Actions. - Any serious effort at a balanced solution
to the mass tort crisis must recognize that federal courts can no longer
afford every litigant in mass torts cases an individual trial. Yet, mass tort
class actions seem systematically to disfavor the plaintiffs, particularly future claimants. Given this statement of the dilemma, the search for reform must seek ways to divert cases out of the federal courts, but in ways
that do not penalize tort victims.
One means to this end involves combining the class action with arbitration (and/or other alternative dispute resolution techniques) on the
limited issues of damages and individual causation. A series of recent
mass tort cases have certified a limited class action for purposes of determining liability, but not for purposes of determining causation or damages. 8s9 Conversely, in his Rhone-Poulenc Rorer decision, Judge Posner re387. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 58-62.
389. Indeed, this is the most common type of mass tort class action that has been
actually certified. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir.)
(certifying limited class action that contemplated "individual damages suits"), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 852 (1986); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1044, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2005, at *41 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 1995) (partial class certified with court specifically
excluding individualized issues of injury-in-fact, proximate cause, reliance, affirmative
defenses, and compensatory damages as unsuitable for class treatment); Cop/ey
Pharmaceutical, "Albuterol"Products Liab. Litig., 161 F.R.D. at 458 (partial class action with
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jected this approach, in part because such a bifurcated trial approach, he
said, infringed .the defendant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial. 90° This Seventh Amendment objection'seems a weak argument, as a
series of circuit court decisions have approved the use of successive juries
to determine different questions, 9 1 and Rule 23(c) (4) (A) explicitly contemplates use of such a procedure. If a limited class were certified for
purposes only of liability determination after a probability of success finding, it seems doubtful that even the Seventh Circuit would find a Seventh
Amendment violation.
As contemplated, the class action would resolve only the issues of
liability and generic causation. Each plaintiff would still be required to
prove in a separate trial the facts demonstrating individual causation in
that plaintiff's case (for example, that the plaintiff was occupationally exposed to asbestos for a sufficient period to cause the claimed injury or
illness). Neither damages nor damage ranges would be established by
the original verdict or by any settlement. In effect, although there could
be a "settlement class" action, it could only establish liability, not the
range within which recoveries would be allowed. Effectively, this protects
future claimants from settlements that expose them to the ravages of inflation and from disproportionate allocation of the settlement fund to
court excluding issues of causation, injury, and damages as not suitable for class
treatment); Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 279-80 (E.D. Tex. 1985)
(certifying a limited class action on liability and related issues, but excluding all
individualized issues in the case, such as exposure, causation, injury and compensatory
damages, which would instead be tried later), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468, 470-72 (5th Cir. 1986);
Delgazzo v. Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080, 1091 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (certifying limited
class, but excluding issues of failure to cure, reliance, and damages). In contrast, very few
decisions have certified a nationwide class of personal injury claims for all purposes. The
leading example (and arguably the only non-bankruptcy example in which appellate
courts have not reversed certification) is In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems.
Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). A unique fact about the
Agent Orange class action was the existence of a common defense to all individual or class
claims (the military contractor defense). See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818
F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Diamond Shamrock, 725 F.2d at 860 and citing the
existence of this defense as the "cardinal fact" about the case), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004
(1988).
390. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.5d 1293, 1503 (7th Cir. 1995).
391. See Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 298 (1977). In some limited circumstances, the Seventh
Amendment has been held to require trial of all issues before a single jury. See Gasoline
Prods. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1951). The right to a unitary jury trial is
not, however, an absolute one and truly applies only when the issues proposed to be
bifurcated are "so interwoven . . . that the [one] cannot be submitted to the jury
independently of the [other] -without confusion and uncertainty which would amount to a
denial of a fair trial." Arthur Young, 549 F.2d at 693 (citing United Air Lines v. Wiener, 286
F.2d 502, 306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 924 (1961)). Later cases have upheld the
power of a trial judge to certify the class only with respect to certain issues, reserving the
other issues for a separate determination. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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other subclasses. Thus, if the settlement were reached in 1995, and a
future claimant first became ill in 2010, such claimant would not be limited to a recovery in 1995 dollars, but could establish damages under the
social and economic conditions prevailing in 2010. In addition, individstandards appliual causation should be determined under the scientific
3 92
cable at the time of the damage determination.
Advantageous as this proposal may be to courts and to plaintiffs, it
may seem doubtful that a defendant would ever willingly accept such an
open-ended settlement, which would deny it the right to know at the outset its total liability. Defendants, however, would receive two significant
advantages: First, punitive damages could be eliminated as part of the
settlement (or they could be fixed at an amount specified in the settlement). Second, and more importantly, the settlement could provide that
the damages determination be allocated to an arbitration panel. The arbitration panel would neither be chosen by the defendants nor would it
be limited in the amount it could award as compensatory damages;
rather, it would apply the contemporary standards at the time of its determination. For the defendant, this approach would result in significant
economies in transaction costs, because today transaction costs and legal
fees appear to account for more of defendants' total expenditures than
do payments to victims.39 3 Because arbitration is significantly less costly
than civil litigation, defendants would have a substantial incentive to accept such an open-ended procedure (subject, of course, to a right to seek
a re-organization in bankruptcy if it proved too costly). Interestingly, sophisticated defendants have recently negotiated substantially this form of
nationwide class action with potentially
settlement to resolve a major
3 94
thousands of class members.
392. This could either benefit or hurt the individual plaintiff. It would mean that
artificial occupational exposure standards (such as a 10-year exposure rule) could not bar
the plaintiff from proving individual causation, but it would also allow defendants to
demonstrate that subsequent scientific discoveries disproved that, for example, silicone gel
breast implants were related to specific illnesses. In effect, the policy here is not to blind
the court with out-of-date scientific assumptions.
393. By one estimate, plaintiffs actually receive only 39% of every dollar expended on
asbestos litigation, with the remainder being consumed by the transaction costs of both
sides. See supra note 15.
394. In August 1995, New York Life Insurance Company reached a class action
settlement with its policyholders that was uniquely structured to provide both class relief
and individualized damages for those class members who wished to opt to pursue a special
ADR alternative before an arbitration forum established pursuant to the settlement. See
Notice of Class Action, Proposed Settlement, Settlement Hearing, and Right to Appear at
4-8, Willson v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 94/127804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Aug.
1995) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Michael Quint, New York Life in Accord on
Class Action Settlement, N.Y. Tunes, Aug. 15, 1995, at D2. All class members will be
entitled to certain class relief (basically low-interest rate loans), but those class members
who were dissatisfied with this relief could either opt out of the class action during an
initial opt out period and sue individually or pursue an arbitration remedy that was
elaborately designed by the settlement agreement and that provides for the award of
monetary damages within specified ranges according to defined criteria. The New York
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This proposal does not contemplate that either legislation or the
court would require the class representative to accept arbitration. Instead, the Seventh Amendment right of the class members to a jury trial
would be voluntarily surrendered by the class representative as part of the
settlement, and class counsel accepting such a settlement would have to
pass the same basic standards as to the adequacy of its representation as
apply today3 95
Above all, such a compromise makes political sense. Today, mass
tort class actions ally the court and the defendants against the plaintiffs
(with the plaintiffs' attorney often being an only equivocal champion of
the interests of the class) in order to minimize duplicative mass tort trials.
This proposal reverses the coalition by showing the court a manageable
way to resolve the mass tort dilemma without sacrificing the interests of
the future claimant or accepting the inevitability of endlessly repetitive
individual trials. Litigant autonomy is retained in its most critical aspect,
because the "high stakes" plaintiff is not submerged within the class. To
implement this approach, a trial court would need only to signal that it
would not certify any large class action under Rule 23(b) (3) unless it
could be assured that a fair remedy would be available to individual
claimants and that remedy would not prove unmanageable at the damage
determination stage. Relatively quickly, both sides would learn (and the
court could hint) that settlements incorporating second stage arbitration
over the issue of damages would have a much greater likelihood of obtaining certification. Both sides would still have the same self-interested
reasons for preferring a class action resolution, but the damages determination would be delayed in each individual case until the time that individual claimants discovered their injuries.
C. Class Certification and the Adequacy of Representation Standard
Class actions have long been plagued by conflict of interests
problems,3 96 but the mass tort context exacerbates these conflicts to a
unique degree. In particular, two types of conflicts stand out:
First, there are conflicts between the attorney's inventory of individual clients and the class members that the attorney wishes to represent in
the class action. The inventory settlements in the asbestos cases present
the most obvious illustration of this first type of conflict, because defendLife settlement does not involve a future claimant class and does place clear boundaries on
the damages that can be awarded (unlike the structure here proposed), but it is an
innovative, thoughtful model.
395. This Article, however, does argue that the current adequacy of representation
standard should bar an attorney from serving as class counsel where he or she has reached
roughly contemporaneous inventory settlements with the defendants or certain other
settlements that are linked to his or her prospective service as class counsel. See infra
notes 401-403 and accompanying text.
396. See Deborah L Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183,
1183 (1982).
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ants tied the inventory settlements to agreements to accept the proposed
settlement of the class action (on terms far less favorable to most class
members) .97I

Second, there are multiple conflicts within the class itself: between
present claimants and future claimants, between those with serious injuries and those with only "subclinical" injuries, between those with manifested illnesses and those without. The interests of class members also
conflict depending upon the state law applicable to their claims: some
class members may be entitled to recovery (and punitive damages) under
the law of their jurisdiction; others similarly situated, except for a difference in state jurisdictions, may not. Almost inevitably, the settlement
transfers wealth between these subclasses.
On an ethical level, probably the most disquieting phenomenon
about recent mass tort settlements has been the acceptance of a single
attorney acting as the representative of multiple subclasses of plaintiffs.
Not only have the interests of these subclasses clearly conflicted, but the
class counsel has explicitly traded off the interests of subclasses against
each other, obtaining substantial compensation for one subclass in return
for a waiver of cash compensation by another. In such multiparty negotiations between the defendants and different subclasses of plaintiffs, even
the well-meaning plaintiffs' attorney shifts inevitably from the role of an
advocate and adviser for clients to the role of a philosopher king, dispensing largess among his client subjects. In the asbestos cases, the pattern
has been the starkest, with the "less" severely injured claimants typically
having cash compensation waived on their behalf in order that those
more severely injured (usually cancer victims) receive substantial cash
compensation. These intra-class trade-offs are, however, an endemic
problem that transcends the asbestos context. Any settlement that awards
compensation by disease or injury classification creates potential allocation issues: should the compensation for one subclass be raised and correspondingly that for another lowered?
Nonetheless, courts approving mass tort settlements have resisted
subclassing, arguing that the use of subclasses is left to the discretion of
the trial court and should not be encouraged.3 98 Of course, if courts are
primarily motivated by the desire to facilitate expeditious settlements
(particularly in the mass torts field), this resistance to subclassing should
not be surprising, as any competent counsel for a subclass would probably
397. See supra text accompanying notes 108-113, 172-214.

398. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.RD. 246, 318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
Gewgine relies on a labor law decision in which a labor union was permitted to represent
the whole class, and subclassing was rejected. See Clark Equip. Co. v. International Union,
Allied Indus. Workers, 803 F.2d 878, 880 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).

Suffice it to say that this is a very different context.
The Supreme Court has held "the burden of constructing subclasses ... is upon the
[party seeking class certification] and it is he who is required to submit proposals to the
court" United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 408 (1980).
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object to any wealth transfer that stripped his or her class of compensation in order to benefit another. But a principled defense of current
procedures simply has not been made.
Proponents of mass tort class actions can reply that settlements
would become impossible if all trade-offs within the plaintiff class became
suspect. Still, outside the mass tort context, two general principles have
been recognized: (1) The overall adequacy of the settlement cannot "ordinarily redeem a settlement that was bargained by a party who was in a
conflict position"; 99 and (2) trade-offs, and even gratuitous transfers
from one subclass to another, will not be overturned if each subclass has
received adequate representation by an attorney who acts with undivided
interests. 4 °0 In short, substantive review has been mild and permissive,
provided that each subclass has its own impartial representative.
What practical rules, then, should govern mass tort class actions?
Two distinct types of rules seem most important. Today, in certifying a
class under Rule 23, the court must find that "the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 40 1 Adequate
representation seems doubtful when the plaintiffs' attorney has entered
into an inventory settlement that is in any way contingent upon the attorney's participation in the class action or that otherwise restricts the attorney's discretion to represent other clients in other actions against the
same defendants. Even in the absence of an explicit linkage, inventory
settlements between the defendants and the plaintiffs' attorney create a
danger of collusion because the payout under the inventory settlement
may be delayed or subject in some continuing respect to the defendants'
control.
This conclusion does not mean that an attorney who has recently
settled cases with the defendants should be barred from representing the
class. 40 2 But how broadly should the disqualification be framed? One
possibility would be to disqualify an attorney from acting as class counsel
only when the inventory settlements appear to be more favorable than
the class action's proposed terms; such a disparity would give rise to a
presumption that the class has been "sold out."403

399. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 211 n.25 (5th Cir.
1981).
400. See In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 236-38 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
(upholding interclass sharing with a subclass of plaintiffs who lacked standing where each
subclass had adequate representation).
401. Fed. P. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
402. Obviously, such an overbroad rule would disqualify any attorney experienced in
the field. In the context of a settlement class action, however, it is critical to bar the
defendants from selecting such an attorney as the plaintiffs' representative with whom to
negotiate the settlement.
403. In Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 157 F.R.D. 246, 298 (E.D. Pa. 1994), the
settling parties took the position that future claimants were not similarly situated to present
claimants and thus that they need not receive similar compensation. Their ethics expert,
Professor John P. Freeman, argued (and the court explicitly agreed) that the fact that
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Still, the problem with this narrower approach involves timing. If
one waits until the class action settlement has been negotiated and
presented to the court for approval to ascertain whether the class can be
certified and whether the plaintiffs' attorneys who negotiated the settlement can represent the class, momentum will have already begun to
gather behind the settlement. Eager for a docket-clearing settlement,
trial courts face a temptation to close their eyes to conflicts and improprieties that they would not tolerate in other contexts. Rather than force
the court to choose between sacrificing a possibly adequate settlement
and tolerating a conflict of interest, it thus seems preferable to adopt a
mildly prophylactic rule that disqualifies any attorney from serving as a
lead counsel (for the class or any subclass) if the attorney has negotiated
an inventory settlement with the same defendants. The mass tort bar is
large and expanding, and it would be a gross overstatement to suggest
that such a rule would disqualify all experienced plaintiffs' attorneys.
A second necessary procedural innovation .is to require subclasses
with separate representation for present and future claimants. Those opposed to subclassing have raised dubious arguments against it. The
Georgine court argued that because illness is often progressive (with victims moving from asbestosis to lung cancer), subclassing was unnecessary.4 °4 In effect, because ex ante future claimants do not know what the
severity of their illnesses will be, it argued that they all have a common
interest and can be grouped in a single class. Unfortunately, this is no
answer to the serious conflicts of interest that can arise between present
and future claimants, because the former have every incentive to deplete
the trust fund (which is often administered by their own attorneys).
A second unsatisfactory argument against subclasses was suggested by
the Second Circuit in the Johns-Manville litigation: subclassing is less important in opt out class actions under Rule 23(b) (3), the court reasoned,
presumably because dissatisfied class members are free to exclude themselves from the class. 4°5 Yet, as the same Second Circuit has emphasized
in other decisions, the right to opt out means little in the case of future
many claimants had received cash compensation under the inventory settlements whereas
persons with similar injuries would not receive cash compensation under the class action,
did not create a conflict of interest for the plaintiff' attorneys representing both because
the two classes of clients had "different expectations." Specifically, the present claimants
had "a realistic expectation" that their cases would be resolved within the tort system and
future claimants did not. Id. at 298. In truth, it seems hopelessly metaphysical to talk of
the expectations of future claimants when most do not know that they have been injured.
However, to the extent that future claimants have lesser expectations, this defines the
problem, rather than solves it, because they are accurately expecting inferior treatment
under the class action. In contrast, future claimants in individual actions will predictably
do better than present claimants because the one clear pattern is that recoveries in mass
tort cases rise steadily over time.

404. See id. at 318.
405. See In re joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 745 (2d Cir. 1992),
modified sub nom. In re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
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claimants.4 0 6 A procedural protection has little value to those who do not
yet know that they will become ill or that they are even within the class of
future claimants.
Moreover, the conflicts between subclasses go well beyond their respective entitlements to cash compensation and extend to most other
issues as well: the case flow limitations, processing rules, and other payment terms that might enable present claimants to seize a disproportionate share of the settlement fund before future claims fully mature. Recent experience shows that present claimants and their counsel have both
the incentive and the ability to understate the number and severity of
future claims that will arise in order to justify a higher payment to present
claimants. Nor is a guardian ad litem for future claimants an adequate
substitute, because a guardian is not in a position to negotiate the settlement's terms. Arm's length negotiation between counsel for present and
future claimants is essential to achieve a fair and realistic allocation of the
settlement.
These two proposals-inventory settlements as a disqualifying factor
for lead counsel and subclasses with separate counsel for present and future claimants-may lengthen settlement negotiations (as well they
should have been lengthened in some recent cases), but they will not bar
or seriously discourage settlements. Rather, they will simply give future
claimants their vicarious day in court.
D. Redefining the Right to Opt Out
Beyond question, a future claims class action trivializes the right to
opt out. But, in turn, an absolute right to opt out invalidates the idea of a
mandatory class action. 40 7 Most commentators doubt that the Supreme
Court meant to go this far when it recognized the presumptive right of a
class member to opt out as an aspect of due process in PhillipsPetroleum
Co. v. Shutts.4 08 Thus, on the doctrinal level, some compromise seems
necessary.
On the policy level, analysis needs to begin with the recognition that
persons who have been exposed to a toxic substance, but who have not
yet manifested injury, will have little incentive to opt out from a class
action that is allegedly brought on their behalf. Ironically, the Second
Circuit conceded this point in the Agent Orange case, arguing that the
right to opt out meant little in such a context and so could be sacrificed:
In the instant case, society's interest in the efficient and fair resolution of large-scale litigation outweighs the gains from individual notice and opt-out rights, whose benefits here are conjec406. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1455 (2d Cir.
1993) (noting that providing an opt out right to a person "unaware of an injury would
probably do no good"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
407. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law In
Multistate Class Actions After PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale LJ. 1, 39 (1986).
408. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).

CLASS WARS

1995]

1447

tural at best ....
[P]roviding individual notice and opt-out
rights to persons who are unaware of an injury would probably
do little good. Their rights are better served, we think, by requiring that "fair and just recovery procedures be made available to these claimants," and by ensuring that they receive vigorous and faithful vicarious representation. 40 9
The problem with this statement is that it defines the issue too narrowly.
Correct as it is that the right to opt out will mean little in a future claims
class action, 410 this observation really suggests that the right needs to be
redefined, not abandoned. If we assume that the right to opt out is of
4 12
this imconstitutional magnitude, 4 1' but also not an absolute right,

plies that the right can be balanced against other considerations. In mass
tort cases involving substantial personal injuries to the plaintiffs, litigant
autonomy seems a value normally deserving considerable constitutional
weight.

4 18

Efforts to strike a balance, however, are not easy. Some have suggested that before a plaintiff can opt out of a federal class action, there
should be a good cause hearing at which the court would balance the
interest of the litigant in seeking to exit the class against those of the class
members who would thereby be injured. 4 14 Unfortunately, the asbestos
experience suggests that such a right would be both administratively burdensome and subject to low visibility abuse. Courts would regularly be
warned by defendants that if plaintiffs opted out, it would jeopardize the
finality of a long-negotiated settlement. The Silicone Gel experience suggests that such threats are not without some basis in fact. 41 5 The likely

result might be that plaintiffs seeking to opt out would experience the
same low success rates as plaintiffs seeking to escape the transferee court
following a consolidation order by the JPML. 416 At the other extreme,

individual plaintiffs' attorneys may wish to argue that, at least in the case
of personal injury litigation, the opt out system should be replaced by a
409. Agent Orange, 996 F.2d at 1435 (quoting 1 Newberg & Conte, supra note 96,

§ 1.28, at 1-56).
410. The decision describes the benefits from the right to opt out as "conjectural at
best." Id.
411. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Brown v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1359 (1994). For an
overview, see Miller & Crump, supra note 407, at 38-57.
412. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,Jurisdiction and Transfer Proposals for Complex
Litigation, 10 Rev. Litig. 325, 360 n.141 (1991) (asserting that Shutts mandates a right to
opt out only for "known plaintiffs" who lack minimum contacts with the forum).
413. See Trangsrud, Mass Trials, supra note 4, at 74-76.
414. See American Bar Ass'n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 202 (1986); Baughman,
supra note 2, at 239-41; Friedman, supra note 6, at 745.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 254-264.
416. Relatively few such litigants succeed in being able to transfer back to the original
jurisdiction in which they filed the action. See supra note 183.
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system for opting in.4 17 Here, the argument would be that in high stakes
actions for personal injuries, the class action is presumptively inappropriate and should only be used when individual class members consent. In
fact, between 1938 and 1966, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively implemented such a system, because plaintiffs could only become
class members in suits now falling within the Rule 23 (b) (3) category (i.e.,
most actions for money judgments) by affirmatively electing to join the
suit.4 18 But the experience with this approach does not counsel its adop-

tion. Commentators argue that many eligible class members simply
would
not, for whatever reason, take the affirmative step necessary to opt
9
in.

41

If so, a more promising option might be to permit opting out, but
also to restrict the choice of forum that the exiting plaintiff could elect.
At the same time, such a reform could also recognize a delayed right to
opt out, which would accrue only once the individual became aware (or,
at most, should have become aware) of a serious compensable injury.
Under this compromise, even if the class action settlement were approved
in 1995, "exposure only" class members who manifested injury in 2010 or
2015 could opt out at that point and pursue individual remedies.
Before such a delayed right is rejected as unacceptable to defendants, it is interesting to note that a delayed right to opt out has actually
been structured into some recent mass tort settlements. In Bowling v.
Pfizer, Inc.,42 0 the court approved a class action settlement in a products
liability case involving the defective Bjork-Shiley convex/concave heart
valve, which had a tendency to fracture while in the recipient because of
design and manufacturing defects. Between 50,000 and 100,000 patients
had received this heart valve, and some 300 deaths had resulted because
of fractures. 42 1 Given the unique risk of future fracture coupled with the
emotional stress from exposure to such a risk, the Bowling settlement provided for a two-stage recovery: First, it gave a modest cash award to all
class members for their claims for emotional stress, and, second, it established an "optional guaranteed compensation program."4 2 2 Basically, in
the event of a valve fracture, the victim would receive somewhere between
$500,000 and $2,000,000, according to a formula that reflected age, income, and family status.4 28 However, class members retained the right to
417. Professor Trangsrud has made the case for consolidation in preference to a class

action, and this position closely resembles an opt in system. See Trangsrud, Joinder
Alternatives, supra note 4, at 831-49.
418. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 751.
419. See id.; see alsoJohn E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 Ariz.
L. Rev. 3, 72 (1983) (citing studies showing failure of significant numbers of plaintiffs to
opt out of Rule 23(b) (3) actions).
420. 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1992), appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir.
1993).
421. See id. at 147.
422. Id. at 150.

423. See id.
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reject this formula payment and sue for damages in court or to opt for
binding arbitration to determine fair compensatory damages (in which
even the defendant would waive all defenses to liability). In short, to the
extent that the settlement covered future claimants, it effectively provided for delayed opt outs (either to sue in court or to accept binding
arbitration) .424

The attraction of this approach is that it effectively converts a "future
claims" class into an option. Transposed to the asbestos context, it might
imply that plaintiffs, on incurring lung cancer a decade into the settlement agreement's life, would have a choice between a specific payment
(or a range of payments) and a right to sue in a civil proceeding (or to
elect arbitration). Similarly, in a breast implants settlement, a subsequent
leakage victim would have a similar choice. In fact, in the A.H. Robins
case, the court effectively provided a delayed opt out for the victims of the
Dalkon Shield. Every Class A member who was dissatisfied with the settlement offer made to her by the Settlement Trust was given "the right to
elect to have her claim settled in a trial with all the procedural rights
normally attaching to a jury trial"-minus any right to punitive
damages.4 5
Of course, many practices are common and desirable that are not
constitutionally required. Yet, as the Supreme Court loves to say, "'due
process' is a flexible concept. " 42 6 In any specific context, the process that
is due depends on a variety of factors; typically, courts balance the marginal gains from a procedural safeguard against its societal cost.4 27 In the
mass tort context, the value of the right to opt out and obtain one's day in
court may seem both illusory, in a world where individual trial attorneys
deal not in cases, but in inventories, 4 28 and expensive, in terms of its impact on the federal docket. However, the impact on the federal docket is
a highly variable consideration. In a litigation context, where the docket
burden is substantial (for example, asbestos), the court might limit the
right to opt out to: (1) federal. districts not experiencing a backlog; (2)
state courts; or (3) arbitration panels under procedures by which the opting out litigant has an equal voice in the selection of the panel
members. 429
424. In addition, certain dass members who qualified for valve replacement surgery
but declined it were also permitted to sue on a delayed basis for emotional injury. See id.
425. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989).
426. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1985); see
also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976) (noting that due process is flexible
and calling for those procedural protections demanded by the particular situation).
427. See Waters, 473 U.S. at 320-21.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 108-113.
429. There is, of course, a Seventh Amendment objection to limiting the opting out
plaintiff to an arbitration remedy and thus precluding any right to a jury trial. Here the
doctrinal answer might be that because there is no recognized constitutional right to a
delayed opt out right, there is also no constitutional right to a jury trial at this stage. In
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These procedures, however, still do not answer the defendants' fundamental objection: the value of the settlement to them is undercut if it
does not ensure global peace. Clearly, settlements on the current basis
will be chilled if plaintiffs with cases having above average value can opt
out to pursue individual remedies in any forum. But it is more debatable
whether this consequence represents a vice or a virtue. The modem
value of the right to opt out may lie more in its utility as a checking mechanism than in its ability to protect litigant autonomy. When sufficient
numbers of plaintiffs opt out, the defendants will be exposed to a twofront war (as in the Silicone Gel litigation) and will seek to cancel the
settlement.
Given the predictable passivity of most class members, minority vetoes may make sense.43 0 In light of them, defendants will predictably
learn to write into the settlement agreement a provision allowing them to
terminate the settlement if a specified percentage or number of plaintiffs
opt out. This in turn gives the plaintiff class a desirable chance to vote
with their feet by opting out. The practical net effect might be to torpedo
the dubious settlement or force its renegotiation. Although a delayed
right to opt out, maturing as of the time of injury recognition, will not
produce the same immediate referendum, it poses an even greater economic threat because the defendant cannot back out years after the settlement has become final. In response, defendants will need to structure
settlement grids to differentiate more effectively in terms of the legal
quality of the claims settled in order to induce those class members with
higher value claims not to opt out.43 '
effect, the class member is simply being accorded a privilege to seek a better award in
arbitration, and the court is relying upon that privilege to find that the proposed class
action satisfies the "superiority" standard applicable to a Rule 23(b) (3) class action.
430. An obvious analogy exists to another area of group decisionmaking. namely, the
supermajority requirement for fundamental changes (such as mergers, liquidations and
related events) in the corporation codes of many states. Although today only a minority of
the states (including New York, see N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 903(a) (2) (Consol. 1983)) still
require a supermajority approval, it used to be a universal requirement. See Ronald J.
Gison & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 642-43 (2d ed.
1995). For a history of the shift from the unanimous shareholder consent rule of the 19th
century to the rule in force in mostjurisdictions today (and the efficiency implications of
different voting rules), see William Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority
Shareholders and Business Purposes, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 69.
431. In terms of its incentive effects, a delayed right to opt out should encourage
defendants to (1) insert more cells into a settlement grid, thereby increasing the
differentiation among class memebers; and (2) tilt the monetary relief toward the more
seriously injured claimants. These conclusions follow because small claimants (i.e. those
with lesser injuries) have less incentive to opt out because they (and their attorneys) face
high transaction costs and considerable docket delay in pursuing individual cases. For
example, assume in an asbestos class action that the ratio of asbestosis victims (i.e., a lesser
injury) to lung cancer victims is 10:1. In the absence of a delayed right to opt out, the
settlement grid might provide that the former cases would receive $10,000 each and the
latter $100,000. Under a delayed opt out system, it would instead be in the interest of the
defendants to move to a settlement grid that awarded the former claimants only $5000 and
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Still, is such a desirable right constitutionally necessary? Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts 432 found that due process entitled class members to

a right to opt out from the class, but there a nationwide class action had
been filed in state court. Shutts's applicability to actions filed in federal
courts is less clear, and by its terms the decision's scope may be "limited
to those class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning
claims wholly or predominantly for moneyjudgments." 43 3 Thus, the still
unresolved issue is whether Shutts applies to a class action covering unknown future victims (such as those occupationally exposed to asbestos).
The Second Circuit has recently answered this question with a highly
equivocal "not necessarily." In In re "Agent Orange"ProductLiability Litigation,434 the Second Circuit "decine[d] to extend the Shutts holding into
situations" where notice could .not reasonably have been given, but it defined this context carefully and narrowly.43 5 On the facts of the Agent
Orange case, the Second Circuit said due process was not offended for two
relatively unique reasons: (1) "the even-handed treatment of both identified and unidentified legitimate claimants in the Agent Orange I settlement;" and (2) their "dim prospects of success." 436 Neither factor is present in the recent asbestos decisions, where present and future claimants
very disparately and where liability was never seriously
were treated
43 7
contested.
Even from the defendants' perspective, a delayed right to opt out
could be a substitute for fully adequate notice in those cases where notice
may be expensive or infeasible. Arguably, Agent Orange only waives the
right to opt out in a case involving unknown future victims. In many mass
tort class actions, the future claimants come from a large pool of individuals who could (at some expense) be identified and to whom notice could
feasibly be given (for example, recipients of breast implants or defective
heart valves). Within this context where notice is possible, the right to
opt out is in fact often exercised, and due process under Shutts probably
requires both notice and a right to opt out. To sum up, of recent mass
tort cases, only the asbestos and Agent Orange cases have truly involved
the latter $150,000; under both formulas, defendants make the same aggregate payouts,
but there is a reduced risk that "high stakes" claims will opt out under the second formula.
Also, defendants might seek to differentiate asbestosis claimants into multiple categories,

awarding some only $4000 or $3000 and others $6000 or $7000-again to deter opting out
by those with stronger claims. Normatively, this implication that the worst injured will

receive higher awards (at the expense of the less injured) seems desirable. Of course, the
more that claims are differentiated in this fashion, the greater the need becomes for
subclasses and separate representation.

432. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
433. Id. at 811 n.3 (emphasis added).
434. 996 F.2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1125 (1994).
435. Id. at 1435.
436. Id. at 1437.
437. For the argument that notice and a right to opt out should be constitutionally
required when present and future claimants are disparately treated or when prospects for
success are stronger, see Koniak, supra note 4 (manuscript at 146-69, 176-83).
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large classes of unknown and unknowable future victims. Although the
Second Circuit has rationalized why a right to opt out need not have been
accorded in Agent Orange, this rationale cannot be easily stretched to apply to most other mass torts, including asbestos.
From a policy perspective, the practical problem with a delayed right
to opt out involves the issue of whether we wish to encourage greater
discrimination among class members based on the strength of their litigation claims. Predictably, defendants will reduce their settlement offers
under a system in which future claimants can opt out. They will anticipate that seriously injured plaintiffs, who expected recoveries in individual actions above the average recovery for their disease category under
the settlement, would normally opt out. Because claimants with "low
quality" cases would disproportionately remain in the class, rational defendants would respond either by lowering the per claimant ceilings on
their proposed settlements or by insisting upon more detailed settlement
grids with more precise differentiation in order to prevent individuals
with lesser injuries from receiving an average value that was computed
with more seriously injured victims in mind.
In this light, for a delayed opt out right to be feasible, there must be
some disincentive to discourage excessive, "opportunistic" opting out.
Often, the plaintiffs' attorney has an incentive to opt out in order to obtain a higher contingent fee than the same attorney would receive under
the settlement. For example, in a controversial, but justified step, Judge
Pointer approved a settlement agreement that, in effect, limited contingent fees in the Silicone Gel case to twenty-four percent of the recovery. 4 8
Unfortunately, this creates a perverse incentive to opt out because attorneys for class members who opt out may receive one-third or higher contingencies-and thus do better financially themselves while their clients
may do worse. A first step toward chilling opting out motivated only by
the attorney's self-interest would be to limit contingent fees payable by
opt outs to the same or lesser percentage received by the class attorneys.
Whether federal courts possess authority to regulate the relationship between class members who opt out and their attorneys remains, however,
uncertain.
As a legislative matter, the most logical disincentive to discourage
opportunistic opting out by plaintiffs' attorneys would be to base the fee
award on the amount by which the exiting plaintiff exceeded the class
action recovery. Thus, if the class action provided for an award of
$50,000 for each class member, and the plaintiff who opted out won
$100,000 at trial, the attorney's fee would be some one third portion of
$50,000 (or $16,667). A more punitive alternative would be to tax some
portion of the defendants' costs to a plaintiffs' attorney who failed to ex-

488. See supra notes 115 and 300 and accompanying text.
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ceed the class action recovery. 4 39 The real gain here is that such a fee
disincentive saves the court's time and thus minimizes social costs by reducing any excessive private incentive to opt out. The plaintiffs' attorney
would gain from opting out only if the attorney substantially outperformed the settlement.
E. Settlement Class Actions
The settlement class action is susceptible to at least three distinct
problems: (1) defendants may effectively be able to choose the plaintiffs'
attorney (or at the least, to avoid negotiating with those plaintiffs' attorneys whom they consider to be intransigent and unreasonable-in short,
the persons that plaintiffs, themselves, would be most likely to choose to
represent their interests); (2) however chosen, the plaintiffs' attorneys
have a limited franchise, cannot threaten credibly to go to trial if a deal is
not struck, and thus are effectively negotiating with one arm tied behind
their back;44° and (3)when a settlement is reached prior to the filing of
the action, the entire process seems to present a paradigm of the
"friendly" or feigned suit that the "case or controversy" requirement has
traditionally denied federal courts the power to hear.4 41 If the "settlement class" procedure could be applied to labor negotiations, one suspects that the 1994-1995 baseball strike would have been concluded in a
few days. But the results of such a settlement might have been as onesided as they seem in the asbestos cases.
These objections to settlement class actions have long been understood and seem so powerful and obvious that one wonders why a court
would accept a settlement negotiated in such a suspect fashion. Of
course, a partial answer is that courts have frequently not accepted proposed settlements so reached. During the last year alone, for example,
the Ford Bronco IT settlement, 442 two separate settlements involving
439. Such a proposal has been made by the Manhattan Institute. See Peter Passell,
Windll Fees in Injury Cases Under Assault, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al, B18. For a
critique, seeJohn C. Coffee,Jr., Regulating Plaintiffs' Attorneys, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 22, 1994, at
5, 6.
440. The danger that unofficial preliminary negotiations could degenerate into
lawyer-shopping has long been understood by appellate courts, even if they have done little
to prevent it. See Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir.
1971) (quoted supra at note 128).
441. For this observation, see In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 790 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Moore v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (dismissing action for lack of Art. I
case or controversy where both parties sought to uphold constitutionality of anti-busing
law); United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 805 (1943) (dismissing action where plaintiff
instituted a "friendly suit" at defendant's request); Teamsters Local 513 v. Wojcik, 325 F.
Supp. 989, 991-92 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (denying declaratory relief for lack of actual controversy
where both parties sought the same determination and where no specific conclusive relief
existed).
442. See In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco H Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CA MDL-991, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3507, at *31 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1995).
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4
General Motors pickup trucks (with explosive side-saddle gas tanks),"6
444
and the polybutylene settlement
were rejected by state and federal
courts. Only in the asbestos and breast implants areas-where the threat
of seemingly unending personal injury litigation overhung the courtroom
and was unmistakably on the court's mind-have such settlements been
approved (and frankly encouraged).
Although strong arguments against any provisional certification "for
purposes of settlement only" can certainly be made, it seems prudent to
ask first if there are reforms that could minimize the potential for collusion. Three seem plausible. First, if settlement classes are to be tolerated,
a minimal reform would require the court to oversee the selection of the
plaintiffs' counsel, after adequate notice was first given to the specialized
bar handling the specific mass tort that certification of a settlement class
was contemplated.4 -5 In short, before the parties could link arms and
jointly approach the court with a seductive settlement, the court must
formally select the counsel with whom defendants are permitted to conduct preliminary negotiations. As discussed earlier, plaintiffs' attorneys
who had entered into inventory settlements or similar understandings
with defendants would be disqualified. The key to this proposal would be
that the settling parties could not approach the court with a proposed
settlement and ask to have the plaintiff's attorney named class counsel.
Rather, as a means of alternative dispute resolution, defendants could ask
the court for a limited period to engage in settlement negotiations with a
plaintiffs' attorney to be designated by the court (during which period all
related actions might be stayed).
Realistically, however, such a reform, standing alone, could be
abused. The trial court bent on settlement (as was the court in Georgine)
would know with whom the defendants wanted to negotiate. Attorneys
with a reputation for a tough bargaining style would be less likely to be
selected. Indeed, under this proposed rule, it is entirely possible that the
Georginecourt would have deliberately chosen the same lead counsel, precisely in order to ensure a quick settlement.
Thus, a second and supplementary reform involves the use of broad
and representative steering committees, deliberately chosen to mirror the
composition of the plaintiffs' bar. This approach was more or less followed in the Silicone Gel litigation. 4 46 Under such an approach, plaintiffs'
counsel would be denied authority to present any settlement to the court

443. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 818-19; Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881
S.W.2d 422, 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
444. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
445. The court could, for example, advertise the position by requesting applications
to be filed with it. Judge Vaughan Walker has used this procedure in conducting auctions
for the position of lead counsel. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal.
1990). Although auctions pose additional issues, there seems no inherent reason why an
attorney must have already filed an action to be chosen lead counsel in a class action.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 248-249.
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for its approval until it had first received a ratification vote from the
broad-based steering committee. Such an approach might prevent some
settlements (as in Gecrgine, where a nationwide plaintiffs' steering committee had earlier refused to approve the settlement offer proposed by
the CCR defendants).447 But that is the point of the reform.
How should the court staff such a steering committee? Most areas 6f
mass tort practice have specialized American Bar Association or American
Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) committees or other ad hoc informal
organizations.4'4 The problem lies not in identifying a representative
committee, but in accepting the risk of paralysis if the steering committee
deadlocks. Trial specialists who believe (in good faith and possibly with
some justification) that the class action was not designed to handle personal injury tort litigation will predictably oppose class certification. Yet,
deadlock is not inevitable, as the Silicone Gel settlement demonstrated.
Moreover, if individual actions have been stayed pending a resolution of
the class action (as they were in Georgine), the pressure to settle will in
time become irresistible. The danger is not that the courts have too little
power to induce settlement, but rather that they will use their very considerable powers in a one-sided fashion to pressure only plaintiffs.
A third proposal might be to preclude certification of a class defined
exclusively in terms of future claimants. By definition, future claimants
are silent and passive, and thus they cannot monitor their attorneys.
Sometimes, however, present claimants can, and in the personal injury
context they have a strong incentive to do so. Again, the Silicone Gel litigation provides the better model, because it included both present and future claimants. Of course, present claimants can normally opt out of the
action, but this should be a telltale sign. Whereas Judge Reed invalidated
several hundred thousand opt outs in Georgine,4 49 Judge Pointer encountered no similar problem (at least on any similar scale) in the Silicone Gel
litigation, suggesting strongly that the proposed settlement in the latter
was perceived to be fairer than in the former.4 5 0
447. See supra text accompanying notes 192-214.
448. For example, ATLA had a Breast Implants litigation Group (BILG) that began
to meet shortly after the FDA's 1992 decision to impose a moratorium on the cosmetic use
of implants. In October 1993, over 300 attorneys belonging to BILG met to discuss
developments in the class action and whether to recommend that clients opt out from it.
See Andrew Blum, Some Grumble Over Implant Pact, But Approval is Expected, Nat' L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 3, 52. Meetings on such a scale suggest at least that active monitoring is
feasible.
449. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
450. In the S'ikon Gel litigation, Judge Pointer circulated a comment form to class
members in 1994. He reported that "less than 1/3 of 1% of those to whom notices were
sent and only slightly more than 1% of those who have already registered under the
settlement" voiced negative comments. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
In absolute terms, some 7800 persons in the United States and 6500 persons outside the
United States opted out as of the initial opt out period, but this came to less than 5% of
putative class members. See id. at "16. In general, the rate of opting out tends to be low.
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Ultimately, these proposed reforms still dodge the central issue: is
the concept of a class certified only for settlement purposes valid? Or
does such a limited certification inherently produce weak and one-sided
settlements because the plaintiffs forego their right to trial? At the heart
of this problem is the anomaly that a class certified by consent for settlement purposes might not be certifiable for litigation purposes. 4 51 If this
is the case, the plaintiffs' attorneys will know (or at least suspect) that they
lack negotiating leverage and may accept recoveries far below what the
plaintiffs could receive in individual actions. From this diagnosis follows
a clear prescription: eliminate the anomaly by not allowing a settlement
class to be certified when a "litigation" class action could not be certified.
In short, the same certification standards should apply to both settlement
class actions and "litigation" class actions.
This. reform would not require legislation or rulemaking, but it
would restrict a rapidly developing practice. Today, there is a tendency
for courts facing a proposed settlement in a settlement class action to
ignore the specific criteria specified in Rule 23(a)-i.e., numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation-and to focus instead only on the fairness of the settlement. 452 Some decisions approving
pre-certification settlements in settlement class actions have simply identified the "questions of law or fact common to the class" as the adequacy of
the settlement.4 5 3 Put simply, this is bootstrapping, because it trivializes
the requirements of Rule 23(a) by reading the commonality and typicality requirements out of the Rule.
The better approach would be to apply the requirements of Rule
23(a) consistently in both settlement and litigation class actions. Exactly
this approach has been taken this year by the Third Circuit in the General
MotorsPick-up Truck Fuel Tank litigation.4 54 Although such a requirement
may invalidate some settlements, an insistence that the trial court find
that the individual elements of Rule 23(a)-numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation-are each satisfied, and a refusal to deem the attractiveness of the settlement as dispositive of these
issues will preserve the negotiating leverage of plaintiffs because they will
See Willging et al., supra note 14, at 50-51 (finding in their survey of two federal districts
that not more than one to two percent of class members appeared to opt out in any case in
their survey).
451. This is particularly true in those circuits (most notably the Seventh Circuit)
where recent precedents suggest that a mass tort class action for personal injuries may not
be certified. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-1304 (7th Cir.
1995); Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993).
452. See 2 Newberg & Conte, supra note 96, § 11.27, at 11-53 ("There is no doubt that
the use of a temporary settlement class tends to short-circuit the class certification process
if the class settlement is approved.").
453. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 141, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (noting
.egalitarian" nature of distributing costs among those who share same risk of injury),
appeal dismissed, 995 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1993).
454. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 792-800 (3d Cir. 1995).
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be able to reach sustainable settlements only in cases when they had the
right to proceed to trial. Under these circumstances where plaintiffs have
both options (settlement and trial) open, the parties at least may be truly
bargaining in the shadow of the law by discounting the likely results at
trial.
Realistically, the Third Circuit's requirements in General Motors will
not significantly change current practices. Writing for the Third Circuit
in another decision in 1995, Judge Becker (the author of the General
Motors decision) found that the commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)
would be "satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of
fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class." 45 5 This is not an
onerous requirement. In this light, General Motors may be more important for its recognition that collusion is a danger than for its substantive
holding. A practical response to the settlement class action therefore requires not simply that the doctrinal requirements be the same for both
"settlement" and "litigation" classes, but that courts insist that a representatively selected steering committee choose the lead counsel that negotiates with the defendants and ratifies the proposed settlement. The telltale clue that something would go wrong in Georgine came early on when
defendants were able to approach the minority faction of the plaintiffs
45 6
steering committee, after the majority had rejected its proposals.
Ideally, the settlement class action should become a temporary form
of alternative dispute resolution with clear time limits. If the parties cannot reach an agreement within, say, a year after judicial selection of lead
counsel and a steering committee for plaintiffs, the same action should
go forward as a "litigation" class action. Defendants could, of course,
then move to dismiss on the grounds that the proposed class flunks the
standards of Rule 23(a) or (b), but an objector to the settlement should
have the same ability to raise these same issues when the parties seek to
certify the settlement class. Only when the rules of the game are the
same for both types of class actions can we expect the settlement process
to fairly approximate and discount the likely outcome at trial.
F. Bankruptcy Versus the Mass Tort Class Action
The reforms discussed in this Part-in particular, delayed opt outs
and restrictions on the certification of future claimant classes-carry potential costs: First, the inability of corporations to resolve their contingent tort liabilities could cripple some firms and lead to their operational
collapse. 45 7 Second, if early resolution of all tort claims is prevented,
455. Baby Neal v. -Casey, 43 F.Sd 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).

456. The analogy in the corporate setting would be if an acquiring firm could
negotiate a merger with a minority of the board of directors after the majority had turned

it down.
457. My colleague, Professor Mark Roe, has detailed a variety of ways in which
overhanging contingent tort liabilities can bring about the firm's operational collapse. See

MarkJ. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L Rev. 846, 856-62 (1984). He focuses
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then later plaintiffs may sometimes find that they hold only paper claims
against an insolvent firm. For both thise reasons, claim pooling and an
early resolution can be desirable for both plaintiffs and defendants. Yet,
as the Silicone Gel experience underlines,4 8 corporate defendants may be
reluctant to enter into global settlements that are effectively open-ended
because of the possibility of delayed opt outs by future claimants.
Still, if early resolution of mass tort liabilities is desirable, it does not
follow that it should be purchased at any price. The real question becomes: What alternative means to this end are feasible? Here, a comparison is necessary between the utility of the mass tort class action and a
bankruptcy reorganization. Unfortunately, many commentators have
simply taken it as self-evident that corporate bankruptcy carries unacceptably high costs, both for the class members themselves, and other constituencies (such as employees and local communities). 45 9 Underlying this
approach is probably an anthropomorphic fallacy: Bankruptcy tends to
be equated with corporate death. In fact, however, Chapter 11 may be a
far more flexible instrument by which to rehabilitate a financially
strained firm.460
Both substantively and procedurally, bankruptcy reorganization has
comparative advantages over a mass tort class action as a means of achieving an equitable resolution of mass tort liabilities that is fair to tort creditors. Substantively, bankruptcy reorganizations have long been guided by
two basic principles: (1) absolute priority; and (2) temporal equality. 461
The first principle seeks to ensure that creditors are compensated in full
(and according to their level of seniority) before stockholders share in
the firm's value; the second principle requires that creditors within the
same class be treated equally, regardless of when their claims mature.
Thus, in the typical bankruptcy, all bondholders of the same level of senin particular upon: (1) blocked access to the capital markets; (2) the slow liquidation of
the firm; (3) the incentive to undertake high risk, negative present value investments; (4)
the barrier to efficient mergers; and (5) the diversion of managerial time.

458. See supra notes 254-264 and accompanying text.
459. For a representative example of this mode of analysis, see Christopher F. Edley,
Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 Harv.J. on Legis. 383, 396
(1993). For a critique of this view, see Siliciano, supra note 18 (manuscript at 13-16).
460. See Roe, supra note 457, at 850-64; Smith, supra note 61, at 372-78.
Interestingly, the best documented criticism of Chapter 11 is that it provides too much
protection to corporate debtors, allowing them to remain in reorganization for too long
and thus delay their creditors. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993
Wis. L Rev. 729, 745-49. While this may reduce the value of the recovery to tort creditors,
it reduces the injury and disruption to other constituencies and certainly does not support
the claim that bankruptcy means operational cessation.
461. See Roe, supra note 457, at 850-51. For a fuller discussion of the normative
foundations of bankruptcy law, see Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale UJ. 857 (1982). The absolute priority
rule is today reflected in the Bankruptcy Code's requirements for confirmation of a plan of
reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994). These provisions prohibit
confirmation of a plan that permits ajunior class to participate in the distribution unless
the claims of all senior classes are paid in full.
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iority will receive the same prorated amount, whether their claims matured the day before insolvency, the month after, or are scheduled to
mature in a decade.
Although in practice bankruptcy reorganizations may not always fully
comply with these two normative principles, mass tort class action settlements violate both principles openly and egregiously. Absolute priority is
not even recognized as a relevant goal in class action settlements. For
example, the claim that a "limited fund" justifies a mandatory, non-opt
out class action is essentially a claim that the firm is insolvent and cannot
fully pay its tort creditors. In the bankruptcy context, the principle of
absolute priority would require that tort claimants receive full payment of
their provable claims before stockholders could share in the firm's value.
But, as the Ahearn and Hayden cases show, the reverse happens in class
action settlements: stock values soar, while tort creditors are either scaled
back or forced to rely on thinly funded or unspecified settlement
funds.4 6 2 Although both class actions and Chapter 11 are costly,463 the

bottom line difference between them is that a corporation filing for a
Chapter 11 reorganization can anticipate having to surrender the majority of its equity to a settlement trust and has no hope of escaping with
only an assignment of its insurance policies. 6 4
The goal of temporal equality is even more systematically violated by
mass tort class action settlements. When present claimants receive more
in inventory settlements than will future claimants (as happened in
GeorgineO5 ), the principle of equality within the class has been breached.
Worse, distant future claimants may receive far less in mass tort settlements than those tort claimants whose claims mature earlier, both because inflation may erode their recovery and because the settlement fund
may be depleted if the eventual number of claims exceeds those predicted. While the date of maturity does not count in bankruptcy, it will
often be critical in class actions resolved through settlement funds.
Procedurally, bankruptcy reorganizations are governed by wellknown and largely settled legal rules that give creditors specific voting
rights and that recognize distinct subclasses. In contrast, a principal attraction of the mass tort class action is that it permits an end run around
462. For the sharp increase in Fibreboard's stock price on the announcement of its
settlement, see supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text. In Hayden, the primary
defendant also claimed to be on the edge of insolvency. See supra note 272.
463. The direct costs of corporate reorganization have been estimated at 2.8% of the

issuer's assets. See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation
of Priority of Claims, 27J. Fin. Econ. 285, 289 (1990). For the typical costs in mass tort

litigation, see supra note 15.
464. The contrast alluded to in the text is that between the Johns-Manville reorganization and the Aheam settlement. For a fuller discussion of the Johns-Manville

experience, see HarveyJ. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related litigants as Holders of Statutory
Claims under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-Manville

Reorganization, 62 Am. Bankr. L.J. 69 (1988).
465. See supra text accompanying notes 187-214.
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this known legal regime. Instead, the settling parties can ask the court to
serve as a mediation forum where virtually anything goes and formal legal
4 66
constraints are lacking.
Perhaps the most important advantage of the bankruptcy forum is
that it tends to alleviate the conflict of interest overhanging plaintiffs'
counsel in a class action. First, the corporation filing for reorganization
cannot select the counsel for the various classes of its creditors in bankruptcy (as defendants may be able to do in some "settlement class" actions). Second, while the plaintiffs' attorneys' fee award in a "settlement
class" action is subject to the major contingency that the two sides must
reach a settlement, this contingency largely vanishes in the case of a bankruptcy reorganization, because once the bankruptcy petition is filed, it
becomes a virtual certainty that the reorganization will proceed to some
final resolution. The elimination of this contingency is critical, because
for plaintiffs' attorneys, the failure to reach a settlement in a mass tort
class action spells financial disaster. In bankruptcy, however, this risk is
minimized,- and as a result the possibility decreases of a collusive deal in
which the plaintiffs' attorney trades a reduced settlement for a higher fee
award.
Ultimately, the proof is in the pudding. Some mass tort bankruptcies have worked well 467 and have shown that Chapter 11 enables a sophisticated court to preserve the economic viability of a financially
strained firm.46 8 In addition, bankruptcy courts may find it easier to
monitor fees and to restrict the percentage of the award that goes to
plaintiffs' attorneys, thus ensuring a greater net recovery to the victims. 469
466. The Third Circuit has acknowledged this inherent danger in the use of
settlement classes. See In re General Motors Pick-up Truck Fuel Tanks Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 787 (3d Cir. 1995).
467. For this conclusion, see Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust:
Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 617, 651-60 (1992).
468. For this assessment, see Siliciano, supra note 18 (manuscript at 14-15). In terms
of its capacity for debtor rehabilitation, the bankruptcy reorganization has distinct
advantages: First, the corporation can obtain low-cost, federally-guaranteed debtor-inpossession financing in bankruptcy, but not in a class action. Second, the reorganization
plan need not involve any cash payment to the tort creditors, but can (as in JohnsManville) transfer a majority block of its stock to a settlement fund (to be sold or managed
by the fund's trustees for the benefit of the tort creditors). Thus, bankruptcy
reorganizations need not involve any drain on the firm's cash flow. Third, management is
not automatically removed under Chapter 11. Rather, the presumption is the reverse:
namely, that Chapter 11 allows the debtor-in-possession to retain management and control
of the debtor's business operations unless a party can prove that appointment of a trustee
is warranted. See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Chapter 11 does, however, threaten the incumbent management that has proved inferior,
and this may be the real reason for its unpopularity. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
78 Cornell L. Rev. 597, 610-11 (1993) (in 70% of the large reorganization cases studied,
there was a change of CEO during the pendency of the Chapter 11 proceeding).
469. Bankruptcy fee awards tend to be lower than in class actions, in part because
there is less contingency risk. In turn, this means that more can go to the creditors. One
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In contrast, no major mass tort class action appears yet to have played to
favorable reviews.
This evaluation leads to three definite conclusions: First, the rationale that the corporation's funds are limited should not justify the certification of a non-opt out class action because such a class action appears at
present to be an inferior substitute for a bankruptcy reorganization. Second, that delayed opt outs and any procedural tightening of the rules
applicable to the mass tort class action may chill some global settlements
is an acceptable cost and may even be desirable to the extent that it induces some firms to use instead the superior alternative of a bankruptcy
reorganization. Third, the appropriate role of the mass tort class action
should be to resolve the tort liabilities of the solvent firm. As long as
solvency is assured, the fact that a delayed opt out right may make the
settlement potentially open-ended will neither foreclose the corporation's access to the capital markets nor, as a practical matter, result in any
other significant inefficiency. In any event, the corporation whose financial situation does worsen can always resort to the bankruptcy alternative.
In sum, given the long latency periods associated with mass torts and
the shot-in-the-dark character of contemporary efforts at epidemiological
prediction, open-ended settlements should be a necessary condition
before a mass tort class action can truly be found to be "superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
470
controversy."
CONCLUSION: TowARD CONSTRAINED AUTONOMY

Class action developments have given rise to a new legal technology
that threatens to strip tort victims of their legal claims, sometimes decades before they even mature. Effectively, this technology has created a
jury-rigged substitute for corporate reorganization, but without the safeguards attending that statutory proceeding. If fully exploited, these techniques-particularly the use of mandatory classes, settlement classes and
future claimant classes-could create a new, even more protective form
of limited liability for corporations. 47 1 But, curiously, this legal transition
has been entirely procedural (that is, the substantive law of torts has
of the motivating factors that inducedJohns-Manville to elect Chapter 11 was its sense "that
too little was going to the victims." Kesner, supra note 464, at 72 n.10. It believed that the
bankruptcy court or the settlement trust could more easily restrict excessive contingency
fees. Of course, class action courts have also attempted to do this-but with the negative
consequence of encouraging opt outs. See supra note 300. To state the obvious, plaintffi'
attorneys cannot opt out of bankruptcy proceedings.
470. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
471. Many today would doubt that corporations should receive greater limited
liability. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991) (favoring unlimited shareholder
liability for corporate torts); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 Yale LJ. 1, 65 (1980) (limited liability for involuntary
debts undermines deterrence).
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changed little over the same period), and the entire process has been
engineered by courts, not legislatures.
To explain and address this phenomenon, one needs to consider its
political context. On the simplest level, recent developments can be
viewed as a consequence of changing perceptions of the class action. As
individual mass tort cases mounted and the burden on the docket grew,
an increasing number of civil procedure scholars began to discover the
utility of the mass tort class action.4 72 Law review notes, in turn, began to
suggest limitations on the right to opt out.4 73 Partly in response, judicial
attitudes changed. Now with the 1990s, the legal community is witnessing
the actual reality of mass tort class actions. Some already find the results
sordid. 474 Thus, some will be tempted to urge a return to litigant autonomy and the traditional bipolar model of individual litigation. From this
Article's perspective, however, any such return to a traditional model is
unlikely because of the impact of mass tort cases on the federal docket.
Politically, mass tort procedural law is the product of the collision of
three sets of interests: (1) mass tort victims (and their attorneys, whose
interests can admittedly deviate markedly from those of their clients); (2)
defendants, who fear exposure to liability and their own legal fees almost
equally; and (3) trial courts, for whom the prospect of an unending
stream of individual actions clogging their dockets has proved unacceptable. The fairest generalization about recent developments in the mass
tort field is that the last two parties in this triad have increasingly, but
tentatively, reached a de facto coalition that has protected their own interests at the expense of tort victims.
More generally, the performance of courts in handling mass tort
class actions appears to have varied in direct proportion to the amount of
docket pressure under which the trial court has perceived itself to be.
Faced with suspicious settlements, federal and state courts have rejected
doubtful settlements in property damage cases, 475 but, in the far more
sensitive mass tort personal injury context, courts have accepted far more
suspicious signs of collusion: inventory settlements, settlements classes
reached not only before certification but before case filing, classes narrowly defined to include only future claimants, and chilling restrictions
on opting out. The generalization that best summarizes these cases is
472. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 11; Rosenberg, supra note 8; Sherman, supra note
11.
473. See, e.g., Baughman, supra note 2, at 232-41; Friedman, supra note 6, at 756-63;
see also Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions

of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 Harv.J.
on Legis. 461, 490 (1988) (proposing an amendment to Rule 23(b)(1) requiring
mandatory classes "when the court deems class action treatment necessary to protect the
rights of potential claimants").
474. See Koniak, supra note 4 (mandscript at 104-05). I should indicate that I

believe Professor Koniak's outrage to be justified and eloquent. This still leaves open,
however, the question of what reforms will work.

475. See supra notes 283-289 and accompanying text.
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that provided by Judge Posner in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer "The number of
asbestos cases was so great as to exert a well-nigh irresistible pressure to
bend the normal rules." 476 Once bent, legal rules tend to stay bent, and
legal rationalizations tailor-made for the asbestos context will inevitably
be cited and, to a considerable extent, followed in other mass tort cases as
well.
As a result, although others have principally focused on the alleged
ethical violations of the settling parties, 477 this Article's contention is that
the fact ofjudicial self-interest must be placed at center stage. Its centrality leads to three distinct policy conclusions: First, the least acceptable
reform proposals are those that simply increase the discretion of the trial
judge.4 78 Given such discretion, the right to opt out would soon wither,
and litigant autonomy might increasingly become a nostalgic memory.
Second, reformers are best advised to address their proposals to appellate courts and place little hope in legislative reform. In any lobbying
contest before the legislature, corporate defendants are far better positioned and equipped to do battle than are public interest representatives
on behalf of inchoate future claimants. In contrast, appellate courts are
less directly affected by docket congestion and fear less the prospect of
mind-numbing tedium from repetitive tort cases. 479
Third, reformers must recognize the necessity of constraining litigant autonomy. The issue is not whether, but how. Unrestrained advocacy of each citizen's "day in court" is exploited by mass tort defendants
to justify settlement practices that would have been unthinkable just decades ago. The more prudent line of defense lies in the proposition that
constraints on litigant autonomy should observe the principle of least
drastic means. That is, because fundamental due process rights are implicated by attempts to draft the individual litigant to serve as a faceless soldier in group litigation, the least restrictive alternative should be preferred that can realize the social goals sought. 480
476. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
477. See Koniak, supra note 4 (manuscript at 108-46, 190-202).

478. Such proposals are now being considered. See Bone, supra note 24, at 83-86.
479. Cases, such as In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. fIab.

Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995), provide some basis for optimism, particularly in the
Third Circuit panel's clear recognition of the powerful "hydraulic pressures confronted by
courts adjudicating very large and complex actions" that can "erode the protections

afforded by [Rule 23] almost entirely." Id. at 799.
480. This Article has argued that the litigant autonomy interest most deserving

protection is the right of the "high stakes" plaintiff to secure an individualized damages
determination. This could be realized by "limited" class actions in which the
individualized determination was made by a state court or an arbitration forum or through
delayed opt out rights (in the case of future claimant classes). Conversely, the litigant

autonomy interests least capable of protection and most susceptible to constraint are the
individual litigant's desire to receive punitive damages and to obtain an individual jury

trial.
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To the extent that litigant autonomy can be made to co-exist with
reforms that control the growth of the federal docket, 48 1 federal courts
can be expected to preserve and protect the individual litigant's desire to
seek an individual recovery. Defendants will predictably resist, but at this
point a very different political coalition may form.
Attempts to balance litigant autonomy and group litigation must inevitably face some problematic trade-offs. One such trade-off is the possibility that recognizing a right to exit for litigants with cases of above average litigation strength will reduce the settlement that defendants offer to
the remaining class members. In principle, this seems the logical outcome, but there is a countervailing consideration: the right to exit
(through delayed opt outs and the ability to contest damages on a de
novo basis in some forum) may serve a checking function that deters collusive settlements. Today, the average claimant may lose more in settlement value because the settling parties can engage in various forms of
structural collusion than such claimant would lose in settlement value
under a legal regime in which claimants with above average cases exercise
482
a right to opt out.

Based on this premise that real reform will require securing the compliance of trial judges who today feel threatened by mass tort individual
actions, this Article has proposed three fundamental principles on which
procedural reforms should be based.
1. Settlement class actions must be monitored by the only participants with the appropriate incentives to monitor: namely, other plaintiffs' attorneys. Although the first step toward reform is the recognition
of the same standards for class certification in the "settlement" class context as in "litigation" class actions, the more important and second step is
to deny the defendant the ability to select the plaintiffs' counsel. The use
of representative steering committees may be the simplest means by
which to minimize the opportunistic discretion of the individual plaintiffs' attorney.
2. Future claimants are uniquely exposed in class actions. Time and
time again, they have lost not only to defendants, but also to present
claimants (and their attorneys). On balance, they appear to fare marginally better in bankruptcy proceedings, whereas the corporation's share481. Legal rules that more equitably allocate cases hold particular promise. When the
JPML decided to transfer all pending asbestos personal injury litigation to a single forum,
it chose the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in part because "more asbestos personal injury
or wrongful death actions [were] pending in that district than any other." In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 422-23 (J.P.M.L. 1991). This may be the
most perverse and counterproductive criterion to use (if one is concerned about the
danger of non-adversarial settlements) because it ensures that the settlement process will
be supervised by a judge who is under more pressure than any other to achieve a
settlement at all costs.
482. Independent of their impact on average settlement values, reforms that increase
litigant autonomy can be defended on grounds of naturaljustice. This topic is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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holders fare significantly better in mass tort class actions., Given the limited judicial ability to project either the number and character of future
claimants in mass tort cases or the rate of inflation in the distant future,
lump sum settlements should be accompanied by a safety valve: some
right on the part of the individual litigant to opt out if actual economic
benefits are less than projected. In general, open-ended settlements
should be preferred, both because the lump sum alternative essentially
shifts residual risk from the firm to its tort creditors and because the
bankruptcy process performs marginally better when a definitive resolution of the firm's tort liabilities is necessary for its survival.
3. The right to opt out needs to be modified and updated to the
extent that "future claims" classes are permitted. A delayed right to opt
out, triggered by the discovery of a previously latent mass tort injury or
illness, would solve many of the problems of both future claimants and
settlement classes.
To sum up,judicial competence is limited. Attempts to peer decades
into the future have uniformly failed. In that light, a cautious and conservative definition of what courts can do will protect both tort victims
and, in the long run, courts themselves.

